Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id LAA00698 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 1 Mar 2000 11:11:10 GMT Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2000 11:10:47 GMT From: Soc Microlab 2 <A.Rousso@uea.ac.uk> Subject: new line: what's the point? To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Message-ID: <ECS10003011147A@imap.uea.ac.uk> Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
robin said:
My point is this: given all the existing concepts, such as meaning, and the whole semiotic toolbag, what
purpose does the meme concept serve? What place is there for a "selfish" replicator in a world of
consciously communicating individual minds? I thought memetics was an alternative scenario.
Otherwise,why bother with memes at all?
<snip>
and I think I get where he's coming from at last. I think you're coming from the whole Blackmore/self is an
illusion side of things.The reason you don't want to talk in terms of meaning is because you don't want to
talk in terms of a meaner. You want to go beyond that and reduce it to what might be called the atoms of
meaning or culture. Well, good luck, because I don't think you're going to get many takers. You're
certainly right to question the purpose of the meme in a world that already has semiotics et al. That's what
every critic of memetics has said so far - what's the point? and my thesis is trying to answer that. My
simplest answer would be that it tries to square the findings of biology with the findings of the social
sciences (especially things like cognitive psychology), and that's why I start with Dennett.
If you're trying to do what Blackmore's doing, I'd say that, with the exception of a few already
converted Zen-types, you will have difficulty convincing people about that version of memetics. I mean, in
that sense, it's just another panacea that explains everything and thus explains nothing. (Blackmore's arg
that of course the self is an illusion because the memes want it that way is rather circular and
unenlightening).
On the subject of Dennett, the reductionism quotes is an appeal against the likes of Searle, who
believe in what he calls original intentionality rather than derived intentionality - that is, meaning just
comes from the meaner (and in a Cartesian sense, this meaner just exists and that's it) and it's not
transparent in the way that Dennett (or you or I) want it to be. Dennett claims (contra Searle) that
meanings can be reduced, but to borrow another famous quote of his, that merely means that they are
explained NOT explained *away*. This still leaves the question of what *level* memetics becomes a useful
application, and I say, (after Dennett) that it is at the level of meaning rather than below that. (see "who's
afraid of reductionism?" in DDI for more on this).
So I think we (Robin and I at least) will have to agree to differ on the ontological constraints
here and leave it at that. Nevertheless, I have benefitted greatly from trying to explain my thoughts to you,
so thank you. However, I think a new argument can emerge from the flames of this one, exactly as Robin
asks - What's the point of memetics?
This is basically the question that I have to answer to get my PhD. I know what my answer is,
but what's everyone else's? Robin has declared that he thinks it's an alternative to theories of meaning,
but I know most of you feel that memetics is less ambitious than that, and is merely an attempt to build a
bridge between biology and culture. With that in mind, what IS the point of memetics - why do we need it
when we already have semantics, semiotics, sociology, critical theory and so on. What has memetics to
offer and how do we show it?
anwers on a virtual postcard
alex.
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