Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id TAA02053 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 1 Mar 2000 19:08:04 GMT From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk> Organization: Reborn Technology To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: new line: what's the point? Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2000 18:08:43 +0000 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.0.21] Content-Type: text/plain References: <ECS10003011147A@imap.uea.ac.uk> Message-Id: <00030119044100.00490@faichney> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Wed, 01 Mar 2000, Soc Microlab 2 wrote:
>robin said:
>
>My point is this: given all the existing concepts, such as meaning, and the whole semiotic toolbag, what
>purpose does the meme concept serve? What place is there for a "selfish" replicator in a world of
>consciously communicating individual minds? I thought memetics was an alternative scenario.
>Otherwise,why bother with memes at all?
>
><snip>
>
>and I think I get where he's coming from at last. I think you're coming from the whole Blackmore/self is an
>illusion side of things.The reason you don't want to talk in terms of meaning is because you don't want to
>talk in terms of a meaner. You want to go beyond that and reduce it to what might be called the atoms of
>meaning or culture. Well, good luck, because I don't think you're going to get many takers.
Your analysis is basically correct, though not entirely. I might post an
explanation of where I'm _really_ coming from, soon. If I think, after
reflection, that there's any point, beyond the egoistic pleasure of talking
about my "self". :-)
> You're
>certainly right to question the purpose of the meme in a world that already has semiotics et al. That's what
>every critic of memetics has said so far - what's the point? and my thesis is trying to answer that. My
>simplest answer would be that it tries to square the findings of biology with the findings of the social
>sciences (especially things like cognitive psychology), and that's why I start with Dennett.
> If you're trying to do what Blackmore's doing, I'd say that, with the exception of a few already
>converted Zen-types, you will have difficulty convincing people about that version of memetics. I mean, in
>that sense, it's just another panacea that explains everything and thus explains nothing. (Blackmore's arg
>that of course the self is an illusion because the memes want it that way is rather circular and
>unenlightening).
I'm not sure to what extent that's an argument. Seems to me that it's a bit
more suggestive than that. It makes a great deal of sense to her (and to me),
but her approach is explicitly anecdotal, and I think she fully recognises how
others won't see it the same way.
> On the subject of Dennett, the reductionism quotes is an appeal
>against the likes of Searle, who believe in what he calls original
>intentionality rather than derived intentionality - that is, meaning just
>comes from the meaner (and in a Cartesian sense, this meaner just exists and
>that's it) and it's not transparent in the way that Dennett (or you or I)
>want it to be. Dennett claims (contra Searle) that meanings can be reduced,
>but to borrow another famous quote of his, that merely means that they are
>explained NOT explained *away*.
Fine. I see it that way too. But in that same quote, he clearly says that
those who deny the possibility of mechanistic memetic explanations are
Darwin-dreaders. Remember, most of this discussion has been between Joe and
me, and I think that's a very difficult point for him to handle.
To expand on that: evolutionary explanations have to be mechanistic -- that's
what they're all about -- that's precisely what the debate with the
creationists is about. They say mechanistic genetic explanations aren't good
enough. I don't see a significant difference between that, and saying that
mechanistic memetic explanations aren't good enough. The creationists, and
Joe, want to invoke the deus ex (or in) machina, without understanding, that's
_not_ an explanation, it's what people say when they _can't_ explain something.
"Well, it's just an Act of God" or "it's a conscious choice". That (the
latter) works in folk psychology (and I really mean, it _does_ work, and I
sincerely believe no improvement on it for everyday use is possible), but
it is not scientific.
>This still leaves the question of what *level* memetics becomes a useful
>application, and I say, (after Dennett) that it is at the level of meaning
>rather than below that. (see "who's afraid of reductionism?" in DDI for more
>on this).
I'm still working on this. Thanks for the cite. I find great food for thought
even when I open that book at random.
> So I think we (Robin and I at least) will have to agree to differ on
>the ontological constraints here and leave it at that. Nevertheless, I have
>benefitted greatly from trying to explain my thoughts to you, so thank you.
Consider that returned, with interest.
>However, I think a new argument can emerge from the flames of this one, exactly
>as Robin asks - What's the point of memetics?
>
> This is basically the question that I have to answer to get my PhD.
You're doing a PhD on memetics? That's terrific! I think you should tell us
more about it.
>I know what my answer is, but what's everyone else's? Robin has
>declared that he thinks it's an alternative to theories of meaning...
Umm, if what I said "really" meant that[1], I miscommunicated. I think I can
"underpin" Wittgenstein's theory in terms of information[2], rather than provide
an alternative, but this is _very_ much work-in-progress.
[1] :-)
[2] Thus supplying one leg of the stool Dennett sketched in the article on
Intentionality in The Oxford Companion to the Mind, saying that matter, mind
and meaning might one day come together in an information-based unified theory.
I'm also working on the other legs.
-- Robin Faichney===============================This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Mar 01 2000 - 19:08:12 GMT