Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id UAA02286 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 1 Mar 2000 20:09:50 GMT Message-Id: <200003012008.PAA10524@mail3.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2000 14:11:35 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: new line: what's the point? In-reply-to: <00030119044100.00490@faichney> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
Organization: Reborn Technology
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: new line: what's the point?
Date sent: Wed, 1 Mar 2000 18:08:43 +0000
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Wed, 01 Mar 2000, Soc Microlab 2 wrote:
> >robin said:
> >
> >My point is this: given all the existing concepts, such as meaning, and the whole semiotic toolbag, what
> >purpose does the meme concept serve? What place is there for a "selfish" replicator in a world of
> >consciously communicating individual minds? I thought memetics was an alternative scenario.
> >Otherwise,why bother with memes at all?
> >
Memetics and semiotics, as I noted before, are complementary in
the sense that semiotics is synchronic, describing the static and
fixed signifier-signifying-signified-code-carrier-message system, like
a sharp snapshot, while memetics is diachronic, describing the
evolution, transmission/reception/replication and mutation of the
messages contained in such encoded messages, like a
(somewhat) blurry movie. Obviously, this being my position, your
charge of neochristian fundamentalism is absurd (BTW, I'm pagan
in outlook due to their ecological and feminist leanings, but not
fundie about it). My essay, GENDER AND NATURE IN
CONTEMPORARY NEOPAGANISM, is posted on
http://www.witchvox.com.
>
> ><snip>
> >
> >and I think I get where he's coming from at last. I think you're coming from the whole Blackmore/self is an
> >illusion side of things.The reason you don't want to talk in terms of meaning is because you don't want to
> >talk in terms of a meaner. You want to go beyond that and reduce it to what might be called the atoms of
> >meaning or culture. Well, good luck, because I don't think you're going to get many takers.
>
> Your analysis is basically correct, though not entirely. I might post an
> explanation of where I'm _really_ coming from, soon. If I think, after
> reflection, that there's any point, beyond the egoistic pleasure of talking
> about my "self". :-)
>
> > You're
> >certainly right to question the purpose of the meme in a world that already has semiotics et al. That's what
> >every critic of memetics has said so far - what's the point? and my thesis is trying to answer that. My
> >simplest answer would be that it tries to square the findings of biology with the findings of the social
> >sciences (especially things like cognitive psychology), and that's why I start with Dennett.
> > If you're trying to do what Blackmore's doing, I'd say that, with the exception of a few already
> >converted Zen-types, you will have difficulty convincing people about that version of memetics. I mean, in
> >that sense, it's just another panacea that explains everything and thus explains nothing. (Blackmore's arg
> >that of course the self is an illusion because the memes want it that way is rather circular and
> >unenlightening).
>
> I'm not sure to what extent that's an argument. Seems to me that it's a bit
> more suggestive than that. It makes a great deal of sense to her (and to me),
> but her approach is explicitly anecdotal, and I think she fully recognises how
> others won't see it the same way.
>
> > On the subject of Dennett, the reductionism quotes is an appeal
> >against the likes of Searle, who believe in what he calls original
> >intentionality rather than derived intentionality - that is, meaning just
> >comes from the meaner (and in a Cartesian sense, this meaner just exists and
> >that's it) and it's not transparent in the way that Dennett (or you or I)
> >want it to be. Dennett claims (contra Searle) that meanings can be reduced,
> >but to borrow another famous quote of his, that merely means that they are
> >explained NOT explained *away*.
>
> Fine. I see it that way too. But in that same quote, he clearly says that
> those who deny the possibility of mechanistic memetic explanations are
> Darwin-dreaders. Remember, most of this discussion has been between Joe and
> me, and I think that's a very difficult point for him to handle.
>
I am a Darwin adherent. I see the evolution of self-conscious
awareness as part and parcel of evolution generally, not a denial of
it, and such an evolution of self-conscious awareness is the
mainstream position in contemporary cognitive psychology
(emergent cognitive materialism). It requires no mystical elan vital
or cartesian theatre-going homunculus, and corresponds
swimmingly with contemporary PET scan and fMRI data. One
does not have to be atomistic to be materialist; emergence is a
synergistic yet scientifically grokkable phemonenon - check out
systems theory and complexity theory. Especially check out the
book EMERGENCE by John Holland of the Santa Fe Institute.
>
> To expand on that: evolutionary explanations have to be mechanistic -- that's
> what they're all about -- that's precisely what the debate with the
> creationists is about. They say mechanistic genetic explanations aren't good
> enough. I don't see a significant difference between that, and saying that
> mechanistic memetic explanations aren't good enough. The creationists, and
> Joe, want to invoke the deus ex (or in) machina, without understanding, that's
> _not_ an explanation, it's what people say when they _can't_ explain something.
> "Well, it's just an Act of God" or "it's a conscious choice". That (the
> latter) works in folk psychology (and I really mean, it _does_ work, and I
> sincerely believe no improvement on it for everyday use is possible), but
> it is not scientific.
>
I am no theist. I do not invoke supernatural explanations of any
kind whatsoever. I also do not deny the apodictically obvious
because it conflicts with my religious dogma (I eschew
dogmatism). I refuse to either embrace what is scientifically untrue
or deny scientific truth because they does not fit comfortably
withsomeone's preexisting worldview, or because they may be
politically, socioculturally, deep-ecologically or religiously incorrect
for such people
>.
> >This still leaves the question of what *level* memetics becomes a useful
> >application, and I say, (after Dennett) that it is at the level of meaning
> >rather than below that. (see "who's afraid of reductionism?" in DDI for more
> >on this).
>
> I'm still working on this. Thanks for the cite. I find great food for thought
> even when I open that book at random.
>
> > So I think we (Robin and I at least) will have to agree to differ on
> >the ontological constraints here and leave it at that. Nevertheless, I have
> >benefitted greatly from trying to explain my thoughts to you, so thank you.
>
> Consider that returned, with interest.
>
> >However, I think a new argument can emerge from the flames of this one, exactly
> >as Robin asks - What's the point of memetics?
> >
> > This is basically the question that I have to answer to get my PhD.
>
> You're doing a PhD on memetics? That's terrific! I think you should tell us
> more about it.
>
> >I know what my answer is, but what's everyone else's? Robin has
> >declared that he thinks it's an alternative to theories of meaning...
>
> Umm, if what I said "really" meant that[1], I miscommunicated. I think I can
> "underpin" Wittgenstein's theory in terms of information[2], rather than provide
> an alternative, but this is _very_ much work-in-progress.
>
> [1] :-)
> [2] Thus supplying one leg of the stool Dennett sketched in the article on
> Intentionality in The Oxford Companion to the Mind, saying that matter, mind
> and meaning might one day come together in an information-based unified theory.
> I'm also working on the other legs.
>
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
>
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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