Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id CAA04018 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 8 Oct 2000 02:36:56 +0100 Message-Id: <200010080134.VAA17800@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2000 20:39:03 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: the conscious universe In-reply-to: <007d01c03065$a5671400$d663b8d0@default> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.01b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: "Lawrence de Bivort" <debivort@umd5.umd.edu>
To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: the conscious universe
Date sent: Sat, 7 Oct 2000 09:51:03 -0400
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
>
> > On Fri, Oct 06, 2000 at 07:08:48AM -0700, Richard Brodie wrote:
> > > ... the meme per its Dawkins/Dennett/Brodie
> > > definition, as mental information...
> >
> > While not necessarily wanting to open this argument up again, I have,
> > as usual, to point out that "mental information" implies a subjective
> > phenomenon, while Dawkins and Dennett view memes as objective, neural
> > information patterns.
>
> I don't see a contradiction here: all 'ideas' held by a person must have
> some neural basis, if our understanding of how brains work is remotely
> accurate. By the term 'information' I take Richard to mean that the idea has
> cognitive or behavioral significance, i.e. that the idea makes a difference
> ("Information is the difference that makes the difference." - G. Bateson).
>
> The neural basis of ideas, I would suggest, is no more significant for memes
> than it is for non-memetic ideas, and so I find the neural elements of memes
> not particularly or intrinsically interesting when it comes to studying
> memes and their workings.
>
The difference is one of perspective - first-person vs. third-person -
upon the same phenomenon. My ideas are objective to me, as
they are objects of my mental attention/intention. That which is
called subjective is objective to the subject. There is no absolute
objectivity; only intersubjective agreement.
>
> <snip>
> > I think few would seriously suggest that artifacts are memes, but
> > artifactual encoding of memes is another matter, and can be considered
> > a subset of behavioural encoding.
>
> Agreed, artifacts need not have memetic content or capability, but can.
> Sometimes the memetic content --of those artifacts that have it--is there
> accidentally, sometimes it is installed there deliberately by those who have
> created the artifacts (e.g. B. Fuller's dymaxion concepts, or P. Soleri's
> Arcosanti-related ideas).
>
> Lawrence de Bivort
> The Memetics Group
>
>
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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