Re: the conscious universe

From: Lawrence de Bivort (debivort@umd5.umd.edu)
Date: Sat Oct 07 2000 - 14:51:03 BST

  • Next message: Lawrence de Bivort: "Re: Perishable artifacts (from: Re: the conscious universe)"

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    From: "Lawrence de Bivort" <debivort@umd5.umd.edu>
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    Subject: Re: the conscious universe
    Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2000 09:51:03 -0400
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    ----- Original Message -----
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>

    > On Fri, Oct 06, 2000 at 07:08:48AM -0700, Richard Brodie wrote:
    > > ... the meme per its Dawkins/Dennett/Brodie
    > > definition, as mental information...
    >
    > While not necessarily wanting to open this argument up again, I have,
    > as usual, to point out that "mental information" implies a subjective
    > phenomenon, while Dawkins and Dennett view memes as objective, neural
    > information patterns.

    I don't see a contradiction here: all 'ideas' held by a person must have
    some neural basis, if our understanding of how brains work is remotely
    accurate. By the term 'information' I take Richard to mean that the idea has
    cognitive or behavioral significance, i.e. that the idea makes a difference
    ("Information is the difference that makes the difference." - G. Bateson).

    The neural basis of ideas, I would suggest, is no more significant for memes
    than it is for non-memetic ideas, and so I find the neural elements of memes
    not particularly or intrinsically interesting when it comes to studying
    memes and their workings.

    <snip>
    > I think few would seriously suggest that artifacts are memes, but
    > artifactual encoding of memes is another matter, and can be considered
    > a subset of behavioural encoding.

    Agreed, artifacts need not have memetic content or capability, but can.
    Sometimes the memetic content --of those artifacts that have it--is there
    accidentally, sometimes it is installed there deliberately by those who have
    created the artifacts (e.g. B. Fuller's dymaxion concepts, or P. Soleri's
    Arcosanti-related ideas).

    Lawrence de Bivort
    The Memetics Group

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