Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id JAA15768 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 9 Apr 2001 09:26:29 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 03:28:56 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <3AD12C78.31383.9FB0EE@localhost> In-reply-to: <20010405150043.A575@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3ACB9DA8.29376.627230@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 10:18:16PM -0500 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 5 Apr 2001, at 15:00, Robin Faichney wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 10:18:16PM -0500, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> > > > You said it yourself: "If the sand grains were spread out
> wide..." > > What matters are the grains and the relationships between
> them (and > > the table, and gravity). The pile and its slope are
> just simplified > > overviews of the individual grains and their
> relationships. > > Obviously, the arrangement matters, but that
> (singular) arrangement is > > just our handle on the (extremely
> plural) grains and their > > relationships. No grain is affected in
> any way by the tipping point. > > What happens is, one grain is
> knocked into by another falling from > > above, transmits that force
> to the three upon which it sits, whereupon > > one of them, presently
> balanced a little precariously, is dislodged... > > The tipping
> point, from this point of view, is an epiphenomenon. > > > The tipping
> point is nevertheless real, for it is the general and > common
> explanation for the behavior of a myriad different sand > grains, and
> would not exist without a slope configuration, but does > in its
> presence.
>
> I stated very clearly that I am not a reductionist, and view the
> tipping point as being as real as any lower level phenomenon. That's
> why I said it's an epiphenomenon "from this point of view" -- the
> level of the individual grains. The pattern of activity that is the
> tipping point is perfectly real, but it has no causal efficacy on the
> grains.
>
> You're not really engaging with what I'm saying here. The tipping
> point phenomenon can be fully explained in terms of the behaviour of
> individual grains. If enough grains were represented in a computer
> model, along with gravity, the table top, etc, the tipping point
> phenomenon would emerge, without having to be explicitly programmed.
> It just *is* an overview of what a large number of grains will do when
> piled up that way. It has no effect on any grain, each of which only
> interacts with its immediate neighbours, but is the pattern we
> perceive emerging out of many such interactions.
>
But we can perceive such an overview, while such an overview
cannot exist for the grains themselves.
>
> > It goes that way with self-conscious awareness,
> > too. We have evolved to the point that we have ourselves become
> > determining nexuses (nexi?), and exert a degree of causative control
> > over ourselves and our environment.
>
> Of course we do.
>
> > None of our decisions
> > contradict physical laws, or we cannot effectuate them (such as
> > leaping over tall buildings in a single bound), but when someone
> > decides to attend an anniversary dinner with their spouse six months
> > hence, it is not explainable by reference to molecules colliding,
> > and neither is it explainable by appealing to atomic structure if he
> > cancells it because in the succeeding months, they got a divorce.
>
> Of course high level phenomena cannot be explained using low level
> concepts. Especially when self-reference etc come into the picture.
> But that does not mean minds have control over molecules, any more
> than molecules have control over minds. Free will is fully explicable
> without any such incoherent thinking.
>
The fact that our self-conscious awarenesses can direct which
portions of our brains are being used is an empirical fact, verified to
the nth degree of statistical probability via many PET-scan trials.
That is the reality of the matter.
>
> > Realizeable purpose, that is, efficient freedom of will,
> > unquestionably exists at the level in which we operate, and is the
> > only available framework for explaining our behavior.
>
> Absolutely -- "at the level at which we operate". That is precisely
> my point.
>
> > In fact, there
> > is no such thing as meaning on the molecular level;
>
> Of course not.
>
> > no one could
> > noncontradictorally attempt to explain the being of the world
> > without reference to meaning, because explanation itself involves
> > meaning.
>
> I think you got a little lost up your own recursion there! What means
> "the being of the world"?
>
Its brute facticity, or 'is-ness.'
>
>Yes, you can't explain meaning without
> using meaning -- subjectivity cannot be reduced to objectivity. But
> accounts of lower level phenomena, though they inevitably *use*
> meaning, need make no explicit reference to it.
>
The physical, chemical and biological realms are realms of being,
while the psychological and sociological realms are realms of
meaning. Only the latter two can use accounts, which are
irretrieveably meaningful (that is, accounts are 'about' what they
represent, rather than being the represented itself). We DO mean
things, and we do act upon our perceived and deduced meanings;
our worlds are perfused with memes and signs. These can mean
nothing on the lower levels; nothing can mean anything on those
levels. Such levels (physics, chemistry, biology) are incapable of
explaining meaning (or of explaining anything, since explanation
itself requires signification, thus sign, signified and signifier, and
requires uncderstanding, that is, subjectivity), yet meaning may be
(and is) used to explain them. What we commonly call these
disciplines is actually the scientific (that is, the intersubjective
specialist community's) understanding and explanation of them.
>
> > There could exist no such thing as meaning in a
> > superdfetermined world, nor could there have been any reason for our
> > self-conscious awarenesses to have evolved without the ability to
> > reflect not conferring some evolutionary advantage, which it
> > certainly wouldn't if (and this is the absurd consequence of
> > superdeterminism) every motion of all our bodies was indelibly
> > written on ths parchment of the universe one nanosecond after the
> > Big Bang.
>
> You rely on non-computability for non-determinism within the brain, so
> why doesn't it suffice in this infinitely more complex scenario?
>
> You'd be so much better off with subjective/objective compatibilism.
> You could have all your free will etc without any need for your
> incomprehensibly incoherent "top-down causation". But you're not
> going to take my word for it, are you? Ho hum... :-)
>
Nope. Top-down causation is as incontrovertible as scientific facts
get, and if this means that the mind and/or the world are incoherent
to you, I'm grateful that I do not share such a problem.
> --
> Robin Faichney
> Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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