Re: The Demise of a Meme

From: Robin Faichney (robin@reborntechnology.co.uk)
Date: Mon Apr 09 2001 - 15:39:11 BST

  • Next message: Robin Faichney: "Re: Determinism"

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    Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 15:39:11 +0100
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme
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    In-Reply-To: <3AD12C78.31383.9FB0EE@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Mon, Apr 09, 2001 at 03:28:56AM -0500
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
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    On Mon, Apr 09, 2001 at 03:28:56AM -0500, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
    > On 5 Apr 2001, at 15:00, Robin Faichney wrote:
    >
    > > You're not really engaging with what I'm saying here. The tipping
    > > point phenomenon can be fully explained in terms of the behaviour of
    > > individual grains. If enough grains were represented in a computer
    > > model, along with gravity, the table top, etc, the tipping point
    > > phenomenon would emerge, without having to be explicitly programmed.
    > > It just *is* an overview of what a large number of grains will do when
    > > piled up that way. It has no effect on any grain, each of which only
    > > interacts with its immediate neighbours, but is the pattern we
    > > perceive emerging out of many such interactions.
    > >
    > But we can perceive such an overview, while such an overview
    > cannot exist for the grains themselves.

    You think that's a point *against* my position? Let me enlighten you:
    that statement supports my position. Different rules apply at different
    levels, which is why mind-level free will is perfectly compatible with
    neural-level determinism.

    (More of the same sort of stuff snipped.)

    > Top-down causation is as incontrovertible as scientific facts
    > get, and if this means that the mind and/or the world are incoherent
    > to you, I'm grateful that I do not share such a problem.

    You say top-down causation is incontrovertible only because you think the
    alternative is determinism. You are wrong on that, but until you make
    the effort to understand the real alternative, you're stuck.

    That wouldn't matter if your own view held together, but unfortunately
    "top-down causation" can't be cashed in. The concept is vacuous.
    You can't explain how it actually works, and neither can anyone else.
    All you're doing in using the phrase is hand-waving.

    So here's a challenge: either (1) explain exactly how top-down causation
    works, or (2) admit you don't know, then explain why my position is so
    wrong-headed that relying on a concept you don't understand is preferable,
    or (3) admit my position is preferable. If you need to know more about
    my position, you can look at the website and/or simply ask me, here on
    the list or off-list. So how are you going to respond?

    -- 
    Robin Faichney
    Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
    (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
    

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