Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id PAA05013 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 5 Apr 2001 15:37:41 +0100 Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2001 15:00:43 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <20010405150043.A575@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AC907FE.1718.307B17@localhost>; <20010403095313.A943@reborntechnology.co.uk> <3ACB9DA8.29376.627230@localhost> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.15i In-Reply-To: <3ACB9DA8.29376.627230@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 10:18:16PM -0500 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 10:18:16PM -0500, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
>
> > You said it yourself: "If the sand grains were spread out wide..."
> > What matters are the grains and the relationships between them (and
> > the table, and gravity). The pile and its slope are just simplified
> > overviews of the individual grains and their relationships.
> > Obviously, the arrangement matters, but that (singular) arrangement is
> > just our handle on the (extremely plural) grains and their
> > relationships. No grain is affected in any way by the tipping point.
> > What happens is, one grain is knocked into by another falling from
> > above, transmits that force to the three upon which it sits, whereupon
> > one of them, presently balanced a little precariously, is dislodged...
> > The tipping point, from this point of view, is an epiphenomenon.
> >
> The tipping point is nevertheless real, for it is the general and
> common explanation for the behavior of a myriad different sand
> grains, and would not exist without a slope configuration, but does
> in its presence.
I stated very clearly that I am not a reductionist, and view the tipping
point as being as real as any lower level phenomenon. That's why I
said it's an epiphenomenon "from this point of view" -- the level of
the individual grains. The pattern of activity that is the tipping
point is perfectly real, but it has no causal efficacy on the grains.
You're not really engaging with what I'm saying here. The tipping
point phenomenon can be fully explained in terms of the behaviour of
individual grains. If enough grains were represented in a computer
model, along with gravity, the table top, etc, the tipping point
phenomenon would emerge, without having to be explicitly programmed.
It just *is* an overview of what a large number of grains will do when
piled up that way. It has no effect on any grain, each of which only
interacts with its immediate neighbours, but is the pattern we perceive
emerging out of many such interactions.
> It goes that way with self-conscious awareness,
> too. We have evolved to the point that we have ourselves become
> determining nexuses (nexi?), and exert a degree of causative
> control over ourselves and our environment.
Of course we do.
> None of our decisions
> contradict physical laws, or we cannot effectuate them (such as
> leaping over tall buildings in a single bound), but when someone
> decides to attend an anniversary dinner with their spouse six
> months hence, it is not explainable by reference to molecules
> colliding, and neither is it explainable by appealing to atomic
> structure if he cancells it because in the succeeding months, they
> got a divorce.
Of course high level phenomena cannot be explained using low level
concepts. Especially when self-reference etc come into the picture.
But that does not mean minds have control over molecules, any more than
molecules have control over minds. Free will is fully explicable without
any such incoherent thinking.
> Realizeable purpose, that is, efficient freedom of will,
> unquestionably exists at the level in which we operate, and is the
> only available framework for explaining our behavior.
Absolutely -- "at the level at which we operate". That is precisely
my point.
> In fact, there
> is no such thing as meaning on the molecular level;
Of course not.
> no one could
> noncontradictorally attempt to explain the being of the world
> without reference to meaning, because explanation itself involves
> meaning.
I think you got a little lost up your own recursion there! What means
"the being of the world"? Yes, you can't explain meaning without using
meaning -- subjectivity cannot be reduced to objectivity. But accounts
of lower level phenomena, though they inevitably *use* meaning, need
make no explicit reference to it.
> There could exist no such thing as meaning in a
> superdfetermined world, nor could there have been any reason for
> our self-conscious awarenesses to have evolved without the ability
> to reflect not conferring someevolutionary advantage, which it
> certainly wouldn't if (and this is the absurd consequence of
> superdeterminism) every motion of all our bodies was indelibly
> written on ths parchment of the universe one nanosecond after the
> Big Bang.
You rely on non-computability for non-determinism within the brain, so
why doesn't it suffice in this infinitely more complex scenario?
You'd be so much better off with subjective/objective compatibilism.
You could have all your free will etc without any need for your
incomprehensibly incoherent "top-down causation". But you're not going
to take my word for it, are you? Ho hum... :-)
-- Robin Faichney Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Apr 05 2001 - 15:42:47 BST