Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id UAA17858 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 30 Jan 2001 20:48:39 GMT Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2001 19:42:02 +0000 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Labels for memes Message-ID: <20010130194202.A2584@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <20010130131003.A1552@reborntechnology.co.uk> <JJEIIFOCALCJKOFDFAHBOEHOCDAA.richard@brodietech.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.12i In-Reply-To: <JJEIIFOCALCJKOFDFAHBOEHOCDAA.richard@brodietech.com>; from richard@brodietech.com on Tue, Jan 30, 2001 at 09:46:53AM -0800 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Tue, Jan 30, 2001 at 09:46:53AM -0800, Richard Brodie wrote:
> Robin,
Richard!
> As you know, there is no way to prove that a definition is correct. You just
> have to bite the bullet and choose what definitions you're going to use.
Some definitions are more logically coherent than others. See below.
> Dawkins and Dennett chose the definition of meme that focuses on its
> existence as a replicator dwelling in a mind.
I noticed you sidestepped my request that you give a citation to back up
your claim that Dennett retracted his previous statement that memes have
one phase of their existence outside the brain.
> By this definition, behaviors,
> artifacts, and encodings of messages are vehicles for the transmission of
> memes from one mind to another, but not memes themselves.
That is logically incoherent, and this is why: memes are items of
information. They are patterns, configurations of stuff, not stuff
in themselves. Were they things, actual stuff, to view them as being
confined to some particular place would make sense, but they're not, and
it doesn't. Where information is transmitted, that information is _not_
normally seen as existing only at each end of the transmission chain.
In fact, to do so is incoherent. No matter how complex its encoding, it
exists throughout the chain (at some point in time). It _has_ to do so,
in order to make it from one end to the other. We are not talking about
things, which can be disassembled and reassembled, either from the same
parts or from identical ones. That kind of consideration is meaningless
when what we're talking about is items of information. Transformation of
information is encoding, and in encoded form, memes exist in patterns
of behaviour. It's that simple. I can't help the facts that Dawkins
doesn't view it this way, and we're not sure how Dennett views it now.
Unless you can come up with a criticism that goes beyond "mine is the
Dawkins/Dennett definition and your's is not" you'll have absolutely no
influence upon me, and little, I suspect, upon anyone else here.
> It's certainly possible to develop self-consistent theories with other
> definitions. For instance, when I started researching Virus of the Mind I
> thought a meme should be any replicator at all. Then I realized that would
> include genes! I began to see why Dawkins and Dennett had both refined their
> views,
I asked you to prove that, for Dennett.
> seeing it was useful to have a word referring specifically to mental
> replicators...
This is irrelevant. I'm not saying other replicators should be considered
memes, I'm saying imitated patterns of behaviour are identical with your
"mental replicators". Given an understanding of information, these are
precisely the same thing. And unless you deny that these are items of
information -- or just fall back on your argument from authority while
failing to address the actual issues -- you can't deny that.
-- Robin Faichney robin@reborntechnology.co.uk=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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