Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id RAA17208 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 30 Jan 2001 17:50:10 GMT From: "Richard Brodie" <richard@brodietech.com> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: RE: Labels for memes Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2001 09:46:53 -0800 Message-ID: <JJEIIFOCALCJKOFDFAHBOEHOCDAA.richard@brodietech.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0) In-reply-to: <20010130131003.A1552@reborntechnology.co.uk> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4133.2400 Importance: Normal Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Robin,
As you know, there is no way to prove that a definition is correct. You just
have to bite the bullet and choose what definitions you're going to use.
Dawkins and Dennett chose the definition of meme that focuses on its
existence as a replicator dwelling in a mind. By this definition, behaviors,
artifacts, and encodings of messages are vehicles for the transmission of
memes from one mind to another, but not memes themselves. You could say that
these things are phases of a meme's life cycle, but to call them memes is
technically incorrect as far as the definition.
It's certainly possible to develop self-consistent theories with other
definitions. For instance, when I started researching Virus of the Mind I
thought a meme should be any replicator at all. Then I realized that would
include genes! I began to see why Dawkins and Dennett had both refined their
views, seeing it was useful to have a word referring specifically to mental
replicators. The unfortunate thing about that choice was that it became
apparent that meme replication was not the only force of cultural evolution:
there were other cultural replicators, collections of artifacts, messages,
and societies, that I found were even more interesting to study. These
clearly couldn't be called memes, so I called them viruses of the mind.
Later I learned Dawkins had chosen exactly the same term in an essay about
religion.
Richard Brodie richard@brodietech.com www.memecentral.com
-----Original Message-----
From: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk [mailto:fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk]On Behalf Of
Robin Faichney
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2001 5:10 AM
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: Labels for memes
On Mon, Jan 29, 2001 at 12:30:59PM -0800, Richard Brodie wrote:
> No one doubts that one phase of the meme's existence is behavioral, just
as
> one phase of the gene's existence is phenotypic.
How can you say "one phase of the gene's existence is phenotypic"?
What does this mean? I don't know of any genetic phase other than
"encoded in DNA."
> But an animal is not a gene
> and a behavior is not a meme.
Animals _carry_ genes. Patterns of behaviour _are_ one phase of memes,
just as pupae _are_ one phase of butterflies. How else could memes get
from brain to brain? Telepathy?
-- Robin Faichney robin@reborntechnology.co.uk=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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