Re: The Demise of a Meme

From: Robin Faichney (robin@reborntechnology.co.uk)
Date: Mon Apr 02 2001 - 14:59:22 BST

  • Next message: Robin Faichney: "Re: it can't happen here...."

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    Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2001 14:59:22 +0100
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    Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme
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    In-Reply-To: <3AC775A5.1846.2ADB13@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Sun, Apr 01, 2001 at 06:38:29PM -0500
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
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    On Sun, Apr 01, 2001 at 06:38:29PM -0500, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
    > I haven't left yet, but did briefly peruse your essay, and I found the
    > conclusion that causation could not pass between levels to be
    > deeply flawed. To present an example of why; there is no such
    > thing as a tipping point for single grains of sand, but when many of
    > them are placed together, the slope thus formed cannot exceed 43
    > 1/2 degrees; at this point, additional sand placed on the apex
    > slides down the sides, increasing the area of the base of the pile,
    > and preserving the slope at or below 43 1/2 degrees; thus your
    > levels of description are causally transgressed. Without the
    > aggregate of the lower components (parts), the emergent property
    > of the whole could not exist. This whole, which then recursively
    > exercises unconscious (in the case of tipping points) or conscious
    > (in the case of self-conscious awareness, volition and free choice)
    > control over the parts of which it is comprised, in turn determines
    > the configurational patterns of these parts.

    The tipping point phenomenon is a very good example of how a tiny
    immediate cause can have a relatively massive effect. Of course, the
    bigger picture includes not just the last grain to fall before the shift,
    but all the grains that fell before that and brought the pile to the
    delicate condition in which just one more grain was required to set
    it off.

    But in any case, this is not an example of what I call "vertical
    causation", and which I contend does not ever actually occur. ("Vertical"
    there refers to hierarchical organisation, and has nothing to do with
    sand pile slopes!) The 43.5 degree slope (I'm sure that figure must
    vary between different types of sand) is certainly a higher level
    feature than those of the individual grains, but the slope in itself
    exerts no effect on them. The movements and eventual disposition of
    each grain are affected only by those of the other grains with which it
    comes into contact (as well as gravity etc). We can measure the slope
    at the tipping point as 43.5 degrees, and the consistent precision
    of that figure might tempt us to think of it as specially significant
    -- and in a sense it is: it's quite fascinating that the features of
    the individual grains, when aggregated, come to this. But it is not
    causally effective. What is, is the relationship between each and every
    grain that is, or comes into, contact with each other. Which is why,
    as I say, the angle of the slope will vary with the features of the
    individual grains. It is just an overview, a simplification, of all
    the relationships between all the individual grains in the pile.

    Despite any impression that might have been given by that paragraph,
    I am not a reductionist, and here is why: I would insist that the slope
    is just as real as the features of the individual grains. Molecules are
    as real as atoms, and higher level phenomena generally are just as real
    as lower level ones. But I also insist that "levels of explanation"
    are well-named: that causal explanations have to adhere to one level to
    be coherent.

    This is not a simple issue, and there is more to be said about it,
    but I think I might as well see how you react to the foregoing before
    saying any more myself.

    (In case anyone's interest has been piqued, there's more on the web on
    causation at http://www.ii01.org/causation.html, and on levels of
    explanation at http://www.ii01.org/levels.html)

    -- 
    Robin Faichney
    Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
    (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
    

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