Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA16168 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 2 Apr 2001 01:00:16 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sun, 1 Apr 2001 18:38:29 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <3AC775A5.1846.2ADB13@localhost> In-reply-to: <20010401145708.A1121@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AC6BA79.22669.2D165BE@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Sun, Apr 01, 2001 at 05:19:53AM -0500 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 1 Apr 2001, at 14:57, Robin Faichney wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 01, 2001 at 05:19:53AM -0500, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> > On 1 Apr 2001, at 10:16, Robin Faichney wrote: > > However, my main
> point survives, because it concerns not the > > determination of
> neural events by other neural events, but the > > determination of
> subjective events (experience) by objective events. > > Not that I'm
> saying that happens! In fact, I say very clearly that it > > does
> not. My point, all along, in questioning your account, is to see > >
> if you can explain why it does not. Because I can. See below. > > >
> Objective events are incompletely represented by subjective > events;
> however, whatever the objective source may be, it must be > such that,
> when presented to our perceptual apparati, our > subjective experience
> results; in that sense, the part (our > subjective experience, the
> thing-for-us) cannot contradict the whole > (the objective
> situation/process, the thing-in-itself).
>
> Sorry. I though it was obvious I was talking about the relationship
> between subjective events and the neural events with which they are
> correlated. My main point is that it makes most sense to recognise
> such correlation, but not mistake it for causation. I believe that
> your view is inconsistent, denying that subjective events are
> determined by neural events, but insisting on "top-down" causation
> whereby neural events are caused by subjective events (willpower). My
> view is that causation is equally invalid in both directions, because
> the correlated neural and subjective events are different aspects of
> the *same* phenomena.
>
I haven't left yet, but did briefly peruse your essay, and I found the
conclusion that causation could not pass between levels to be
deeply flawed. To present an example of why; there is no such
thing as a tipping point for single grains of sand, but when many of
them are placed together, the slope thus formed cannot exceed 43
1/2 degrees; at this point, additional sand placed on the apex
slides down the sides, increasing the area of the base of the pile,
and preserving the slope at or below 43 1/2 degrees; thus your
levels of description are causally transgressed. Without the
aggregate of the lower components (parts), the emergent property
of the whole could not exist. This whole, which then recursively
exercises unconscious (in the case of tipping points) or conscious
(in the case of self-conscious awareness, volition and free choice)
control over the parts of which it is comprised, in turn determines
the configurational patterns of these parts. In this manner, the
greater level (the tipping point of the aggregate) exercises top-down
control over the individual grains (whether they will stay or slide
down a slope) from which it is comprised; likewise, the mind or
self, which is an emergent property of the complexity-multiplicity
quotient of brain neurons, axons and synapses, recursively
exercises top-down control over where the configurational
patterning of electrochemical dynamism is most activated - within
the areas subserving memory, or those subserving differing
perceptual modes, and whether this perception is apprehending
communication (discourse, text) or not, or those subserving one
type of action or another, whether it is speaking or writing or
gesturing or performing noncommunicative action, etc. This finding
is noncontroversial except among the prejudiced few; we have a
plethora of PET scan studies to confirm same. Of course, tipping
points cannot exist for single or a few grains of sand, any more
than minds can exist unless the multiplicity-complexity quotient of
neurons, axons and synapses trangresses the Godelian bounds
beyond which recursion emerges; both are emergent properties
which result from a sufficiently large aggregation of single
components into a greater whole. It is a mereological axiom that
the whole is more than the sum of its parts; it is the sum of its
parts plus their interrelations.
>
> The following para might now make more sense to you:
>
> > > You talk about about top-down causation, as if that implied
> > > subjective-> objective (willpower->neural effects) causation, but
> > > (a) that implies bottom-up determination of experience by neural
> > > events (as we sense whatever it is we are about to act on), (b) it
> > > flies in the face of your denial of causation within complex
> > > systems, and (c) you have given no clue as to how it could
> > > actually work.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > I am not a determinist, but my answer to the
> > > fact that, at least at the cellular level, every event in brain is
> > > physically determined, differs from yours, and now that I've
> > > managed to get you to actually explain yourself, my position is
> > > clearly superior.
> > >
> > I'm happy for you that you think so. I am also intrigued by the way
> > you have arranged to change your position whilst maintaining that it
> > was never really your all along. It will be interesting to discover
> > if this device will apply to more of your positions.
>
> As long as you fail to see that people can, and very often do, present
> arguments with which they do not particularly identify, you will
> continue to be bemused.
>
> In connection with the views with which I do apparently identify, on
> the self, none of the views on *any* subject that emanate from this
> direction are identified with 100%. All is and will remain
> provisional.
>
> Of course, for the sake of convenience, and also out of sheer habit,
> appearances will often incline otherwise.
>
> > > What it is, if you're interested, you can read at
> > > http://www.ii01.org/causation.html This is quite rough at
> > > present, cobbled together from various writings over the years,
> > > repetitive and incomplete, but I think it presents my case at
> > > least as well as you've presented yours here.
> > >
> > I'm leaving for a week at a condo within the day, but I have
> > bookmarked your site and printed out your essay, and will get back
> > to you on it.
>
> I feel appropriately honoured, and await your response with breath
> bated!
>
This is just a brief, off-the-cuff taste; I'll rebate your breath better
later.
> --
> Robin Faichney
> Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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