Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id FAA22678 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 3 Apr 2001 05:12:54 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2001 23:15:10 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <3AC907FE.1718.307B17@localhost> In-reply-to: <20010402145922.A532@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AC775A5.1846.2ADB13@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Sun, Apr 01, 2001 at 06:38:29PM -0500 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 2 Apr 2001, at 14:59, Robin Faichney wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 01, 2001 at 06:38:29PM -0500, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> > I haven't left yet, but did briefly peruse your essay, and I found
> the > conclusion that causation could not pass between levels to be >
> deeply flawed. To present an example of why; there is no such > thing
> as a tipping point for single grains of sand, but when many of > them
> are placed together, the slope thus formed cannot exceed 43 > 1/2
> degrees; at this point, additional sand placed on the apex > slides
> down the sides, increasing the area of the base of the pile, > and
> preserving the slope at or below 43 1/2 degrees; thus your > levels of
> description are causally transgressed. Without the > aggregate of the
> lower components (parts), the emergent property > of the whole could
> not exist. This whole, which then recursively > exercises unconscious
> (in the case of tipping points) or conscious > (in the case of
> self-conscious awareness, volition and free choice) > control over the
> parts of which it is comprised, in turn determines > the
> configurational patterns of these parts.
>
> The tipping point phenomenon is a very good example of how a tiny
> immediate cause can have a relatively massive effect. Of course, the
> bigger picture includes not just the last grain to fall before the
> shift, but all the grains that fell before that and brought the pile
> to the delicate condition in which just one more grain was required to
> set it off.
>
> But in any case, this is not an example of what I call "vertical
> causation", and which I contend does not ever actually occur.
> ("Vertical" there refers to hierarchical organisation, and has nothing
> to do with sand pile slopes!) The 43.5 degree slope (I'm sure that
> figure must vary between different types of sand) is certainly a
> higher level feature than those of the individual grains, but the
> slope in itself exerts no effect on them. The movements and eventual
> disposition of each grain are affected only by those of the other
> grains with which it comes into contact (as well as gravity etc). We
> can measure the slope at the tipping point as 43.5 degrees, and the
> consistent precision of that figure might tempt us to think of it as
> specially significant -- and in a sense it is: it's quite fascinating
> that the features of the individual grains, when aggregated, come to
> this. But it is not causally effective. What is, is the relationship
> between each and every grain that is, or comes into, contact with each
> other. Which is why, as I say, the angle of the slope will vary with
> the features of the individual grains. It is just an overview, a
> simplification, of all the relationships between all the individual
> grains in the pile.
>
> Despite any impression that might have been given by that paragraph, I
> am not a reductionist, and here is why: I would insist that the slope
> is just as real as the features of the individual grains. Molecules
> are as real as atoms, and higher level phenomena generally are just as
> real as lower level ones. But I also insist that "levels of
> explanation" are well-named: that causal explanations have to adhere
> to one level to be coherent.
>
> This is not a simple issue, and there is more to be said about it, but
> I think I might as well see how you react to the foregoing before
> saying any more myself.
>
Briefly stopped back in. If the sand grains were spread out wide on
a table so that they were not heaped, the new grains falling would
act differently than they do when dropped upon a slope comprised
of many contiguous grains; this differential behavior is indeed
caused by the table grains being in a different configuration. How
much more so is the differential between the emergent mind's
capacity to access brain areas, and 3 1/2 pounds of scrambled
grey goo? Any 3 1/2 pounds of meat will not do; the complex and
recursive interconnections must be there for the mind which then
selectively utilizes them to emerge. The configurational patternings
of the physical substrate cause the mind in that it is the sine qua
non; that is, the condition without which the mind's emergence is
not possible, yet once this emergent property manifests, it may do
something that 3 1/2 pounds of most meat cannot; recursively
autoregulate its further configurational patternings.
>
> (In case anyone's interest has been piqued, there's more on the web on
> causation at http://www.ii01.org/causation.html, and on levels of
> explanation at http://www.ii01.org/levels.html)
>
> --
> Robin Faichney
> Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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