Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id XAA13602 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sat, 31 Mar 2001 23:04:48 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2001 16:07:06 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <3AC600AA.16997.3264CA@localhost> In-reply-to: <20010331142130.A478@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AC48788.4568.2BB51C@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 01:18:00PM -0600 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 31 Mar 2001, at 14:21, Robin Faichney wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 01:18:00PM -0600, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> > On 30 Mar 2001, at 11:07, Robin Faichney wrote: > > > You miss the
> point, big time. You think a determinist would agree > > that you're
> free just because you do something other than you're > > told?[1] If
> that line of thinking is good enough for you, Joe, that's > > fine. As
> a common sense sort of attitude, it works -- even for me! On > > a
> *purely* pragmatic level, that is. Because it's not philosophy. > >
> And if you rely on this sort of argument in an academic context, > >
> you're heading for big trouble. > > > > [1] Just in case anyone here
> doesn't know and couldn't guess, a > > determinist would say the
> experience of freedom is an illusion, and > > doing other than you're
> told just involves a slightly more complex > > causal chain than doing
> exactly what you're told. > > > That's because determinists are true
> believers in the dogma...
>
> I don't know anyone who is genuinely a determinist, and I doubt
> whether any such exist. This is a debating point. The validity of
> determinism is irrelevant. The question is not whether you can slag
> off the hypothetical determinist, but whether your account is coherent
> and complete, or incoherent and/or full of holes.
>
Actually, my account is eminently coherent and logically
seamless; any possible wiggle room for holes to manifest
themselves is just a nod to the popperian conception of the
scientific enterprise, which forbids the foreclosing of the possibility
that additional contrafactual evidence might in the future present
itself. Corroborating evidence for my position abounds.
Creationists themselves use the logical 'out' to claim that evolution
is not 'proven', all the while knowing that their definition of 'proven'
means 100% absolute certitude, a standard only (and illegitimately
and dishonestly) claimed by religious dogmas.
>
> > > > > And are you actually suggesting that no neural causal chain
> > > > > can exist between the auditory nerve and the activated brain
> > > > > areas because the chain actually goes through the self
> > > > > instead? Do you think that's plausible? (Or even
> > > > > comprehensible?)
> > > > >
> > > > Between the efferent and the afferent (perception and action)
> > > > areas, the information is indeed processed in the associative
> > > > cortex, and the physical (objective) analogue of the
> > > > subjectively perceived self would indeed be found flitting about
> > > > in the dynamically recursive pattern-configurations and
> > > > elsewhere, such as in the raphe and reticular actiating systems.
> > > >
> > >
> > > So is that a causal chain or isn't it? (Please give your
> > > reasoning.)
> > >
> > No, it isn't, for causality is a linear thing. What is happening in
> > the associative cortex is complex and recursive, with both feedback
> > and feedforward, and cannot be considered causation by any
> > standardly accepted definition of the term except by those ignorant
> > of complexity theory (I recommend that you try enlightening yourself
> > on the subject by reading COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM by Paul
> > Cilliers, while knowing beforehand that you won't).
>
> Causation isn't mentioned in the index. So do I have to read the
> whole book, only to find that this particular issue isn't discussed,
> and you cite it only because you think it's "on your side" generally,
> and while I'm reading it I'll be off your back? (The "reading list as
> smokescreen" ploy, in which you specialize.) Or will you give a page
> reference?
>
Try Chapter 6; SELF-ORGANIZATION IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS,
as well as the conclusion to Chapter 5 (pp. 109-114); NEURAL
NETS, in John H. Holland's EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO
ORDER. Reading the two books titled COMPLEXITY (one by
Roger Lewin, the other by Mitchell Waldrop), CHAOS by James
Gleick, THE FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY by Coveny & Highfield,
and RECURSIVENESS by Eilenberg and Elgot might help
enlighten you, too; then again, maybe nothing can help you, least
of all unread books, for a person who has a hard time reading a
page and whose education in cog sci apparently ended two
decades ago.
>
> I might as well tell you now, Joe, that though I'm sure there's much
> of interest in complexity theory, and maybe even of relevance, I very
> much doubt your understanding of it. Else why not have a stab at
> explaining it yourself? Most people around here are willing to have a
> go, even if it means risking making a fool of themselves, because at
> least they might learn something. Why does causation not apply within
> complex systems? Can't we trace a linked chain of events through the
> components of such a system? If not, why not? And if neural chains
> of events can't be traced, what future is there for neurology?
>
W caanot trace a chain because there isn't just ONE; there are
many interacting and mutually influencing strands (and they
recursively LOOP), involving some of the same and some differing
components (that's why they call it complexity; DUH!).
Heisenbergianly, we cannot simultaneously observe all the fine-
grained componential interplay of such a system without affecting it
(in other words, putting monitors on a massive plethora of individual
neuronal pathways, after we've decoded what the signal sequences
indicate in each case, because, guess what? it ain't a matter of a
single pulse; there are multiple pulse patterns, recursive loops
involving excitatory and inhibitory feedback, and all kinds of, yes,
complex-ifications), due to its SDIC (sensitive dependence on initial
conditions), otherwise known as the Butterfly Effect. And no, there
IS no future for neurology, if what is being asked of it is to
standardize the location and parameters of every conception coded
in the brain of a generic individual, for there no such creature - a
point on which you obviously agree when you state that memetics
is a philosophical stance that perhaps logically could become a
science (if all these things could be done) but which practically
won't, because of the insurmountable pragmatic and empirical
problems, not the least of which is that each person codes the
same meme (if we can even
speak of it being the same me e) differently, depending upon the
present gestalt with which it must co-adapt. You insist upon trying
to take this omniscient, God's-eye view, blithely ignoring the fact
that such a view is a conceptual fiction, and stating that for the
deity with this view, all is known, when the complexity involving
these things militates for the principle that they are not in the fine-
grained approach even knowable. If complex interactions are
knowable, why don't you get down off your rhatorical high horse
and prove it by solving the three-body problem in physics (not too
many moving parts to confuse you there).
> --
> Robin Faichney
> Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sat Mar 31 2001 - 23:07:27 BST