Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id KAA14685 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 1 Apr 2001 10:39:48 +0100 Date: Sun, 1 Apr 2001 10:16:59 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <20010401101659.A973@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AC48788.4568.2BB51C@localhost>; <20010331142130.A478@reborntechnology.co.uk> <3AC600AA.16997.3264CA@localhost> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.15i In-Reply-To: <3AC600AA.16997.3264CA@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Sat, Mar 31, 2001 at 04:07:06PM -0600 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Sat, Mar 31, 2001 at 04:07:06PM -0600, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> On 31 Mar 2001, at 14:21, Robin Faichney wrote:
>
> > > > So is that a causal chain or isn't it? (Please give your
> > > > reasoning.)
> > > >
> > > No, it isn't, for causality is a linear thing. What is happening in
> > > the associative cortex is complex and recursive, with both feedback
> > > and feedforward, and cannot be considered causation by any
> > > standardly accepted definition of the term except by those ignorant
> > > of complexity theory (I recommend that you try enlightening yourself
> > > on the subject by reading COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM by Paul
> > > Cilliers, while knowing beforehand that you won't).
> >
> > Causation isn't mentioned in the index. So do I have to read the
> > whole book, only to find that this particular issue isn't discussed,
> > and you cite it only because you think it's "on your side" generally,
> > and while I'm reading it I'll be off your back? (The "reading list as
> > smokescreen" ploy, in which you specialize.) Or will you give a page
> > reference?
> >
> Try Chapter 6; SELF-ORGANIZATION IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS,
> as well as the conclusion to Chapter 5 (pp. 109-114); NEURAL
> NETS, in John H. Holland's EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO
> ORDER. Reading the two books titled COMPLEXITY (one by
> Roger Lewin, the other by Mitchell Waldrop), CHAOS by James
> Gleick, THE FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY by Coveny & Highfield,
> and RECURSIVENESS by Eilenberg and Elgot might help
> enlighten you, too; then again, maybe nothing can help you, least
> of all unread books, for a person who has a hard time reading a
> page and whose education in cog sci apparently ended two
> decades ago.
I've read both the Complexity books. In fact, I cite them on my
website. Also Gleick. See below.
> > I might as well tell you now, Joe, that though I'm sure there's much
> > of interest in complexity theory, and maybe even of relevance, I very
> > much doubt your understanding of it. Else why not have a stab at
> > explaining it yourself? Most people around here are willing to have a
> > go, even if it means risking making a fool of themselves, because at
> > least they might learn something. Why does causation not apply within
> > complex systems? Can't we trace a linked chain of events through the
> > components of such a system? If not, why not? And if neural chains
> > of events can't be traced, what future is there for neurology?
> >
> W caanot trace a chain because there isn't just ONE; there are
> many interacting and mutually influencing strands (and they
> recursively LOOP), involving some of the same and some differing
> components (that's why they call it complexity; DUH!).
Obviously true. We cannot actually trace a chain. In fact I've been
saying for years that even outside of complex systems we should talk about
"causal nets" instead, because events generally have more than cause
and more than one effect. I go further, and suggest that the very word
"cause" is misleading, if that is taken to mean something essentially
different from a mere precondition.
The question here was not whether a chain can actually be traced, but
whether it could in principle be traced given infinite resources --
omniscience, if you like. Now, complexity theory shows us that the
distinction between theory and practice is not as clearcut as many
used to think, and I'm perfectly willing to concede that the principled
stance here is not necessarily a useful one. If something is guaranteed
always to be impossible in practice, then any theory that assumes it to
be doable is highly suspect.
However, my main point survives, because it concerns not the determination
of neural events by other neural events, but the determination of
subjective events (experience) by objective events. Not that I'm saying
that happens! In fact, I say very clearly that it does not. My point,
all along, in questioning your account, is to see if you can explain
why it does not. Because I can. See below.
You talk about about top-down causation, as if that implied subjective->
objective (willpower->neural effects) causation, but (a) that implies
bottom-up determination of experience by neural events (as we sense
whatever it is we are about to act on), (b) it flies in the face of your
denial of causation within complex systems, and (c) you have given no
clue as to how it could actually work.
> Heisenbergianly, we cannot simultaneously observe all the fine-
> grained componential interplay of such a system without affecting it
> (in other words, putting monitors on a massive plethora of individual
> neuronal pathways, after we've decoded what the signal sequences
> indicate in each case, because, guess what? it ain't a matter of a
> single pulse; there are multiple pulse patterns, recursive loops
> involving excitatory and inhibitory feedback, and all kinds of, yes,
> complex-ifications), due to its SDIC (sensitive dependence on initial
> conditions), otherwise known as the Butterfly Effect. And no, there
> IS no future for neurology, if what is being asked of it is to
> standardize the location and parameters of every conception coded
> in the brain of a generic individual, for there no such creature - a
> point on which you obviously agree when you state that memetics
> is a philosophical stance that perhaps logically could become a
> science (if all these things could be done) but which practically
> won't, because of the insurmountable pragmatic and empirical
> problems, not the least of which is that each person codes the
> same meme (if we can even
> speak of it being the same me e) differently, depending upon the
> present gestalt with which it must co-adapt. You insist upon trying
> to take this omniscient, God's-eye view, blithely ignoring the fact
> that such a view is a conceptual fiction, and stating that for the
> deity with this view, all is known, when the complexity involving
> these things militates for the principle that they are not in the fine-
> grained approach even knowable. If complex interactions are
> knowable, why don't you get down off your rhatorical high horse
> and prove it by solving the three-body problem in physics (not too
> many moving parts to confuse you there).
All along you have most unphilosophically assumed that I must "believe
in" the position I was taking. Any decent philosopher can argue
their opponents case almost as convincingly as they put their own.
A philosophy seminar that lacks at least one devil's advocate is at best
lack-lustre, and at worst -- well, the worst is probably infinite in
its horrible variety. I am not a determinist, but my answer to the fact
that, at least at the cellular level, every event in brain is physically
determined, differs from yours, and now that I've managed to get you to
actually explain yourself, my position is clearly superior.
What it is, if you're interested, you can read at
http://www.ii01.org/causation.html This is quite rough at present,
cobbled together from various writings over the years, repetitive and
incomplete, but I think it presents my case at least as well as you've
presented yours here.
-- Robin Faichney Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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