Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id LAA14806 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 1 Apr 2001 11:17:37 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sun, 1 Apr 2001 05:19:53 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <3AC6BA79.22669.2D165BE@localhost> In-reply-to: <20010401101659.A973@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AC600AA.16997.3264CA@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Sat, Mar 31, 2001 at 04:07:06PM -0600 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 1 Apr 2001, at 10:16, Robin Faichney wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 31, 2001 at 04:07:06PM -0600, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> > On 31 Mar 2001, at 14:21, Robin Faichney wrote: > > > > > So is that
> a causal chain or isn't it? (Please give your > > > > reasoning.) > >
> > > > > > No, it isn't, for causality is a linear thing. What is
> happening in > > > the associative cortex is complex and recursive,
> with both feedback > > > and feedforward, and cannot be considered
> causation by any > > > standardly accepted definition of the term
> except by those ignorant > > > of complexity theory (I recommend that
> you try enlightening yourself > > > on the subject by reading
> COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM by Paul > > > Cilliers, while knowing
> beforehand that you won't). > > > > Causation isn't mentioned in the
> index. So do I have to read the > > whole book, only to find that
> this particular issue isn't discussed, > > and you cite it only
> because you think it's "on your side" generally, > > and while I'm
> reading it I'll be off your back? (The "reading list as > >
> smokescreen" ploy, in which you specialize.) Or will you give a page
> > > reference? > > > Try Chapter 6; SELF-ORGANIZATION IN COMPLEX
> SYSTEMS, > as well as the conclusion to Chapter 5 (pp. 109-114);
> NEURAL > NETS, in John H. Holland's EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO > ORDER.
> Reading the two books titled COMPLEXITY (one by > Roger Lewin, the
> other by Mitchell Waldrop), CHAOS by James > Gleick, THE FRONTIERS OF
> COMPLEXITY by Coveny & Highfield, > and RECURSIVENESS by Eilenberg and
> Elgot might help > enlighten you, too; then again, maybe nothing can
> help you, least > of all unread books, for a person who has a hard
> time reading a > page and whose education in cog sci apparently ended
> two > decades ago.
>
> I've read both the Complexity books. In fact, I cite them on my
> website. Also Gleick. See below.
>
Good for you. Seriously. You'd find the others to be good, as well.
>
> > > I might as well tell you now, Joe, that though I'm sure there's
> > > much of interest in complexity theory, and maybe even of
> > > relevance, I very much doubt your understanding of it. Else why
> > > not have a stab at explaining it yourself? Most people around
> > > here are willing to have a go, even if it means risking making a
> > > fool of themselves, because at least they might learn something.
> > > Why does causation not apply within complex systems? Can't we
> > > trace a linked chain of events through the components of such a
> > > system? If not, why not? And if neural chains of events can't be
> > > traced, what future is there for neurology?
> > >
> > W caanot trace a chain because there isn't just ONE; there are many
> > interacting and mutually influencing strands (and they recursively
> > LOOP), involving some of the same and some differing components
> > (that's why they call it complexity; DUH!).
>
> Obviously true. We cannot actually trace a chain. In fact I've been
> saying for years that even outside of complex systems we should talk
> about "causal nets" instead, because events generally have more than
> cause and more than one effect. I go further, and suggest that the
> very word "cause" is misleading, if that is taken to mean something
> essentially different from a mere precondition.
>
I was wondering when you'd bring in the Buddhist doctrine of co-
dependent origination. In fact, at the moment when causes
supposedly cause effects, the causes and effects are temporally
simultaneous and mutually define. But this is not what is typically
(and erroneously) meant in the standard definition of the two terms.
The term used in cog. sci. is 'neural net', and it is associated with
the connectionist paradigm.
>
> The question here was not whether a chain can actually be traced, but
> whether it could in principle be traced given infinite resources --
> omniscience, if you like. Now, complexity theory shows us that the
> distinction between theory and practice is not as clearcut as many
> used to think, and I'm perfectly willing to concede that the
> principled stance here is not necessarily a useful one. If something
> is guaranteed always to be impossible in practice, then any theory
> that assumes it to be doable is highly suspect.
>
It is certainly practically useless.
>
> However, my main point survives, because it concerns not the
> determination of neural events by other neural events, but the
> determination of subjective events (experience) by objective events.
> Not that I'm saying that happens! In fact, I say very clearly that it
> does not. My point, all along, in questioning your account, is to see
> if you can explain why it does not. Because I can. See below.
>
Objective events are incompletely represented by subjective
events; however, whatever the objective source may be, it must be
such that, when presented to our perceptual apparati, our
subjective experience results; in that sense, the part (our
subjective experience, the thing-for-us) cannot contradict the whole
(the objective situation/process, the thing-in-itself).
>
> You talk about about top-down causation, as if that implied
> subjective-> objective (willpower->neural effects) causation, but (a)
> that implies bottom-up determination of experience by neural events
> (as we sense whatever it is we are about to act on), (b) it flies in
> the face of your denial of causation within complex systems, and (c)
> you have given no clue as to how it could actually work.
>
The environing world gives us a range of perceptual alternatives,
and in that sense restricts us to those alternatives within the range,
while yet allowing us interpretational free choice between those
alternatives within the range. We cannot perceive a Necker Cube
in an infinite variety of ways, but we can perceive it as spinning
clockwise or counterclockwise, as we can perceive a static cube
diagram as concave, complex, or flat.
>
> > Heisenbergianly, we cannot simultaneously observe all the fine-
> > grained componential interplay of such a system without affecting it
> > (in other words, putting monitors on a massive plethora of
> > individual neuronal pathways, after we've decoded what the signal
> > sequences indicate in each case, because, guess what? it ain't a
> > matter of a single pulse; there are multiple pulse patterns,
> > recursive loops involving excitatory and inhibitory feedback, and
> > all kinds of, yes, complex-ifications), due to its SDIC (sensitive
> > dependence on initial conditions), otherwise known as the Butterfly
> > Effect. And no, there IS no future for neurology, if what is being
> > asked of it is to standardize the location and parameters of every
> > conception coded in the brain of a generic individual, for there no
> > such creature - a point on which you obviously agree when you state
> > that memetics is a philosophical stance that perhaps logically could
> > become a science (if all these things could be done) but which
> > practically won't, because of the insurmountable pragmatic and
> > empirical problems, not the least of which is that each person codes
> > the same meme (if we can even speak of it being the same me e)
> > differently, depending upon the present gestalt with which it must
> > co-adapt. You insist upon trying to take this omniscient, God's-eye
> > view, blithely ignoring the fact that such a view is a conceptual
> > fiction, and stating that for the deity with this view, all is
> > known, when the complexity involving these things militates for the
> > principle that they are not in the fine-grained approach even
> > knowable. If complex interactions are knowable, why don't you get
> > down off your rhetorical high horse and prove it by solving the
> > three-body problem in physics (not too many moving parts to confuse
> > you there).
>
> All along you have most unphilosophically assumed that I must "believe
> in" the position I was taking. Any decent philosopher can argue their
> opponents case almost as convincingly as they put their own. A
> philosophy seminar that lacks at least one devil's advocate is at best
> lack-lustre, and at worst -- well, the worst is probably infinite in
> its horrible variety. I am not a determinist, but my answer to the
> fact that, at least at the cellular level, every event in brain is
> physically determined, differs from yours, and now that I've managed
> to get you to actually explain yourself, my position is clearly
> superior.
>
I'm happy for you that you think so. I am also intrigued by the way
you have arranged to change your position whilst maintaining that it
was never really your all along. It will be interesting to discover if
this device will apply to more of your positions.
>
> What it is, if you're interested, you can read at
> http://www.ii01.org/causation.html This is quite rough at present,
> cobbled together from various writings over the years, repetitive and
> incomplete, but I think it presents my case at least as well as you've
> presented yours here.
>
I'm leaving for a week at a condo within the day, but I have
bookmarked your site and printed out your essay, and will get back
to you on it.
> --
> Robin Faichney
> Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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