Re: The Demise of a Meme

From: Robin Faichney (robin@reborntechnology.co.uk)
Date: Sat Mar 31 2001 - 14:21:30 BST

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    Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2001 14:21:30 +0100
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme
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    In-Reply-To: <3AC48788.4568.2BB51C@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 01:18:00PM -0600
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
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    On Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 01:18:00PM -0600, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
    > On 30 Mar 2001, at 11:07, Robin Faichney wrote:
    >
    > > You miss the point, big time. You think a determinist would agree
    > > that you're free just because you do something other than you're
    > > told?[1] If that line of thinking is good enough for you, Joe, that's
    > > fine. As a common sense sort of attitude, it works -- even for me! On
    > > a *purely* pragmatic level, that is. Because it's not philosophy.
    > > And if you rely on this sort of argument in an academic context,
    > > you're heading for big trouble.
    > >
    > > [1] Just in case anyone here doesn't know and couldn't guess, a
    > > determinist would say the experience of freedom is an illusion, and
    > > doing other than you're told just involves a slightly more complex
    > > causal chain than doing exactly what you're told.
    > >
    > That's because determinists are true believers in the dogma...

    I don't know anyone who is genuinely a determinist, and I doubt
    whether any such exist. This is a debating point. The validity of
    determinism is irrelevant. The question is not whether you can slag
    off the hypothetical determinist, but whether your account is coherent
    and complete, or incoherent and/or full of holes.

    > > > > And are you actually suggesting that no neural causal chain can
    > > > > exist between the auditory nerve and the activated brain areas
    > > > > because the chain actually goes through the self instead? Do you
    > > > > think that's plausible? (Or even comprehensible?)
    > > > >
    > > > Between the efferent and the afferent (perception and action) areas,
    > > > the information is indeed processed in the associative cortex, and
    > > > the physical (objective) analogue of the subjectively perceived self
    > > > would indeed be found flitting about in the dynamically recursive
    > > > pattern-configurations and elsewhere, such as in the raphe and
    > > > reticular actiating systems.
    > >
    > > So is that a causal chain or isn't it? (Please give your reasoning.)
    > >
    > No, it isn't, for causality is a linear thing. What is happening in the
    > associative cortex is complex and recursive, with both feedback
    > and feedforward, and cannot be considered causation by any
    > standardly accepted definition of the term except by those ignorant
    > of complexity theory (I recommend that you try enlightening
    > yourself on the subject by reading COMPLEXITY AND
    > POSTMODERNISM by Paul Cilliers, while knowing beforehand that
    > you won't).

    Causation isn't mentioned in the index. So do I have to read the whole
    book, only to find that this particular issue isn't discussed, and you
    cite it only because you think it's "on your side" generally, and while
    I'm reading it I'll be off your back? (The "reading list as smokescreen"
    ploy, in which you specialize.) Or will you give a page reference?

    I might as well tell you now, Joe, that though I'm sure there's much of
    interest in complexity theory, and maybe even of relevance, I very much
    doubt your understanding of it. Else why not have a stab at explaining
    it yourself? Most people around here are willing to have a go, even if
    it means risking making a fool of themselves, because at least they might
    learn something. Why does causation not apply within complex systems?
    Can't we trace a linked chain of events through the components of such
    a system? If not, why not? And if neural chains of events can't be
    traced, what future is there for neurology?

    -- 
    Robin Faichney
    Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
    (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
    

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