Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id WAA23633 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 7 Feb 2001 22:24:02 GMT From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2001 16:27:32 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: Labels for memes Message-ID: <3A817774.13301.1BCC1B@localhost> In-reply-to: <JJEIIFOCALCJKOFDFAHBIEDDCEAA.richard@brodietech.com> References: <20010201091216.B1239@reborntechnology.co.uk> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 7 Feb 2001, at 10:15, Richard Brodie wrote:
Artifacts may be other than recorded behavior; they may be
recorded ideas. Of course it takes behavior to record the ideas,
but the process by which they are recorded is to be distinguished
from the content which the behavior records; that content is the
external form of the meme.
>
> Robin,
>
> I forgot what we were arguing about.
>
> Given your definition of behavior as any kind of information
> manifested in physical reality (an unusual definition?) then I think
> we agree about the definition of meme. You want to extend the word to
> include all the Rube Goldberg apparatus that helps it transmit itself
> to another mind. I don't really have a problem with that as long as
> we're clear that we're talking about mental replicators.
>
> Richard Brodie richard@brodietech.com www.memecentral.com
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk [mailto:fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk]On
> Behalf Of Robin Faichney Sent: Thursday, February 01, 2001 1:12 AM To:
> memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Labels for memes
>
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2001 at 12:40:05PM -0800, Richard Brodie wrote:
> > Robin,
> >
> > <<what exactly
> > is the point of saying, when that information is in a brain it's a
> > meme but when it's encoded in behaviour it's not?>>
> >
> > There are some hidden assumptions in your question. I do not believe
> > that memes can be encoded in behavior in all cases. I do not believe
> > that it is necessary to the memetics model to assume that they can
> > be.
>
> Don't make the mistake of seeing media and artifacts as anything other
> than recorded behaviour. Or if that's not what you're doing -- what
> else is there?
>
> > << Only sufficient information to allow
> > perfectly complete recreation of a ballgame is the same as that
> > ballgame. The reason we say that behaviour encodes memes, is that it
> > allows imitation (recreation) of THE SAME behaviour.>>
> >
> > So a recipe is the same as a cake?
>
> Obviously not. Disregarding the limitations of analogies, the point
> is that behaviourally-encoded memes allow recreation of THE SAME
> behaviour. The information required is all there.
>
> > And I don't know who "we" is other than
> > you.
>
> You certainly know that Tim takes substantially the same view. Joe
> also indicated recently that he goes along broadly with the "memes are
> external AND internal" theme. There are others, around here and
> elsewhere.
>
> > <<Just as an insect grub has different properties from the adult
> > form. But they're the same insect, as we see when we take the long
> > view. Adult->grub->adult is a recognisable cycle, and when we think
> > of the insect in broad terms, it's the cycle that includes both
> > forms that we think of. Brain->behaviour->brain is the
> > corresponding cycle for memes, and when we think of a meme, unless
> > for some particular reason we're focusing on a particular stage, it
> > should be the whole cycle we have in mind. Otherwise, we don't have
> > the full story.>>
> >
> > This is your personal theory, but there are many other ways for
> > memes to
> be
> > transmitted other than this cycle.
>
> Such as?
>
> > <<But behaviourally-encoded memes have the ability to get into the
> > brains
> of
> > observers! And that is exactly equally important. What you're
> > saying is like "grubs aren't really important, that's just the
> > intermediate stage". You're asssuming that what interests you is all
> > that matters. You need to step back, be more objective. If the
> > behaviour isn't interesting enough to be watched and remembered, it
> > has no chance of being repeated. Its ability to get into a mind is
> > perfectly complimentary to the brain-encoded form's ability to get
> > out again, into behaviour. There is absolutely no way you can say
> > one of these abilities is more important than the other. Are
> > chickens more important than eggs?>>
> >
> > I have said several times that I don't think memes are the most
> > important thing to study in cultural evolution. I think mind viruses
> > are.
>
> That wasn't my main point, and I'm happy to let it go. What interests
> you most isn't my concern here. What is, is this...
>
> > All I'm
> > doing is guarding the definition of the word "meme" to mean mental
> > replicators.
>
> I have tried to explain that I'm not interested in extending the use
> of "meme", that these same entities have to be encoded in behaviour,
> that this is the only coherent way to explain their transmission. You
> have denied that, but you have yet to offer any detailed argument to
> support your denial.
>
> > [RB]
> > > But a meme is substantial. In fact, one of the most interesting
> > > things
> > about
> > > a meme is how many copies of it there are in different minds.
> >
> > <<Memes are no more substantial than words. As for the notion that
> > many copies = substantiality -- words fail me.>>
> >
> > You misunderstood my point. The meme's existence in a particular
> > mind is what makes it substantial, not the number of copies of it.
>
> What I meant by "substantial", in the passage you are responding to at
> [RB], which was edited out, was actually physical. Memes are not
> physical things in themselves, just patterns, configuration of things.
> As such, it is silly to insist that such patterns be given one name in
> one context, and another elsewhere, especially when their existence in
> either location is absolutely dependent on their existence in the
> other! They don't get into brains unless observed in behaviour, and
> they can't get expressed in behaviour without having resided in the
> relevant brain. And the complexity covered by "behaviour", including
> as it does all media and artifacts, is irrelevant to this account of
> the basic principles.
>
> --
> Robin Faichney
> robin@reborntechnology.co.uk
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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