RE: Darwinian evolution vs memetic evolution

From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Tue Feb 06 2001 - 18:59:32 GMT

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    Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 12:59:32 -0600
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    Subject: RE: Darwinian evolution vs memetic evolution
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    On 6 Feb 2001, at 12:39, Lawrence DeBivort wrote:

    > A point of clarification, Joe,
    >
    > <snip>
    >
    > Joe Dees:
    > (such
    > as a request to use nonlinguistic auditory perception correlating with
    > one part of the brain lighting up, and linguistic auditory perception
    > correlating with another, and nontext visual perception with a third,
    > and text-reading visual perception with a fourth, and memory with a
    > fifth, and so on, and the subjects can direct those areas to light up
    > on the PET scan at will (like BIOFEEDBACK, Robin)), it is reasonable
    > to conclude by any scientific model you care to name that such a high
    > statistical correlation entails the high-confidence likelihood that
    > the subjects are indeed succeeding in doing what they are trying to
    > do; selectively access certain parts of their brains which operate on
    > the contents and forms requested, and this involves both conscious
    > self-awareness and efficacious volition.
    >
    > <snip>
    >
    > Lawrence de Bivort:
    > Agreeing with the correlation between cognitive tasks (visual,
    > linguisitic, non-linguistic auditory, etc.,)and brain area activity,
    > we still cannot (nor perhaps need to say) that the subject is
    > consciously or deliberately activating a specific part of their brain:
    > rather, they are consciously selecting only a cognitive task, whose
    > performance is/happens to be carried out by a specific part of the
    > brain. I make this observation because we 'use' our brains without
    > much awareness of what our brains are doing to enable their use.
    > Brains get a high-level command (see this, read that) and then
    > execute, without meta-feedback to the subject. In my view, this
    > automaticity of the brain's response has a lot to do with our
    > perception (or lack or perception) of how memes are 'accepted', of
    > 'free will' and choice, etc.
    >
    > And it presents a wonderful image of a person's brain trying to
    > generate a meta-understanding of how that highly automated brain
    > works; the thing that gives us consciouness itself operates without
    > directly giving us the information with which to understand the
    > processes of that consciousness. Yet we tackle the job persistently,
    > with argumentation, logic, PET scans, stimulus probes, head trauma
    > studies, etc. We can applaud this persistence... There is something so
    > very human about it.
    >
    It is one of the grand endeavors. But it does not matter
    geographically where in the head the memory stores are, or the
    vision, or the linguistic audition for it to be said that a person
    intentionally activates the areas they select. When someone tries
    to remember something, even if they have never heard the words
    "temporal lobe", it will nevertheless light up. We learn through
    doing, and having learned, we know how. We have control over
    voluntary access to those areas without many of us being aware of
    their specific locations, because we know through experience how
    to set our mental feet on the paths. And we do get feedback; the
    registration of the meanings of the words to which we are
    attending, the sought memory, etc. But it is also true that a
    recursive system such as our brain, while being consciously self-
    aware, can never achieve experiential self-transparency. The
    snake of self-consciousness must bite its own tail, but it can never
    swallow its own jaws. Just like other Godelian recursions, ours is
    by necessity both present and incomplete, while self-
    consciousness inheres.
    >
    > - Lawrence
    >
    >
    >
    > ===============================================================
    > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
    >
    >

    ===============================================================
    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



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