Re: mysticism etc

From: Robin Faichney (robin@reborntechnology.co.uk)
Date: Sun Sep 24 2000 - 14:57:34 BST

  • Next message: Aaron Lynch: "RE: First Appearances"

    Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id JAA00412 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 25 Sep 2000 09:22:32 +0100
    Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 14:57:34 +0100
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: mysticism etc
    Message-ID: <20000924145734.A1773@reborntechnology.co.uk>
    References: <200009220025.UAA08968@mail3.lig.bellsouth.net>; <20000922091517.A1246@reborntechnology.co.uk> <200009230604.CAA12850@mail5.lig.bellsouth.net>
    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
    User-Agent: Mutt/1.0.1i
    In-Reply-To: <200009230604.CAA12850@mail5.lig.bellsouth.net>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Sat, Sep 23, 2000 at 01:09:27AM -0500
    Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk
    Precedence: bulk
    Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    

    On Sat, Sep 23, 2000 at 01:09:27AM -0500, Joe E. Dees wrote:
    [RF]
    > > > > If you're conscious, the universe is conscious.
    [JD]
    > > > If we're conscious, then discrete systemic parts of the universe are
    > > > (sufficiently complex to be) conscious.
    [RF]
    > > "Discrete systemic" is an oxymoron. To take the systems view is to stop
    > > pretending that parts are discrete.
    [JD]
    > Well, to take the systems view is to reject the idea that everything
    > is some single sort of amorphous mass. By discrete, I meant
    > distinct, differentiable, distinguishable.

    Which says nothing about whether it's us, or the universe, that's
    conscious. Your comment that we are sufficiently complex to be
    conscious represents quite a common attitude, but it's based on a
    misunderstanding of conciousness, at least if that's understood as
    distinct from self-consciousness, being more akin to simple awareness.
    That is not -- cannot be -- a function, such as intelligence. Rather,
    it's an intersubjective attribute. Intelligence, if defined as something
    like reaction time for tasks requiring cortical processing, is measurable,
    whereas consciousness is, by comparison at least, almost imponderable.
    It is purely passive, any reaction whatsoever being explicable in terms
    of lower-level processing, whether that's in logical, cognitive terms,
    or at the neural level.

    Ultimately, what we consider to be conscious is not a dry, technical question,
    but one that reflects our attitudes to ourselves, each other, members of
    other species, and so on. To suggest that it's not us, but the universe
    that's conscious, though (obviously) "through" us amongst others, is not to
    propose a scientific hypothesis -- the suggestion that we are conscious is
    not scientific either -- but to suggest a change of attitude to ourselves
    and to the rest of the universe that will be found beneficial in terms of
    our health and general welfare, as well as freeing some of us from
    futile pursuits such as machine consciousness -- if all is conscious, there's
    no point seeking it in any particular place, and it can't be found by
    objective means, anyway.

    There is much, much more that can and should be said about this, but even if
    I had the time, this is not the place. You'll just have to wait until my
    book comes out! :-)

    Despite the smiley, I'm serious about this: Joe and I have been around
    the block on issues closely related to this many times, and I will not
    respond to responses from him, or from anyone else, for that matter.
    I'd rather spend my writing time on the book.

    -- 
    Robin Faichney
    

    =============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Sep 25 2000 - 09:24:25 BST