Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id VAA06615 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 22 Mar 2000 21:43:39 GMT Message-Id: <200003222142.QAA09833@mail3.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 15:45:40 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: Self-Acquisition In-reply-to: <LPBBICPHCJJBPJGHGMCIGEPKCEAA.ddiamond@ozemail.com.au> References: <200003220536.AAA01772@mail3.lig.bellsouth.net> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: "Chris Lofting" <ddiamond@ozemail.com.au>
To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Subject: RE: Self-Acquisition
Date sent: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 19:54:08 +1100
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk [mailto:fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk]On Behalf
> > Of Joe E. Dees
> > Sent: Wednesday, 22 March 2000 4:40
> > To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> > Subject: Self-Acquisition
> >
> >
> > As i mentioned before, the idea of a self is taught to us by our
> > primary caregivers, whom we distinguish from the surrounding
> > environment on the basis of their meaning-laden, purposeful and
> > responsive behavior. We then internalize this distinction and
> > ourselves become individual self-conceivers among others.
>
> nope. IF you look at the development of mental states from mammals through
> primates to us so the concept of self comes first. In monkey studies there
> is a sense of SELF-awareness but NOT of OTHERS-awareness where OTHERS means
> OTHER MINDS. There seems to be a mental state where actions performed by
> others are seen as being 'somehow' programmed/controlled by 'me'.
>
No, the work done by Lewis and Brooks-Gunn in SOCIAL
COGNITION AND THE ACQUISITION OF SELF clearly shows that
when the species being tested does not recognize a mirror image
as an image of itself (demonstrating self-awareness), it regards that
image as the image of a conspecific (another member of the same
species). Baboons, for instance, attack their mirrored reflections.
One would not physically attack one's own mind-slave; one would
simply order it around. You seem to be confusing self-awareness
with self-concept; they are NOT the same, and while self-
awareness is needed to internalize the distinction between
signifying and responsive intentionalities and the rest of the
environment which the example of caregivers presents to the infant,
the internalization of this distinction is necessary for self-concept
to occur. OF COURSE there would be no distinction made
between other signifying intentionalities and other things in the
case where the distinguisher lacks (has not evolved) the cognitive
capacity to do so; as I said before, until the threshhold of self-
awareness is passed, they simply cannot "get" it. And you are
quite simply wrong about self-concept preceding such a distinction
(even though self-awareness is necessary to internalize it); Lewis
and Brooks-Gunn show that person-permanence (as in caregivers)
precedes both self-permanence and object-permanence, which
develop at the same point.
>
> As we develop intellectually, and especially in humans, so the awareness of
> other MINDS leads to a feedback process that goes to flesh-out our sense of
> self.
>
This is true enough, and is exactly what I said, but the skeleton of
self-awareness must be present in order for self-concept to flesh it
out.
>
> This process then leads to the awareness that, when we store information in
> books etc, so there is a degree of objectivity involved in that disciplines
> such as mathematics etc can take on a life of their own. This comes about
> due to the realisation that all of the mathematics in the world did not come
> from one mind, it came from many minds. This creates disciplines that seem
> to take-on a sense of identity, of 'self-ness' such that these disciplines
> are interpreted as having roots outside of 'us'. This is to some degree,
> illusion.
>
Yes, it is an illusion that any academic disciplines are Platonically
independent of us, but one I've never shared.
>
> Note that the sense of self is an object sense, it is a sense based on
> precision, on the assertion of the personal pronoun, "I".
>
No, the sense of self occurs in human infants prior to their
mastering even the rudiments of speech; they know that they exist
before they can even use the personal pronoun "I". This is why
mirror tests were devised; to investigate the prelinguistic
psychogenesis of self-awareness.
>
> We can link this to the concept of oneness, wholeness, and in doing so
> introduce the concept of encapsulation.
>
> The pointedness reflected in the concept of "I" is also reflected in those
> parts of our neurological and psychological development concerned with
> territorial mapping where we can see the emergence of the distinction of
> 'mine' from 'not mine'. Note the emphasis on MINE rather than OURS.
>
Subjectivity is in each case mine, to paraphrase Martin Heidegger,
but the only way something can be "not mine" is if it belongs to an
"other", or to "no one" (out of a field of others). Either of these
alternatives acknowledges the existence of others.
>
> As we see in hippocampus, there is a link of waypoint mapping to territorial
> mapping and this leads to the abstraction of mine/not mine to
> correct/incorrect. Further abstraction takes us into the neocortex and the
> root of syntactic processing which is sourced in that part of the brain best
> associated with object thinking, encapsulated thinking, SELF thinking.
>
This granting of specific semantic specifications (mine/not mine,
correct/incorrect), for all humans, to a particular midbrain (limbic
system) component which is known primarily for its roles in
memory and emotion is a speculation without scientific basis at
the present state of cognitive science. Current speculation upon
the location of Antonio Damasio's "sense of self" includes, but is
not limited to, the midbrain (primarily the reticular activating
system).
>
> The emotion linked to the syntax concept has been located by Demasio et al.,
> in the left hemisphere of the brain. Thus there is a fundamental emotion
> linked to the concept of "I".
>
Emotions are generated in the limbic system, which is midbrain. I
own two of Damasio's books (Descartes' Error and The Feeling of
What Happens); please refer me to pagination for this contention.
The linguistic system itself is rooted in Broca's area, Wernicke's
area, and the arcuate fasciculus which connects them across the
Sylvan fissure. And in lefties, this all is found in the right
hemisphere, as it is linked to handedness and contralateral control.
>
> This concept, being linked to that part of the brain that, in most, is
> biased to the assertion of precision, of 'pointedness', is gene based in
> that the fundamental distinctions at the neurological level deals with
> wholes and parts aka objects. Thus the concept of SELF, the awareness of
> SELF, has emerged from more reptilian thinking linked to territorial
> mapping. This goes as far as asserting that the concept of a truth is also
> stemmed from territorial mapping in that an absolute truth is as precise as
> "I".
>
Precision in elaboration of a vocabulary was preceded by precision
in fashioning and using tools. The areas to which I previously
referred when discussing linguistic ability (Broca's area, Wernicke's
area and the arcuate fasciculus) are located at those afferent and
efferent areas divided by the Sylvan fissure which are involved in
manual dexterity (hands and fingers). Language use is dependent
for its elaborated neural substrate upon the evolutionarily selected
growth of the area controlling manual dexterity, and the hand-eye
coordination area being co-opted (via mutation) by the mouth-ear
nexus for speech production (see Philip Lieberman's book Uniquely
Human, and Bright Air, Brilliant Fire by Gerald Edelman).
>
> Thus the raw concept of SELF has gene foundations that are then 'refined'
> through firmware (neurochemistry) and software (psychology). The memetics
> element is in the neurochemistry/psychology where feedback loops aid in
> re-identifying "I" through local and non-local means (personal psychology
> and cultural/species influences).
>
Self-awareness is permitted by the evolution of a large enough and
complex enough brain to breach the Godelian barrier and allow for
recursion, but this is a capacity which is realized only in the
maturation of individual humans. There is no such thing as a
genetically coded "self-concept" sequence.
>
> Since there is a gene based element so that element is the 'root' SELF. The
> assertion of "I AM" stems from this in that there is no intent behind this,
> there is just a fundamental feeling of "MINE", "ME", "ONE". There is nothing
> else. This is like a random process where something just 'happens', there is
> no intent. This is a PRIMARY process.
>
Intentionality and signification are dependent upon subjectivity for
their existence. I think that Damasio's idea of a "proto-self" is a
useful one, but see it as quite compatible with my memetic
position. To feel a self is to intend it via self-perception.
>
> The SECONDARY process is in the refinement of the expression of SELF through
> the use of exageration and/or suppression of aspects to try and add some
> qualitative precision to the basic assertion.
>
This is the realm of the self-concept, which is indeed memetic,
unlike self-awareness, which is necessary for the self-concept
memesis, but is not itself a meme.
>
> The SECONDARY process (and this is the world of memes) works in a context of
> total faith in the primary such that all experiences are deemed to have
> meaning. In the secondary process the concept of randomness does not exist
> since this process is relationally biased and works on there being at least
> TWO objects (basic one is 'me' and 'context'); the secondary process works
> in the space in-between objects (without objects there are no
> relationships).
>
Randomness and order are correlatively opposite and mutually
defining conceptions; neither can exist without the other as a
specific and differentiable conception, as each derives its meaning
by comparison and contrast with the other. The oppositional
complementarities of object and relationship, and figure and
ground, fit this model, too.
>
> The secondary process is the home of OTHERS and in humans this areas is well
> developed to a degree where an individual can develop a bias to secondary
> thinking and consider OTHERS as primary. An error. An error in LEVELS of
> analysis in that if you drop a level or so, so genes working at the GROUP
> level aid in the development of the individual but the emergence of
> awareness, of SELF, comes from the individual not the group.
>
Given a sufficiently large and complex neural substrate, self-
awareness requires only an environment; self-concept, however,
requires others. As I have stated before, they are not the same.
Our genetics allow for the capacity for self-awareness, but this
capacity requires an environment in which it can be realized; this is
different from having self encoded in genes. Self is an emergent
product of complex interrelations involving many neural
components.
>
> There is a development path that is consistant where SELF comes 'first' and
> then comes 'OTHERS'. Entangle these fundamentals by applying the 1:many
> dichotomy recursively and you get a continuum of different expressions
> biased to different degrees of SELF/OTHER expression.
>
Self-awareness occurs prior to the internalization of other-based
distinctions; self-concept is dependent upon, therefore posterior to
them.
>
> Without OTHERS you endup psychotic, self-contained, encapsulated aka
> 'naturally wild'. All that keeps you going if in a group are genes since
> there is no awareness of other MINDS.
>
There is awareness of the purposive and signifying behavior of
others, as distinct from the rest of one's environment; the concept
of other minds residing within some of these external bodies
(caregivers, later generalized to all humans) and not others(persons
as opposed to things) is the extrapolation of a cause for this
difference.
>
> IF you combine SELF-Aware with OTHERS-Aware you start to get 'Mind' and
> there is the suggestion that this is a feedback process, it develops from
> the SELF/OTHERS interaction where OTHERS is transforming but not
> fundamental.
>
Others are necessary for the internalizing of a self-concept; without
them, we are left with feral, or "wild" children. The two elements of
the distinction (people vs. things) are co-primordial in that each
depends upon the other for its own oppositional definition.
>
> best,
>
> Chris.
>
Likewise, Joe
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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