Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id GAA07541 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 23 Mar 2000 06:07:46 GMT Message-ID: <004c01bf94e2$07b0a4c0$03000004@r2z3h3> From: "Tyger" <void@internet-zahav.net.il> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> References: <200003220536.AAA01772@mail3.lig.bellsouth.net> <200003222142.QAA09833@mail3.lig.bellsouth.net> Subject: Re: Self-Acquisition Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2000 08:08:28 -0800 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
concerning the distinction between self concept and self awareness
A physicist is just an atom's way of looking at itself. -- Niels Bohr
best,:-)
Tyger
----- Original Message -----
From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net>
To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2000 1:45 PM
Subject: RE: Self-Acquisition
> From: "Chris Lofting" <ddiamond@ozemail.com.au>
> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> Subject: RE: Self-Acquisition
> Date sent: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 19:54:08 +1100
> Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk [mailto:fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk]On
Behalf
> > > Of Joe E. Dees
> > > Sent: Wednesday, 22 March 2000 4:40
> > > To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> > > Subject: Self-Acquisition
> > >
> > >
> > > As i mentioned before, the idea of a self is taught to us by our
> > > primary caregivers, whom we distinguish from the surrounding
> > > environment on the basis of their meaning-laden, purposeful and
> > > responsive behavior. We then internalize this distinction and
> > > ourselves become individual self-conceivers among others.
> >
> > nope. IF you look at the development of mental states from mammals
through
> > primates to us so the concept of self comes first. In monkey studies
there
> > is a sense of SELF-awareness but NOT of OTHERS-awareness where OTHERS
means
> > OTHER MINDS. There seems to be a mental state where actions performed by
> > others are seen as being 'somehow' programmed/controlled by 'me'.
> >
> No, the work done by Lewis and Brooks-Gunn in SOCIAL
> COGNITION AND THE ACQUISITION OF SELF clearly shows that
> when the species being tested does not recognize a mirror image
> as an image of itself (demonstrating self-awareness), it regards that
> image as the image of a conspecific (another member of the same
> species). Baboons, for instance, attack their mirrored reflections.
> One would not physically attack one's own mind-slave; one would
> simply order it around. You seem to be confusing self-awareness
> with self-concept; they are NOT the same, and while self-
> awareness is needed to internalize the distinction between
> signifying and responsive intentionalities and the rest of the
> environment which the example of caregivers presents to the infant,
> the internalization of this distinction is necessary for self-concept
> to occur. OF COURSE there would be no distinction made
> between other signifying intentionalities and other things in the
> case where the distinguisher lacks (has not evolved) the cognitive
> capacity to do so; as I said before, until the threshhold of self-
> awareness is passed, they simply cannot "get" it. And you are
> quite simply wrong about self-concept preceding such a distinction
> (even though self-awareness is necessary to internalize it); Lewis
> and Brooks-Gunn show that person-permanence (as in caregivers)
> precedes both self-permanence and object-permanence, which
> develop at the same point.
> >
> > As we develop intellectually, and especially in humans, so the awareness
of
> > other MINDS leads to a feedback process that goes to flesh-out our sense
of
> > self.
> >
> This is true enough, and is exactly what I said, but the skeleton of
> self-awareness must be present in order for self-concept to flesh it
> out.
> >
> > This process then leads to the awareness that, when we store information
in
> > books etc, so there is a degree of objectivity involved in that
disciplines
> > such as mathematics etc can take on a life of their own. This comes
about
> > due to the realisation that all of the mathematics in the world did not
come
> > from one mind, it came from many minds. This creates disciplines that
seem
> > to take-on a sense of identity, of 'self-ness' such that these
disciplines
> > are interpreted as having roots outside of 'us'. This is to some degree,
> > illusion.
> >
> Yes, it is an illusion that any academic disciplines are Platonically
> independent of us, but one I've never shared.
> >
> > Note that the sense of self is an object sense, it is a sense based on
> > precision, on the assertion of the personal pronoun, "I".
> >
> No, the sense of self occurs in human infants prior to their
> mastering even the rudiments of speech; they know that they exist
> before they can even use the personal pronoun "I". This is why
> mirror tests were devised; to investigate the prelinguistic
> psychogenesis of self-awareness.
> >
> > We can link this to the concept of oneness, wholeness, and in doing so
> > introduce the concept of encapsulation.
> >
> > The pointedness reflected in the concept of "I" is also reflected in
those
> > parts of our neurological and psychological development concerned with
> > territorial mapping where we can see the emergence of the distinction of
> > 'mine' from 'not mine'. Note the emphasis on MINE rather than OURS.
> >
> Subjectivity is in each case mine, to paraphrase Martin Heidegger,
> but the only way something can be "not mine" is if it belongs to an
> "other", or to "no one" (out of a field of others). Either of these
> alternatives acknowledges the existence of others.
> >
> > As we see in hippocampus, there is a link of waypoint mapping to
territorial
> > mapping and this leads to the abstraction of mine/not mine to
> > correct/incorrect. Further abstraction takes us into the neocortex and
the
> > root of syntactic processing which is sourced in that part of the brain
best
> > associated with object thinking, encapsulated thinking, SELF thinking.
> >
> This granting of specific semantic specifications (mine/not mine,
> correct/incorrect), for all humans, to a particular midbrain (limbic
> system) component which is known primarily for its roles in
> memory and emotion is a speculation without scientific basis at
> the present state of cognitive science. Current speculation upon
> the location of Antonio Damasio's "sense of self" includes, but is
> not limited to, the midbrain (primarily the reticular activating
> system).
> >
> > The emotion linked to the syntax concept has been located by Demasio et
al.,
> > in the left hemisphere of the brain. Thus there is a fundamental emotion
> > linked to the concept of "I".
> >
> Emotions are generated in the limbic system, which is midbrain. I
> own two of Damasio's books (Descartes' Error and The Feeling of
> What Happens); please refer me to pagination for this contention.
> The linguistic system itself is rooted in Broca's area, Wernicke's
> area, and the arcuate fasciculus which connects them across the
> Sylvan fissure. And in lefties, this all is found in the right
> hemisphere, as it is linked to handedness and contralateral control.
> >
> > This concept, being linked to that part of the brain that, in most, is
> > biased to the assertion of precision, of 'pointedness', is gene based in
> > that the fundamental distinctions at the neurological level deals with
> > wholes and parts aka objects. Thus the concept of SELF, the awareness of
> > SELF, has emerged from more reptilian thinking linked to territorial
> > mapping. This goes as far as asserting that the concept of a truth is
also
> > stemmed from territorial mapping in that an absolute truth is as precise
as
> > "I".
> >
> Precision in elaboration of a vocabulary was preceded by precision
> in fashioning and using tools. The areas to which I previously
> referred when discussing linguistic ability (Broca's area, Wernicke's
> area and the arcuate fasciculus) are located at those afferent and
> efferent areas divided by the Sylvan fissure which are involved in
> manual dexterity (hands and fingers). Language use is dependent
> for its elaborated neural substrate upon the evolutionarily selected
> growth of the area controlling manual dexterity, and the hand-eye
> coordination area being co-opted (via mutation) by the mouth-ear
> nexus for speech production (see Philip Lieberman's book Uniquely
> Human, and Bright Air, Brilliant Fire by Gerald Edelman).
> >
> > Thus the raw concept of SELF has gene foundations that are then
'refined'
> > through firmware (neurochemistry) and software (psychology). The
memetics
> > element is in the neurochemistry/psychology where feedback loops aid in
> > re-identifying "I" through local and non-local means (personal
psychology
> > and cultural/species influences).
> >
> Self-awareness is permitted by the evolution of a large enough and
> complex enough brain to breach the Godelian barrier and allow for
> recursion, but this is a capacity which is realized only in the
> maturation of individual humans. There is no such thing as a
> genetically coded "self-concept" sequence.
> >
> > Since there is a gene based element so that element is the 'root' SELF.
The
> > assertion of "I AM" stems from this in that there is no intent behind
this,
> > there is just a fundamental feeling of "MINE", "ME", "ONE". There is
nothing
> > else. This is like a random process where something just 'happens',
there is
> > no intent. This is a PRIMARY process.
> >
> Intentionality and signification are dependent upon subjectivity for
> their existence. I think that Damasio's idea of a "proto-self" is a
> useful one, but see it as quite compatible with my memetic
> position. To feel a self is to intend it via self-perception.
> >
> > The SECONDARY process is in the refinement of the expression of SELF
through
> > the use of exageration and/or suppression of aspects to try and add some
> > qualitative precision to the basic assertion.
> >
> This is the realm of the self-concept, which is indeed memetic,
> unlike self-awareness, which is necessary for the self-concept
> memesis, but is not itself a meme.
> >
> > The SECONDARY process (and this is the world of memes) works in a
context of
> > total faith in the primary such that all experiences are deemed to have
> > meaning. In the secondary process the concept of randomness does not
exist
> > since this process is relationally biased and works on there being at
least
> > TWO objects (basic one is 'me' and 'context'); the secondary process
works
> > in the space in-between objects (without objects there are no
> > relationships).
> >
> Randomness and order are correlatively opposite and mutually
> defining conceptions; neither can exist without the other as a
> specific and differentiable conception, as each derives its meaning
> by comparison and contrast with the other. The oppositional
> complementarities of object and relationship, and figure and
> ground, fit this model, too.
> >
> > The secondary process is the home of OTHERS and in humans this areas is
well
> > developed to a degree where an individual can develop a bias to
secondary
> > thinking and consider OTHERS as primary. An error. An error in LEVELS of
> > analysis in that if you drop a level or so, so genes working at the
GROUP
> > level aid in the development of the individual but the emergence of
> > awareness, of SELF, comes from the individual not the group.
> >
> Given a sufficiently large and complex neural substrate, self-
> awareness requires only an environment; self-concept, however,
> requires others. As I have stated before, they are not the same.
> Our genetics allow for the capacity for self-awareness, but this
> capacity requires an environment in which it can be realized; this is
> different from having self encoded in genes. Self is an emergent
> product of complex interrelations involving many neural
> components.
> >
> > There is a development path that is consistant where SELF comes 'first'
and
> > then comes 'OTHERS'. Entangle these fundamentals by applying the 1:many
> > dichotomy recursively and you get a continuum of different expressions
> > biased to different degrees of SELF/OTHER expression.
> >
> Self-awareness occurs prior to the internalization of other-based
> distinctions; self-concept is dependent upon, therefore posterior to
> them.
> >
> > Without OTHERS you endup psychotic, self-contained, encapsulated aka
> > 'naturally wild'. All that keeps you going if in a group are genes since
> > there is no awareness of other MINDS.
> >
> There is awareness of the purposive and signifying behavior of
> others, as distinct from the rest of one's environment; the concept
> of other minds residing within some of these external bodies
> (caregivers, later generalized to all humans) and not others(persons
> as opposed to things) is the extrapolation of a cause for this
> difference.
> >
> > IF you combine SELF-Aware with OTHERS-Aware you start to get 'Mind' and
> > there is the suggestion that this is a feedback process, it develops
from
> > the SELF/OTHERS interaction where OTHERS is transforming but not
> > fundamental.
> >
> Others are necessary for the internalizing of a self-concept; without
> them, we are left with feral, or "wild" children. The two elements of
> the distinction (people vs. things) are co-primordial in that each
> depends upon the other for its own oppositional definition.
> >
> > best,
> >
> > Chris.
> >
> Likewise, Joe
> >
> > ===============================================================
> > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
> >
> >
>
>
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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