Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id IAA11815 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 5 Mar 2000 08:21:37 GMT From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk> Organization: Reborn Technology To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: new line: what's the point? Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2000 08:03:57 +0000 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.0.21] Content-Type: text/plain References: <200003050733.CAA29552@mail6.lig.bellsouth.net> Message-Id: <00030508184701.00439@faichney> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Sun, 05 Mar 2000, Joe E. Dees wrote:
>> On Sat, 04 Mar 2000, Joe E. Dees wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >How can an entity that does not possess subjectivity either mean
>> >> >or intend anything? Short answer: it can't. Subjectivity is an a
>> >> >priori sine qua non for both signification and intentionality.
>> >>
>> >> Didn't you say you'd read all of Dennett's books? I suggest you reread The
>> >> Intentional Stance, at least. I'm sure you possess it, and Dennett's style is
>> >> infinitely more persuasive than mine, even for the average reader, nevermind
>> >> those with preconceptions.
>> >>
>> >Yeah, you lionize Dennett when his position agrees with your own
>> >preconceptions, and claim he must be wrong where you disagree.
>>
>> Address the issue, please: do you still claim, contra Dennett, who wrote the
>> definitive modern work on the topic, that intentionality necessarily implies
>> subjectivity?
>>
>Yep, if that is indeed what he claimed (you've been wrong about
>him before here). Intender-intending-intended is another one of
>those tripartate and interdependent structures comprised of source,
>path and goal, distinguishable yet inseparable components of a
>single system (for reference, I know you won't check
>PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS
>CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT by George Lakoff and
>Mark Johnson, Basic Books 1999, because you never check
>anything, but it's in there) . Intention is, like signification (signifier-
>signifying-signified), dependent upon subjectivity for the source
>from which it flows as much as it depends upon the existence of a
>world for the goal to which it goes, and upon perception,
>conception and action to serve as paths from source to goal. Just
>as meaning is imposed upon the world by the subject, so is
>intention directed towards differentiable particulars within the world
>(or towards representations of these stored in memory and
>abstracted into knowledge) by the subject.
You do not inspire confidence in your philosophical competence by continually
conflating the common concept of intention with the technical term
"intentionality".
But let's focus on the point at issue here. In DDI, Dennett says that memes
are semantically rather than syntactically encoded in the brain, because there
is no "brain language" (I think "brain programming language" might convey the
point more effectively) which is consistent across brains. The clear
implication is that semantic here does *not* necessarily imply subjective,
because the requirement can be covered by saying that the same meme in
different brains codes for the same behaviour, regardless of neural
instantiation. Do you disagree, and if so, why?
--
Robin Faichney
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