Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id HAA11680 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 5 Mar 2000 07:34:51 GMT Message-Id: <200003050733.CAA29552@mail6.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2000 01:36:53 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: new line: what's the point? In-reply-to: <00030505541602.00357@faichney> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
Organization: Reborn Technology
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: new line: what's the point?
Date sent: Sun, 5 Mar 2000 05:51:19 +0000
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Sat, 04 Mar 2000, Joe E. Dees wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >How can an entity that does not possess subjectivity either mean
> >> >or intend anything? Short answer: it can't. Subjectivity is an a
> >> >priori sine qua non for both signification and intentionality.
> >>
> >> Didn't you say you'd read all of Dennett's books? I suggest you reread The
> >> Intentional Stance, at least. I'm sure you possess it, and Dennett's style is
> >> infinitely more persuasive than mine, even for the average reader, nevermind
> >> those with preconceptions.
> >>
> >Yeah, you lionize Dennett when his position agrees with your own
> >preconceptions, and claim he must be wrong where you disagree.
>
> Address the issue, please: do you still claim, contra Dennett, who wrote the
> definitive modern work on the topic, that intentionality necessarily implies
> subjectivity?
>
Yep, if that is indeed what he claimed (you've been wrong about
him before here). Intender-intending-intended is another one of
those tripartate and interdependent structures comprised of source,
path and goal, distinguishable yet inseparable components of a
single system (for reference, I know you won't check
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS
CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT by George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson, Basic Books 1999, because you never check
anything, but it's in there) . Intention is, like signification (signifier-
signifying-signified), dependent upon subjectivity for the source
from which it flows as much as it depends upon the existence of a
world for the goal to which it goes, and upon perception,
conception and action to serve as paths from source to goal. Just
as meaning is imposed upon the world by the subject, so is
intention directed towards differentiable particulars within the world
(or towards representations of these stored in memory and
abstracted into knowledge) by the subject.
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
>
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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