Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id WAA13508 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 5 Mar 2000 22:28:32 GMT Message-Id: <200003052229.RAA17073@mail1.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2000 16:30:32 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: new line: what's the point? In-reply-to: <00030508184701.00439@faichney> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
Organization: Reborn Technology
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: new line: what's the point?
Date sent: Sun, 5 Mar 2000 08:03:57 +0000
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Sun, 05 Mar 2000, Joe E. Dees wrote:
> >> On Sat, 04 Mar 2000, Joe E. Dees wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >How can an entity that does not possess subjectivity either mean
> >> >> >or intend anything? Short answer: it can't. Subjectivity is an a
> >> >> >priori sine qua non for both signification and intentionality.
> >> >>
> >> >> Didn't you say you'd read all of Dennett's books? I suggest you reread The
> >> >> Intentional Stance, at least. I'm sure you possess it, and Dennett's style is
> >> >> infinitely more persuasive than mine, even for the average reader, nevermind
> >> >> those with preconceptions.
> >> >>
> >> >Yeah, you lionize Dennett when his position agrees with your own
> >> >preconceptions, and claim he must be wrong where you disagree.
> >>
> >> Address the issue, please: do you still claim, contra Dennett, who wrote the
> >> definitive modern work on the topic, that intentionality necessarily implies
> >> subjectivity?
> >>
> >Yep, if that is indeed what he claimed (you've been wrong about
> >him before here). Intender-intending-intended is another one of
> >those tripartate and interdependent structures comprised of source,
> >path and goal, distinguishable yet inseparable components of a
> >single system (for reference, I know you won't check
> >PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS
> >CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT by George Lakoff and
> >Mark Johnson, Basic Books 1999, because you never check
> >anything, but it's in there) . Intention is, like signification (signifier-
> >signifying-signified), dependent upon subjectivity for the source
> >from which it flows as much as it depends upon the existence of a
> >world for the goal to which it goes, and upon perception,
> >conception and action to serve as paths from source to goal. Just
> >as meaning is imposed upon the world by the subject, so is
> >intention directed towards differentiable particulars within the world
> >(or towards representations of these stored in memory and
> >abstracted into knowledge) by the subject.
>
> You do not inspire confidence in your philosophical competence by continually
> conflating the common concept of intention with the technical term
> "intentionality".
>
> But let's focus on the point at issue here. In DDI, Dennett says that memes
> are semantically rather than syntactically encoded in the brain, because there
> is no "brain language" (I think "brain programming language" might convey the
> point more effectively) which is consistent across brains. The clear
> implication is that semantic here does *not* necessarily imply subjective,
> because the requirement can be covered by saying that the same meme in
> different brains codes for the same behaviour, regardless of neural
> instantiation. Do you disagree, and if so, why?
>
The fact that the neural instantiations differ across individuals is
proof of their individuality, not the opposite. As you yourself said,
we are not talking intersubjectively identical coding here. Also,
your assumption that the behavior is the same rather than similar
cannot be substantiated, and in fact would seem to preclude the
mutation necessary for memetic evolution, and your claim that it is
the "same" meme coded in different brains is clearly confused. No
two people mean exactly the same thing when they say any
particular word, due to their differing semiotic meaning-webs and
the differing positions any word holds in these respective ever-
changing semantic totalities. The meme for any particular behavior
type (of which there may be variations in the particular tokens of
the type) will be a complex concatenation composed of many
components, all of which will be accommodated as to their niches,
by the gestaltly shaping co-presence of all the other memetic
inhabitants of each particular mindscape. Therefore, the neural
patterns corresponding to physical instantiation will differ not only
across brains but also within each brain with the passage of time
and the impact of new experiences continuing to shape it, and so
will the memes and the meanings, within a spectrum inside of
which we can say that it is the "same" meme, even though it is
actually only very similar, and outside of which we would have to
assert that a related but different meme has made its appearance.
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
>
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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