Re: Monkeys stone herdsman in Kenya

From: Joe E. Dees (joedees@bellsouth.net)
Date: Sat Mar 04 2000 - 02:54:54 GMT

  • Next message: Joe E. Dees: "Ideation, Execution and Apprehension"

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    From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net>
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    Subject: Re: Monkeys stone herdsman in Kenya
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    Date sent: Fri, 03 Mar 2000 19:34:27 -0500
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    From: "Mark M. Mills" <mmills@htcomp.net>
    Subject: Re: Monkeys stone herdsman in Kenya
    Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk

    > Joe,
    >
    > >I see memes as existing in either of two forms; 1) exclusively
    > >within a consciousness, where intentional or
    > >inadvertant/accidental modification/mutation can take place in
    > >reaction to either (or both) already present information
    > >(memory/knowledge) and/or subsequently encountered information
    >
    > >(perception), and 2) both within and between consciousnesses, in
    > >action (including speech), where selection can be applied to the
    > >transmission of memes by means of their acceptance or rejection
    > >by prospected receivers (resulting in evolution), and where
    > >modification/mutation can also take place due to the vagaries of
    > >communication (such as misunderstanding or incomplete
    > >communication and the subsequent 'filling in of the gaps" by the
    > >receiver).
    >
    > To understand this, I've outlined the above long sentence (no words changed):
    >
    > I see memes as existing in either of two forms;
    > 1) exclusively within a consciousness, where intentional or
    > inadvertant/accidental modification/mutation can take place in reaction to:
    > a) either (or both) already present information (memory/knowledge)
    > b) subsequently encountered information (perception),
    > 2) both within and between consciousnesses, in action (including speech),
    > a) where selection can be applied to the transmission of memes by
    > means of their acceptance or rejection by prospected receivers (resulting
    > in evolution),
    > b) where modification/mutation can also take place due to the
    > vagaries of communication (such as misunderstanding or incomplete
    > communication and the subsequent 'filling in of the gaps" by the receiver).
    >
    > As I understand the above, you seem to be dropping the 'meme is a behavior'
    > definition. A behavior doesn't exist 'within a consciousness.'
    >
    On the contrary; although the action being taken doesn't exist
    within a consciousness except as perceptual change which serves
    the feedback verification purpose of letting th agent know that the
    action is actually taking place, memetic behavior cannot exist
    without its being motivated by memetic intended meaning. This
    internal memeform (memetic thought), which is necessary and
    essential for the execution of the external memeform (memetic
    behavior), exists as instructions for the performance of the behavior
    being exhibited and the desire to engage in such a performance,
    or, in other words, the 1) intention motivating the agent to engage
    in the behavior and the 2) behavior's meaning to its agent (two not
    strictly separable things). A behavior without internal (to
    consciousness) instructions being intentionally followed to
    produce/guide it is reduced to being either instinctual (genetic) or
    random, not memetic.
    >
    > This seems more philosophic than empirical. Science has no means of
    > measuring 'consciousness' directly, much less an entity contained with it
    > or 'both within and between consciousnesses.'
    >
    We know that an intentional and significant behavior between
    transmitter and receiver cannot occur in the absence of a signifying
    and intentional consciousness within at least the transmitter, and a
    successful transmission/reception cannot occur unless both
    transmitter and receiver are signifying and intentional
    consciousnesses. Do not allow the mechanistic flavor of the terms
    "transmitter" and "receiver" to semantically deceive you into
    misconstrual; we are not talking radios and TV's here, but self- and
    other-conscious awarenesses. And it is not a matter of
    "measuring" self-conscious awareness, as that is a quality, not a
    quantity; we can however detect its presence or absence with a
    high degree of assurance with a few simple tests (such as the
    mirror test, which great apes can pass, and the turing test, which
    is a test requiring the possession of more formal and abstract
    reasoning skills and a broader vocabulary than apes, and most
    preadolescent humans, possess). It is intellectual blindness born
    of denial to claim, with Watson and Skinner, that because it is hard
    to peruse, that there is no "inside" a mind, especially when such a
    view has been repeatedly repudiated by PET and fMRI tests, which
    can record specific components of the human brain (the emergent
    mind's physical substrate) selectively light up for some stimuli and
    not others, when their differences are not perceptual, but have
    solely to do with the presence vs. absence, or even the character
    of, semantic content.
    >
    > The Lynch definition can address the issues you raise, though. Since we
    > identify 'consciousness' via behaviors, 'consciousness' can be identified
    > as a phenotype to the Lynch meme. Thus, the lynch meme is 'hidden'
    > somewhere behind the behavioral evidence we empirically observe.
    > (addressing issues in clause #1 above). With regard to the transmission of
    > memes (clause #2), one can invoke the transmitter/receptor issues with via
    > a 4 step process:
    >
    > a) the meme is used to produce a 'replicating behavior'
    > b) the behavior is observed by a receiver
    > c) the receiver's sensations create a new configuration in the target's
    > neural system.
    > d) feedback (repeating steps a,b,c) is used to insure the behavioral
    > products of the transmitted meme satisfy replication requirements. This
    > step produces isomorphism of response rather than isomorphism of neural
    > connection. For replication purposes, isomorphism of response (behavior)
    > is all that is required.
    >
    Memes must live both within AND between minds, and their life
    cycle must include both, like tapeworms growing within dogs and
    traveling between them, "encoded" in fleas. If memes just lived
    within minds they could not replicate, and if memes just lived
    between minds they could not exist (since they would have no
    niche in which they could perdure between replicating behaviors,
    which are not constant by a long shot).
    >
    > In short, the Lynch definition seems straight forward, empirical and
    > consistent with other evolutionary disciplines. In contrast, the Gatherer
    > definition forces one to either break away from the founding concept of
    > evolutionary theory, the genotype and phenotype, or place great reliance
    > on abstract and untestable qualities of consciousness.
    >
    Our conscious awareness is the most concrete of all things we
    experience, as it is that which contains and makes possible both
    our experience of self, body, other and world, and any meaning and
    value we may impose upon them, as well as any memories and
    knowledge of them we may retain, and any deconstructions and
    recombinations of our memories and knowledge found in
    imagination and cognition. As to it being, unlike behavior,
    untestable, if you don't like the cutting-edge cognitive mapping
    being currently done by those in the forefront of the psychological
    establishment via PET and fMRI, here's a simple one. Ask a
    sample population to do something easy for a million dollars, then
    remove their brains and ask for the same behavior again. I
    guarantee that the scientifically measurable response will be rather
    dampened in the second case. My position is in many ways a
    synthesis of Lynch and Gatherer, as I do not see how memes can
    fulfill theor evolutionary and multiplicative functions without both
    components (within and between) of the single memetic coin.
    >
    > Mark
    >
    >
    > ===============================================================
    > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
    >
    >

    ===============================================================
    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



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