Re: meaning in memetics

From: Robin Faichney (robin@faichney.demon.co.uk)
Date: Sat Feb 12 2000 - 17:18:14 GMT

  • Next message: Robin Faichney: "Re: More on what memes are made of"

    Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id PAA01353 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 14 Feb 2000 15:47:18 GMT
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
    Organization: Reborn Technology
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: meaning in memetics
    Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:18:14 +0000
    X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.0.21]
    Content-Type: text/plain
    References: <ECS10002091254A@imap.uea.ac.uk>
    Message-Id: <00021217261101.00510@faichney>
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
    Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk
    Precedence: bulk
    Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    

    On Wed, 09 Feb 2000, Soc. Lab. 2 wrote:
    >Here's a quote from "Dennett and his Critics", from
    >Dennett's replies p.230:
    >
    >"Above the biological level of brute belief and simple
    >intentional icons, human beings have constructed a level
    >that is composed of objects that are socially constructed,
    >replicated, distributed, traded (etc). . . Dawkins has given
    >us a generic name for these things - memes - and what I have
    >called opinions are a species of memes: sentences on whose
    >truth a person has, in effect, made a wager."
    >
    >now, if that ain't meaning maybe we are going to have to go
    >back to the basics.
    >
    >To reiterate, Dennett sez that intentionalities are
    >necessarily involved in memetics - intentionalities are (he
    >thinks) the foundations from which we get meaning, and
    >memetics is his theory of meaning. And whether you like it
    >or not, Dennett is the Granddaddy of memetics right now.

    Is memetics really Dennett's theory of meaning? Can you give me a citation on
    that?

    If Dennett really would stand on the claim that "intentionalities are
    necessarily involved in memetics" then I'm sorry to have to say he's wrong. I
    do know that he does not understand the difference between physical and
    intentional information, because he said as much at the May 99 Cambridge
    meeting, but given his work with Sue Blackmore, he should be familiar with the
    argument as to the memetic nature of birdsong. Ah well, I guess maybe he's not
    infallible after all.

    --
    Robin Faichney
    

    ===============================This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Feb 14 2000 - 15:47:22 GMT