RE: meaning in memetics

From: Richard Brodie (richard@brodietech.com)
Date: Mon Feb 14 2000 - 16:12:44 GMT

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    From: "Richard Brodie" <richard@brodietech.com>
    To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Subject: RE: meaning in memetics
    Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 08:12:44 -0800
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    Robin wrote:

    <<If Dennett really would stand on the claim that "intentionalities are
    necessarily involved in memetics" then I'm sorry to have to say he's wrong.
    I
    do know that he does not understand the difference between physical and
    intentional information, because he said as much at the May 99 Cambridge
    meeting, but given his work with Sue Blackmore, he should be familiar with
    the
    argument as to the memetic nature of birdsong. Ah well, I guess maybe he's
    not
    infallible after all.>>

    Dennett and I are pretty much in agreement on everything to do with memetics
    that I am aware of... of course his understanding goes much deeper than mine
    as he is so well grounded in the many branches of philosophy. The birdsong
    example is distracting because it brings into play the question of non-human
    transmission of culture, which arguably exists but is clearly, to me at
    least, a different animal from memetics, which studies the interplay between
    self-replicating information and the human mind.

    To say that Dennett "does not understand" the difference between physical
    and intentional information is perhaps unfair. It might be more accurate to
    say that he does not acknowledge such a difference. You believe that there
    are inherent patterns to be found in the universe. I think it is more useful
    to believe that all patterns are in the eye of the beholder. Dennett's idea
    of "Good Tricks" is a wonderful medium in this philosophical minefield.

    Your claim that he is "wrong" is disturbing. Do you really think there is
    one "right" model and that all others are "wrong"? The test of a good
    scientific model is the results it produces predictively, and further down
    the road the engineering that can be done with that model. From that
    standpoint both Newtonian and Einsteinian physics are great models for
    different purposes. Similarly there are many ways to look at cultural
    evolution, one being memetics.

    Richard Brodie richard@brodietech.com www.memecentral.com/rbrodie.htm

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