Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id SAA02417 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 14 Feb 2000 18:03:52 GMT From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk> Organization: Reborn Technology To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: RE: meaning in memetics Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 16:33:08 +0000 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.0.21] Content-Type: text/plain References: <NBBBIIDKHCMGAIPMFFPJAELCEFAA.richard@brodietech.com> Message-Id: <00021416535701.00818@faichney> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Mon, 14 Feb 2000, Richard Brodie wrote:
>Robin wrote:
>
><<If Dennett really would stand on the claim that "intentionalities are
>necessarily involved in memetics" then I'm sorry to have to say he's wrong.
>I
>do know that he does not understand the difference between physical and
>intentional information, because he said as much at the May 99 Cambridge
>meeting, but given his work with Sue Blackmore, he should be familiar with
>the
>argument as to the memetic nature of birdsong. Ah well, I guess maybe he's
>not
>infallible after all.>>
>
>Dennett and I are pretty much in agreement on everything to do with memetics
>that I am aware of... of course his understanding goes much deeper than mine
>as he is so well grounded in the many branches of philosophy. The birdsong
>example is distracting because it brings into play the question of non-human
>transmission of culture, which arguably exists but is clearly, to me at
>least, a different animal from memetics, which studies the interplay between
>self-replicating information and the human mind.
I'm guessing you didn't notice that "necessarily" in there. What I'm working
on is the foundations of memetics. I'm quite happy with the suggestion that
most -- nearly all, even -- of the study of memetics in humans concerns "the
interplay between self-replicating information and the human mind". But it's
surely better to say that there are huge differences between avian and human
memetics, than to say that the former isn't memetics at all. Aren't we talking
basically about patterns of behaviour replicating via imitation? Why should
memetics be exclusively about the human mind? I recognise your concerns, but I
don't recognise your right to rule out mine, even if only by saying "that's not
real memetics".
>To say that Dennett "does not understand" the difference between physical
>and intentional information is perhaps unfair. It might be more accurate to
>say that he does not acknowledge such a difference.
No, I'm very sure that if asked in those terms, he would acknowledge it. But
at that meeting, a printed sheet of paper was held up and the question asked,
"what's the difference between the information printed here, and the
information inherent in the structure of the paper", and Dennett said, in
effect, "I don't know, but I don't think we need to worry about that right
now". The difference is that the printed information is intentional and the
structural information is physical.
>You believe that there are inherent patterns to be found in the universe. I
>think it is more useful to believe that all patterns are in the eye of the
>beholder.
I know you do, and I have difficulty understanding how you can maintain that
belief alongside a recognition of the value of the scientific method. If there
are no patterns "out there", how can any model ever predict anything? If
everything was random, there would be no science whatsoever (in fact, no
people, no life...).
>Your claim that he is "wrong" is disturbing. Do you really think there is
>one "right" model and that all others are "wrong"? The test of a good
>scientific model is the results it produces predictively, and further down
>the road the engineering that can be done with that model. From that
>standpoint both Newtonian and Einsteinian physics are great models for
>different purposes. Similarly there are many ways to look at cultural
>evolution, one being memetics.
Yes, there are multiple viewpoints, and so on, but I return to that word
"necessarily". It's the person who uses that, not me, who is being dogmatic
and restrictive about what's what. All I'm saying is that useful work can be
done in memetics, particularly on its foundations, without bringing in
intentionality. That leaves everything wide open. Exactly as it should be.
-- Robin Faichney===============================This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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