Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id XAA03700 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 14 Feb 2000 23:20:23 GMT Message-Id: <200002142318.SAA25577@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 17:22:13 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: meaning in memetics In-reply-to: <00021416535701.00818@faichney> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
Organization: Reborn Technology
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: RE: meaning in memetics
Date sent: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 16:33:08 +0000
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Mon, 14 Feb 2000, Richard Brodie wrote:
> >Robin wrote:
> >
> ><<If Dennett really would stand on the claim that "intentionalities are
> >necessarily involved in memetics" then I'm sorry to have to say he's wrong.
> >I
> >do know that he does not understand the difference between physical and
> >intentional information, because he said as much at the May 99 Cambridge
> >meeting, but given his work with Sue Blackmore, he should be familiar with
> >the
> >argument as to the memetic nature of birdsong. Ah well, I guess maybe he's
> >not
> >infallible after all.>>
> >
> >Dennett and I are pretty much in agreement on everything to do with memetics
> >that I am aware of... of course his understanding goes much deeper than mine
> >as he is so well grounded in the many branches of philosophy. The birdsong
> >example is distracting because it brings into play the question of non-human
> >transmission of culture, which arguably exists but is clearly, to me at
> >least, a different animal from memetics, which studies the interplay between
> >self-replicating information and the human mind.
>
> I'm guessing you didn't notice that "necessarily" in there. What I'm working
> on is the foundations of memetics. I'm quite happy with the suggestion that
> most -- nearly all, even -- of the study of memetics in humans concerns "the
> interplay between self-replicating information and the human mind". But it's
> surely better to say that there are huge differences between avian and human
> memetics, than to say that the former isn't memetics at all. Aren't we talking
> basically about patterns of behaviour replicating via imitation? Why should
> memetics be exclusively about the human mind? I recognise your concerns, but I
> don't recognise your right to rule out mine, even if only by saying "that's not
> real memetics".
>
Imitation is an intentional act; what the birds are doing is
circumscribed by instinct.
>
> >To say that Dennett "does not understand" the difference between physical
> >and intentional information is perhaps unfair. It might be more accurate to
> >say that he does not acknowledge such a difference.
>
> No, I'm very sure that if asked in those terms, he would acknowledge it. But
> at that meeting, a printed sheet of paper was held up and the question asked,
> "what's the difference between the information printed here, and the
> information inherent in the structure of the paper", and Dennett said, in
> effect, "I don't know, but I don't think we need to worry about that right
> now". The difference is that the printed information is intentional and the
> structural information is physical.
>
And without intentionality and the understanding of language, the
profusion of meaningless marks would be impossible to reproduce,
except by such an unlikely creature as an un-self-conscious
Kreskin. It is the very fact that the marks have a meaning which
may be understood and reproduced by those who grok the
language that makes the mnemonic function possible with regard
to the message printed on the paper.
>
> >You believe that there are inherent patterns to be found in the universe. I
> >think it is more useful to believe that all patterns are in the eye of the
> >beholder.
>
> I know you do, and I have difficulty understanding how you can maintain that
> belief alongside a recognition of the value of the scientific method. If there
> are no patterns "out there", how can any model ever predict anything? If
> everything was random, there would be no science whatsoever (in fact, no
> people, no life...).
>
Here I agree with Robin; there are patterns to be found in nature,
and we have evolved to be able to find and use them, as well as
create our own. Intentionality and signification are essential
components of such functions. Memetics, however, has nothing to
do with the primordial extraction of pattern from the natural world,
and everything to do with, subsequent to our imposition of meaning
and value upon it and our coding of it in a common symbol system,
its transmission and reception between, and mutation within,
intentional and signifying minds.
>
> >Your claim that he is "wrong" is disturbing. Do you really think there is
> >one "right" model and that all others are "wrong"? The test of a good
> >scientific model is the results it produces predictively, and further down
> >the road the engineering that can be done with that model. From that
> >standpoint both Newtonian and Einsteinian physics are great models for
> >different purposes. Similarly there are many ways to look at cultural
> >evolution, one being memetics.
>
> Yes, there are multiple viewpoints, and so on, but I return to that word
> "necessarily". It's the person who uses that, not me, who is being dogmatic
> and restrictive about what's what. All I'm saying is that useful work can be
> done in memetics, particularly on its foundations, without bringing in
> intentionality. That leaves everything wide open. Exactly as it should be.
>
If you want to study everything, then leave doors wide open. If you
want to study something in particular, such as memetics, it is
necessary to definitionally delimit the scope and range of the field
represented by the term, or end up saying nothing at all about
everything under the sun. To attempt a memetic ontology without
reference to meaning or intention is akin to attempting a football
pass without game definitions (general signification - language), a
football (specific message meaning), a passer (intender), a
trajectory (intending direction) or a receiver (the intended), in short,
to reduce the study to not only meaninglessness, which is bad
enouth, but to nothingness, which is worse.
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
>
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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