Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA21450 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 10 Feb 2000 01:55:38 GMT Message-Id: <200002100154.UAA22087@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 19:57:43 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: meaning in memetics In-reply-to: <ECS10002091254A@imap.uea.ac.uk> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Date sent: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:01:54 GMT
From: "Soc. Lab. 2" <A.Rousso@uea.ac.uk>
Subject: meaning in memetics
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> <snip from robin/joe>
>
> > >It does mean that you're wrong about meaning having no
> place in=20
> > >the foundation of memetics. Do you even know what the
> word=20
> > >"meme" means? Just as genetic characteristics are
> enGENdered=20
> > >(replicated) through sexual reproduction, memes are
> reMEMbered=20
> > >(lodged in the MEMory) by means of communicative
> replication=20
> > >between intentionalities.
> >
> > Again I have to ask, sez who? If this was established,
> you'd obviously b=
> > e
> > able to cite copious support. So why don't you?
> >
> > (In case it's not obvious, the point with which I disagree
> is that
> > intentionalities are necessarily involved. I know of no
> reason to believ=
> > e
> > that, and in fact, off hand, can't think of any argument
> that's ever been=
> > made
> > for it. Though I haven't yet read every article in the
> JoM archives.)
>
> you don't seem to have read much Dennett - or if you have,
> you're at total loggerheads with the most fundamental aspect
> of his theory. Joe's comprehensive mind/meaning list of
> authors nevertheless missed out Darwin's Dangerous Idea and
> Consciousness Explained, both by Dennett, and both it should
> be stressed, the only established works on mind that
> explicitly use memes. I could quote extensively from those
> two, but while you're in the mood to tell others how much
> reading they need to do, I guess I'll tell you to (re)read
> them. Here's a quote from "Dennett and his Critics", from
> Dennett's replies p.230:
>
> "Above the biological level of brute belief and simple
> intentional icons, human beings have constructed a level
> that is composed of objects that are socially constructed,
> replicated, distributed, traded (etc). . . Dawkins has given
> us a generic name for these things - memes - and what I have
> called opinions are a species of memes: sentences on whose
> truth a person has, in effect, made a wager."
>
> now, if that ain't meaning maybe we are going to have to go
> back to the basics.
>
> To reiterate, Dennett sez that intentionalities are
> necessarily involved in memetics - intentionalities are (he
> thinks) the foundations from which we get meaning, and
> memetics is his theory of meaning. And whether you like it
> or not, Dennett is the Granddaddy of memetics right now.
>
> cheers, alex rousso.
>
One could even find this tendency in Dawkins as well; my list
mainly included people with which I figured this list was not
intimately familiar, even though, for Robin's sake, I probably should
have included not only Bateson and Dennett, but Dawkins as well
(and probably Brodie and Lynch, too!).
>
>
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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