Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id DAA06184 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Fri, 1 Feb 2002 03:50:07 GMT X-Sender: unicorn@pop.greenepa.net Message-Id: <p04320401b87fbfa81759@[192.168.2.3]> Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 22:44:47 -0500 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk From: "Francesca S. Alcorn" <unicorn@greenepa.net> Subject: Perception, Memory, Knowledge, Imagination and Cognition Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
All of the other mental modalities have their source in
perception. Memory comes directly from perception, knowledge is the
subcless of former memories that have been narratively compressed or
abstractly represented, imagination is comprised of perceptions and
memories deconstructed and components of them recombined, and
cognition is the deconstruction and recombination of components of
perception and knowledge.
Memory is restricted to the reproduction to some degree of a
segment of past perception, complete with a spatiotemporal
perspective; thus memory is diachronic and positional. On the other
hand, knowledge of an informational datum would not entail that we be
capable of reproducing the experience of learning it; thus knowledge
may be considered synchronic and apositional. Imagination and
cognition extrapolate possibilities from the actualities grasped in
perception and retained in (for imagination) memory and (for
cognition) knowledge. However, imagination is restricted to a
generation of possible perceptions from particular spatiotemporal
perspectives and is diachronic and positional; cognition is
synchronic and apositional. Although they are all to some degree
autonomous with respect to perception (knowledge and cognition more
so than memory and imagination, due to the fact that the former two
have dispensed with spatiotemporal context), they are all directly or
ind!
irectly grounded in perception, and recurse to inform it. Forgetting
needs to be mentioned also. If we consider memory to be an imprinted
representation of presented experience, a perceptual text, if you
will, and subsequent experience to be continually inscribing upon the
same neural parchment, the minor details and routine experiences
would become obliterated first; thus broad outlines and the unusual
would be remembered longer. Finally, the experiential, that is,
spatiotemporal and object-perceptual context in which the information
was received would be destroyed, and thbat which remains would no
longer be memory, but knowledge. Cognition deconstructs and
recombines these nerratized and abstracted remainders, as imagination
deconstructs and recombines memory images (of all percpetual media,
not just visual) and perceptions.
>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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