Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id FAA23727 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 12 Apr 2001 05:14:01 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 23:16:33 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <3AD4E5D1.30064.608F66@localhost> In-reply-to: <00b201c0c2a2$bfd0da40$5eaefea9@rcn.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 11 Apr 2001, at 12:16, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 4:45 AM
> Subject: Re: Determinism
>
>
> > On 11 Apr 2001, at 3:59, Aaron Agassi wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> > > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 3:53 AM
> > > Subject: Re: Determinism
> > >
> > >
> > > > On 11 Apr 2001, at 2:41, Aaron Agassi wrote:
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> > > > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> > > > > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 2:13 AM
> > > > > Subject: Re: Determinism
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > On 9 Apr 2001, at 12:36, Aaron Agassi wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> > > > > > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> > > > > > > Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 4:59 AM
> > > > > > > Subject: Re: Determinism
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On 5 Apr 2001, at 8:36, Robin Faichney wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 08:55:38PM -0400, Aaron Agassi
> > > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Free choices being subjective, then,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > do not contradict with
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > objective
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > determinism.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You got it!
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now all we have to do is get it clear
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > that subjectivity is not
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > generally
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > inferior (or superior) to objectivity.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > What ever are you talking about?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Again, I have to spell it out: despite
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > being subjective, freedom
> > > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > > > > just
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > as real as -- something real.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where does superiority or inferiority come
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > into it?
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Illusions are generally considered inferior to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > real phenomena.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > I don't understand.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Don't you prefer reality over dealing with
> > > > > > > > > > > illusions?
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Preference is another question.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I don't think it's entirely rational either, but
> > > > > > > > > you'll find there's quite a widespread preference for
> > > > > > > > > objectivity over subjectivity.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Which is quite strange, considering that objectivity is
> > > > > > > > unattainable; the best we can do is intersubjective
> > > > > > > > agreement.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Never the less, we still seek to improve our knowledge of
> > > > > > > truth (correspondence to reality). And besides
> > > > > > > subjectivity, there is also relativity. And the question
> > > > > > > remains whether subjective freedom is illusory or simply
> > > > > > > relative to the subjective frame of reference, thus as
> > > > > > > objectively real as superdeterminism, globally.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > Much realer,
> > > > >
> > > > > No, only more immediate and vivid. And that IS entirely
> > > > > perceptual.
> > > > >
> > > > Can you name anything that does NOT originate in perception?
> > >
> > > *Anything that happens, happens, whether it is seen or not, and is
> > > caused prior to the outcome being witnessed.
> > >
> > But you can't NAME it, because that requires experience of it.
>
> So what?
>
It's US things have to be real TO; whenever we speak of the real,
the tag-end -for-us is assumed.
> > >
> > > > Certainly not our memories, nor the knowledge we extract from
> > > > generalizations of sets of them, nor our imagination, which is
> > > > memories dissected and recombined in novel ways, and cognition,
> > > > which is our knowledge dissected and combined in novel ways. But
> > > > we are capable of directing those dissections and
> > > > recombinations, and our actions taken on the basis of them.
> > >
> > > You are confusing Phenomenology with Ontology.
> > >
> > No, I'm well versed in both. Epistemology (what we may know)
> > demarks the parameters of ontology (what must be)
>
> You are confused! Epistemological limitations make the paramiters of
> what we can know. They don't magically control objective reality!
>
I'll try a concrete example for you in order to help you grasp the
concept.
If we can epistemologically verify that electrons do not possess
more mass than neutrons (and we can), then the ontological
alternatives wherein electrons must possess more mass than
neutrons are eliminated from the realm of possibility.
>
> , but as our
> > ability to know is imperfect (Heisenberg and Godel, among others),
> > ontological possibilities are not therefore winnowed to a single
> > actuality.
>
> You've got that bass-backwards! Because our ability to know is
> imperfect (measurement uncertainty, BTW predictable from
> Thermodynamics under the science of Fisher information,.and under the
> assumption that all physical information does exist, but is simply
> subject to Entropy in the retrieval process) that does not indicate
> that the unknown does not exist!
>
No, but it does indicate that whatever the unknown whole is, it
cannot contradict the known part. And I do NOT have it
backwards; that would be your (mis)understanding of what I said
(and just resaid). Since we have epistemologically imperfect
knowledge, multiple ontological alternatives are still within the
realm of possibility; because we have SOME knowledge (that is,
our knowledge is not entirely epistemologically absent), those
ontological alternatives that would contradict that knowledge we
have are eliminated from the realm of possibility.
>
> >And these terms only need be capitalized at the
> > beginnings of sentences; they are not proper names. The only
> > thing we can know about the whole (the noumenon, or thing-in-
> > itself), much of which is beyond the bounds of our perceptions, is
> > that it must be such that, when presented to our sensory apparati,
> > the phenomenon, the thing-for-us, what appears, must, as a part, not
> > be in contradiction with that whole; the whole must
> > noncontradictorally subsume the part as a component or aspect of
> > itself (this is known as mereology, the philosophy of wholes and
> > parts).
> > > > >
> > > > > >since we all personally, phenomenologically
> > > > > > experience our apodictically self-evident freedom, while
> > > > > > only some of us hypothecize and conjecture that they might
> > > > > > be deluded as to their own experience's facticity. To even
> > > > > > label such a conjecture as objectively real
> > > > >
> > > > > No hypothesis is real (except to the extent that such an
> > > > > hypothesis itself may have, indeed, been actually
> > > > > hypothesized), only, possibly, true (corespondent to reality).
> > > > >
> > > > But apodictically self-evident experience is real - which is my
> > > > point.
> > >
> > > Only real in so far as it is really experienced
> > >
> > But of course, and it is - by definition (I DID say apodictically
> > self- evident experience, didn't I?). What is NOT experienced is
> > the supposition of superdeterminism, which is much less real than
> > the grounds upon which ALL suppositions, legitimate and otherwise,
> > rest, and from which they are all logically or illogically drawn.
>
> You use the word 'real' to mean something other than objectively real.
>
It can only mean subjectively or intersubkectively real; 'objective
reality' is an abstract ideal fiction, epistemologically approachable
but never realizeable. That is, unless it is completely self-
contradictory, as reality 'experienced' by objects (which are
incapable of experience) would be.
> > > > >
> > > > > >(as if it were absolutely proven
> > > > >
> > > > > Another question entirely.
> > > > >
> > > > > Besides, as Einstein demonstrated, proof only exists in Logic
> > > > > and Mathematics. In all post priori questions, the best that
> > > > > may be had is evidentiary support.
> > > > >
> > > > But evidence for a universal empirical truth-claim must be
> > > > complete,
> > >
> > > False. Support only exists by degree.
> > >
> > Exactly my point - such evidence must be complete,
>
> Why must it be complete? Because you keep repeating that it must be?
>
> It must be complete for proof, which is impossible, but not for
> support which exists only by degrees.
>
It must be complete in the sense that if what is asserted is both
uni-versal AND empirical, which superdeterminism undeniably
purports to be, then populations representational of that universality
must be testable from all quarters within the uni-verse, for even
statistical probability to hold. Now, I'm sure you've been to the
distant past and far future, and everywhen in between, and all over
the cosmos during all these periods, diligently testing
superdeterminism, and it's not just a cognitive fixation with you. If
you would just publish your manner of spacetime travel, you could
make a mint. You'll also have to deal with the P-E pairs, human
freedom, Brownian motion, and Godel's Theorem, but I'm sure that
for an intrepid spacetime sojourner like you, those are just pesky
details.
>
> >but it CAN'T
> > be, thus any such truth-claim as superdeterminism is empirically
> > illegitimate.
> > >
> > > >and Popperianly, such evidence is impossible to muster;
> > >
> > > So, what?
> > >
> > So, science and the verification principle - DUH!.
>
> Popper rejects verification. - DUH!
>
No, Popper states that in the case of universal positive empirical
truth-claims, verification is both necessary (just as for any other
empirical truth-claims) and impossible.
>
> > Superdeterminism is, after all, an empirical assertion, but it is
> > an untestable one, since it would have to be tested absolutely,
> > which is impossible.
>
> The Popperian question is only whether it is at all supportable and/or
> refutable.
>
And it is unverifiable/unfalsifiable across the range of the truth-claim
(absolute - no exceptions, empirical - in the universe, and universe-
al - in ALL of it), thus it belongs in the realm of faith/belief, not
knowledge.
>
> >It therefroe lies irretrieveable within the realm of
> > belief, and outside the realm of knowledge - even provisional
> > knowledge (in addition to those pesky falsifying counterexamples,
> > namely, human freedom and those Houdini positron-electron pairs).
> > >
> > > > however, a single counterexample can put the lie to such
> > > > absolutistic universal claims, as do both our experienced
> > > > freedom
> > >
> > > No. I have already reconciled the global and the subjective.
> > >
> > So many a mystic has intoned, with no less credence.
> > >
> > > > and the observed appearing-disappearing positron-electron pairs.
> > > > >
> > > > > >- something that
> > > > > > can never happen for a positive universal empirical
> > > > > > truth-claim, since it violates Popperian falsifiability)
> > > > >
> > > > > Not so. Only one contrary example constitutes falsification.
> > > > >
> > > > But my point is that no amount of evidence would constitute
> > > > verification
> > >
> > > What is verification? There is only support, and by degrees, in
> > > all post priori questions.
> > >
> > Which reduces Superdeterminism to a belief with
> > unrefuted, and perhaps unrefuteable, counterexamples.
>
> If they are unrefutable, then they are unscientific, and probably
> belong to Quantum Mechanics!
>
You WOULD be a good droogie of Everette Allie and his crackpot
guru, Hall. Whatever we discover in the future about particle
physics, it will subsume the Standard Model as a special case, as
Einstein did Newton, and according to Kuhnian paradigm shifts.
> > >
> > > >because it can never be proven to be ALL the possible
> > > > evidence applicable. This is a logical point, of course;
> > > > empirically, the depths of all stars and the beginning and
> > > > ending of our universe cannot be plumbed for such evidence. One
> > > > cannot look under everty rock in the cosmos all the time. And
> > > > this is why...
> > > > >
> > > > > >is much worse than simply
> > > > > > logically incorrect; it is absurd and nonsensical on its
> > > > > > face.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > > Robin Faichney
> > > > > > > > > Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> > > > > > > > > (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to
> > > > > > > > > spin)
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
>
>
>
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