Re: Determinism

From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Wed Apr 11 2001 - 09:45:11 BST

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    Subject: Re: Determinism
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    On 11 Apr 2001, at 3:59, Aaron Agassi wrote:

    >
    > ----- Original Message -----
    > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 3:53 AM
    > Subject: Re: Determinism
    >
    >
    > > On 11 Apr 2001, at 2:41, Aaron Agassi wrote:
    > >
    > > >
    > > > ----- Original Message -----
    > > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    > > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    > > > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 2:13 AM
    > > > Subject: Re: Determinism
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > > On 9 Apr 2001, at 12:36, Aaron Agassi wrote:
    > > > >
    > > > > >
    > > > > > ----- Original Message -----
    > > > > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    > > > > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    > > > > > Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 4:59 AM
    > > > > > Subject: Re: Determinism
    > > > > >
    > > > > >
    > > > > > > On 5 Apr 2001, at 8:36, Robin Faichney wrote:
    > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 08:55:38PM -0400, Aaron Agassi
    > > > > > > > wrote:
    > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Free choices being subjective, then, do
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > not contradict with
    > > > > > > > > > > > > objective
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > determinism.
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You got it!
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now all we have to do is get it clear that
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjectivity is not
    > > > > > > > > > > > > generally
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > inferior (or superior) to objectivity.
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > What ever are you talking about?
    > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > Again, I have to spell it out: despite being
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective, freedom
    > > > > > > > > is
    > > > > > > > > > > just
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > as real as -- something real.
    > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > Where does superiority or inferiority come into
    > > > > > > > > > > > > it?
    > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > Illusions are generally considered inferior to
    > > > > > > > > > > > real phenomena.
    > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > I don't understand.
    > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > Don't you prefer reality over dealing with illusions?
    > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > Preference is another question.
    > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > I don't think it's entirely rational either, but you'll
    > > > > > > > find there's quite a widespread preference for objectivity
    > > > > > > > over subjectivity.
    > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > Which is quite strange, considering that objectivity is
    > > > > > > unattainable; the best we can do is intersubjective
    > > > > > > agreement.
    > > > > >
    > > > > > Never the less, we still seek to improve our knowledge of
    > > > > > truth (correspondence to reality). And besides subjectivity,
    > > > > > there is also relativity. And the question remains whether
    > > > > > subjective freedom is illusory or simply relative to the
    > > > > > subjective frame of reference, thus as objectively real as
    > > > > > superdeterminism, globally.
    > > > > >
    > > > > Much realer,
    > > >
    > > > No, only more immediate and vivid. And that IS entirely
    > > > perceptual.
    > > >
    > > Can you name anything that does NOT originate in perception?
    >
    > *Anything that happens, happens, whether it is seen or not, and is
    > caused prior to the outcome being witnessed.
    >
    But you can't NAME it, because that requires experience of it.
    >
    > > Certainly not our memories, nor the knowledge we extract from
    > > generalizations of sets of them, nor our imagination, which is
    > > memories dissected and recombined in novel ways, and cognition,
    > > which is our knowledge dissected and combined in novel ways. But we
    > > are capable of directing those dissections and recombinations, and
    > > our actions taken on the basis of them.
    >
    > You are confusing Phenomenology with Ontology.
    >
    No, I'm well versed in both. Epistemology (what we may know)
    demarks the parameters of ontology (what must be), but as our
    ability to know is imperfect (Heisenberg and Godel, among others),
    ontological possibilities are not therefore winnowed to a single
    actuality. And these terms only need be capitalized at the
    beginnings of sentences; they are not proper names. The only
    thing we can know about the whole (the noumenon, or thing-in-
    itself), much of which is beyond the bounds of our perceptions, is
    that it must be such that, when presented to our sensory apparati,
    the phenomenon, the thing-for-us, what appears, must, as a part,
    not be in contradiction with that whole; the whole must
    noncontradictorally subsume the part as a component or aspect of
    itself (this is known as mereology, the philosophy of wholes and
    parts).
    > > >
    > > > >since we all personally, phenomenologically
    > > > > experience our apodictically self-evident freedom, while only
    > > > > some of us hypothecize and conjecture that they might be deluded
    > > > > as to their own experience's facticity. To even label such a
    > > > > conjecture as objectively real
    > > >
    > > > No hypothesis is real (except to the extent that such an
    > > > hypothesis itself may have, indeed, been actually hypothesized),
    > > > only, possibly, true (corespondent to reality).
    > > >
    > > But apodictically self-evident experience is real - which is my
    > > point.
    >
    > Only real in so far as it is really experienced
    >
    But of course, and it is - by definition (I DID say apodictically self-
    evident experience, didn't I?). What is NOT experienced is the
    supposition of superdeterminism, which is much less real than the
    grounds upon which ALL suppositions, legitimate and otherwise,
    rest, and from which they are all logically or illogically drawn.
    > > >
    > > > >(as if it were absolutely proven
    > > >
    > > > Another question entirely.
    > > >
    > > > Besides, as Einstein demonstrated, proof only exists in Logic and
    > > > Mathematics. In all post priori questions, the best that may be
    > > > had is evidentiary support.
    > > >
    > > But evidence for a universal empirical truth-claim must be
    > > complete,
    >
    > False. Support only exists by degree.
    >
    Exactly my point - such evidence must be complete, but it CAN'T
    be, thus any such truth-claim as superdeterminism is empirically
    illegitimate.
    >
    > >and Popperianly, such evidence is impossible to muster;
    >
    > So, what?
    >
    So, science and the verification principle - DUH!.
    Supoerdeterminism is, after all, an empirical assertion, but it is an
    untestable one, since it would have to be tested absolutely, which
    is impossible. It therefroe lies irretrieveable within the realm of
    belief, and outside the realm of knowledge - even provisional
    knowledge (in addition to those pesky falsifying counterexamples,
    namely, human freedom and those Houdini positron-electron pairs).
    >
    > > however, a single counterexample can put the lie to such
    > > absolutistic universal claims, as do both our experienced freedom
    >
    > No. I have already reconciled the global and the subjective.
    >
    So many a mystic has intoned, with no less credence.
    >
    > > and the observed appearing-disappearing positron-electron pairs.
    > > >
    > > > >- something that
    > > > > can never happen for a positive universal empirical truth-claim,
    > > > > since it violates Popperian falsifiability)
    > > >
    > > > Not so. Only one contrary example constitutes falsification.
    > > >
    > > But my point is that no amount of evidence would constitute
    > > verification
    >
    > What is verification? There is only support, and by degrees, in all
    > post priori questions.
    >
    Which reduces Superdeterminism to a belief with
    unrefuted, and perhaps unrefuteable, counterexamples.
    >
    > >because it can never be proven to be ALL the possible
    > > evidence applicable. This is a logical point, of course;
    > > empirically, the depths of all stars and the beginning and ending of
    > > our universe cannot be plumbed for such evidence. One cannot look
    > > under everty rock in the cosmos all the time. And this is why...
    > > >
    > > > >is much worse than simply
    > > > > logically incorrect; it is absurd and nonsensical on its face.
    > > > > >
    > > > > > > > --
    > > > > > > > Robin Faichney
    > > > > > > > Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
    > > > > > > > (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
    > > > > > > >
    > > > > >
    > > > > >
    > > > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    >
    >
    >
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    >

    ===============================================================
    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



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