Re: Determinism

From: Aaron Agassi (agassi@erols.com)
Date: Wed Apr 11 2001 - 08:59:29 BST

  • Next message: Aaron Agassi: "Re: Determinism"

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    From: "Aaron Agassi" <agassi@erols.com>
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    Subject: Re: Determinism
    Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 03:59:29 -0400
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    ----- Original Message -----
    From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 3:53 AM
    Subject: Re: Determinism

    > On 11 Apr 2001, at 2:41, Aaron Agassi wrote:
    >
    > >
    > > ----- Original Message -----
    > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    > > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 2:13 AM
    > > Subject: Re: Determinism
    > >
    > >
    > > > On 9 Apr 2001, at 12:36, Aaron Agassi wrote:
    > > >
    > > > >
    > > > > ----- Original Message -----
    > > > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    > > > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    > > > > Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 4:59 AM
    > > > > Subject: Re: Determinism
    > > > >
    > > > >
    > > > > > On 5 Apr 2001, at 8:36, Robin Faichney wrote:
    > > > > >
    > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 08:55:38PM -0400, Aaron Agassi wrote:
    > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Free choices being subjective, then, do not
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > contradict with
    > > > > > > > > > > > objective
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > determinism.
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You got it!
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now all we have to do is get it clear that
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjectivity is not
    > > > > > > > > > > > generally
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > > inferior (or superior) to objectivity.
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > What ever are you talking about?
    > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > Again, I have to spell it out: despite being
    > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective, freedom
    > > > > > > > is
    > > > > > > > > > just
    > > > > > > > > > > > > as real as -- something real.
    > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > Where does superiority or inferiority come into it?
    > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > Illusions are generally considered inferior to real
    > > > > > > > > > > phenomena.
    > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > I don't understand.
    > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > Don't you prefer reality over dealing with illusions?
    > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > Preference is another question.
    > > > > > >
    > > > > > > I don't think it's entirely rational either, but you'll find
    > > > > > > there's quite a widespread preference for objectivity over
    > > > > > > subjectivity.
    > > > > > >
    > > > > > Which is quite strange, considering that objectivity is
    > > > > > unattainable; the best we can do is intersubjective agreement.
    > > > >
    > > > > Never the less, we still seek to improve our knowledge of truth
    > > > > (correspondence to reality). And besides subjectivity, there is
    > > > > also relativity. And the question remains whether subjective
    > > > > freedom is illusory or simply relative to the subjective frame of
    > > > > reference, thus as objectively real as superdeterminism, globally.
    > > > >
    > > > Much realer,
    > >
    > > No, only more immediate and vivid. And that IS entirely perceptual.
    > >
    > Can you name anything that does NOT originate in perception?

    *Anything that happens, happens, whether it is seen or not, and is caused
    prior to the outcome being witnessed.

    > Certainly not our memories, nor the knowledge we extract from
    > generalizations of sets of them, nor our imagination, which is
    > memories dissected and recombined in novel ways, and cognition,
    > which is our knowledge dissected and combined in novel ways.
    > But we are capable of directing those dissections and
    > recombinations, and our actions taken on the basis of them.

    You are confusing Phenomenology with Ontology.

    > >
    > > >since we all personally, phenomenologically
    > > > experience our apodictically self-evident freedom, while only some
    > > > of us hypothecize and conjecture that they might be deluded as to
    > > > their own experience's facticity. To even label such a conjecture
    > > > as objectively real
    > >
    > > No hypothesis is real (except to the extent that such an hypothesis
    > > itself may have, indeed, been actually hypothesized), only, possibly,
    > > true (corespondent to reality).
    > >
    > But apodictically self-evident experience is real - which is my point.

    Only real in so far as it is really experienced

    > >
    > > >(as if it were absolutely proven
    > >
    > > Another question entirely.
    > >
    > > Besides, as Einstein demonstrated, proof only exists in Logic and
    > > Mathematics. In all post priori questions, the best that may be had is
    > > evidentiary support.
    > >
    > But evidence for a universal empirical truth-claim must be
    > complete,

    False. Support only exists by degree.

    >and Popperianly, such evidence is impossible to muster;

    So, what?

    > however, a single counterexample can put the lie to such
    > absolutistic universal claims, as do both our experienced freedom

    No. I have already reconciled the global and the subjective.

    > and the observed appearing-disappearing positron-electron pairs.
    > >
    > > >- something that
    > > > can never happen for a positive universal empirical truth-claim,
    > > > since it violates Popperian falsifiability)
    > >
    > > Not so. Only one contrary example constitutes falsification.
    > >
    > But my point is that no amount of evidence would constitute
    > verification

    What is verification? There is only support, and by degrees, in all post
    priori questions.

    >because it can never be proven to be ALL the possible
    > evidence applicable. This is a logical point, of course; empirically,
    > the depths of all stars and the beginning and ending of our universe
    > cannot be plumbed for such evidence. One cannot look under
    > everty rock in the cosmos all the time. And this is why...
    > >
    > > >is much worse than simply
    > > > logically incorrect; it is absurd and nonsensical on its face.
    > > > >
    > > > > > > --
    > > > > > > Robin Faichney
    > > > > > > Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
    > > > > > > (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
    > > > > > >
    > > > >
    > > > >
    > > > >
    > >
    > >
    > >

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