Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id JAA21490 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 11 Apr 2001 09:23:48 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 03:26:04 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-transfer-encoding: Quoted-printable Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <3AD3CECC.29048.F13111@localhost> In-reply-to: <008e01c0c25c$69052ae0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 11 Apr 2001, at 3:52, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 3:40 AM
> Subject: Re: Determinism
>
>
> On 11 Apr 2001, at 1:41, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 1:25 AM
> > Subject: Re: Determinism
> >
> >
> > On 10 Apr 2001, at 13:02, Aaron Agassi wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Chris Taylor" <Christopher.Taylor@man.ac.uk>
> > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> > > Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 6:06 AM
> > > Subject: Re: Determinism
> > >
> > >
> > > > > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
> > > >
> > > > > Agreed.
> > > >
> > > > Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in
> > > > time, under exactly the same environmental conditions, with the
> > > > same orientation of molecules and distribution of charges around
> > > > their body (incl. nervous system), always make the same choice?
> > > > [Thereby obeying simple deterministic causality].
> > > >
> > > > If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough
> > > > way to be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that
> > > > to get our feeling of free choice - I know that on different
> > > > days I might make a different choice about the same thing
> > > > (because internals have changed, and so have other externals),
> > > > so am I building (flawed and internally different) models of
> > > > future behaviour all the time that come out at equivalent
> > > > fitness, or is there a more formal 'rounding' process going on
> > > > (i.e. most things seem roughly equivalent when not directly
> > > > compared side by side - you can tell different thickness of
> > > > paper apart well when they are both there to compare, but not so
> > > > well when the examinations of the two sheets are a day apart).
> > > >
> > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > > > Chris Taylor (chris@bioinf.man.ac.uk)
> > > > http://bioinf.man.ac.uk/ »people»chris
> > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Most precisely, perfect knowledge would negate choice, not
> > > freedom. Because the more one knows, this tends to narrow one's
> > > choices. -Down to the one optimal decision, given adequate
> > > knowledge, let alone hypothetical perfect and complete knowledge.
> > >
> > As I have stated before, there may be more than one optimal
> > choice available, such as multiple solutions to quadratic equations.
> >
> > *Ah, yes. But that is a problem of limited scope. Omniscience would
> > mean knowing which solution would be best for any application, and
> > every consequence.
> >
> But that is making the unwarranted assumption that one or the
> other would always be better than the other. Neither is better than
> the other for solving the equation.
>
> *But omniscience would extend beyond that trifle.
>
That is no trifle; that is a ground condition.
> > >
> > > But I have argued that even this might not actually negate
> > > freedom, or the feeling there of, because:
> > >
> > > Super Determinism is both necessary and sufficient for freedom.
> > > After all, what sort of freedom would be sheer randomness?
> > >
> > It is not an either/or, superdeterminism or complete randomness.
> >
> > *Non sequitur. So what?
> >
> Just the point that there is an entire spectrum between the poles
> which cannot be wished away or ignored.
>
> *Only if both do exist, whatever that means...
>
They both exist as concepts, and so does the territory between
them. I maintain that the state of affairs is somewhere in the
middle, a concretely real mean that walks the middle way between
two abstract ideal extremes.
> >
> > There may be influences which it is harder to oppose than to go
> > along with, although one can do either; the first just takes a
> > greater effort of will. You obviously believe that human striving
> > is for nothing, and that everything any of us does is effortless
> > because it is all predestined, and that our sensations of effort and
> > perseverence are travestous self-delusions. You can choose to
> > believe such tripe, but I refuse to.
> >
> > *You are not paying attention. I said nothing of effortlessness, and
> > I differentiate the subjective referential from the illusory.
> >
> You missed my point.
> There could be nothing BUT effortlessness is superdeterminism
> applied. Effort would not only be counterproductive, but impossible.
>
> *False. Subjective freedom, yadda yadda.
>
Neither self-consciousness nor will, illusory or otherwise, could
have evolved in a situation where they could not bring differential
selection pressures to bear.
> > >
> > > Freedom is characterized by predictable behavior: Give someone
> > > free reign over their impulses, and behavior will be predictable,
> > > and we call them predictable.
> > >
> > Actually, no; that is what being an individual is all about.
> >
> > *How does your response disagree with my initial statement?
> >
> Anyone who has any experience in sociology or economics knows
> that statistical models
>
> *Which are by definition not omniscient...
>
But they can be all-inclusive if every token of a type is included.
>
> not only project a wide spectrum of
> possibile responses, some more likely than others, but also that
> none of them may be assigned to an individual a priori.
>
> *Why not? Because of imperfect knowledge. Measurement uncertainty, not
> Indeterminacy (sic).
>
Knowledge must forever remain imperfect, since it cannot get to
the end of the infinite progression of knowing that it knows that it...
>
> Just
> because something may be (partially and sometimes) understood
> looking backwards does not mean that it can be predicted
> looking forwards.
>
> *But this is a question of feasibility, not principle.
>
If perfect knowledge is, IN PRINCIPLE, impossible because of the
infinite regression problem, it is indeed true in principle that all
perfect predictions cannot be made.
>
> > >
> > > Likewise, loftier motives. Because when we experience the greatest
> > > freedom in deciding choices, we say that in so far as such is
> > > conceivable, had we to do it again, we'd do it exactly the same.
> > > But when a person of principle is predictable, we call them,
> > > instead, reliable.
> > >
> > But this is exactly the delusion. Each moment happens but once; as
> > heraclitus says, one cannot step in the same river twice.
> >
> > *True, but hypothetical examples purely for illustration need not be
> > feasible in actuality.
> >
> If what is being proposed is a universal empirical condition, yes,
>
> *False
>
Not false, unless they meet the criterion Isubsequently stated (right
under this reply) which yours does not.
>
> they must, unless they are used to demonstrate the impossibility
> of an alternative, which yours does not.
>
> Why so? This does not follow.
>
It follows like a gutter ball down a gutter. The impossible cannot
directly demonstrate the possible or its certainty, for they are
different categories (one has an IM infront of it); it can only be used
to demonstrate the impossibility of alternatives to a possible.
> >
> > It is
> > therefore absurd and nonsensical to appeal to a hyppothetical
> > which is in fact an impossibility.
> >
> > *Not at all.
> >
> In the manner in and for the purpose for which you appealed, quite so.
>
> Why?
>
See above.
> >
> > If frogs had wings, they wouldn't
> > bump their butts when they hit the ground, and this has at least a
> > chance of some day happening.
> >
> > >
> > > Here, again, the predictability on principle, superdeterminism, is
> > > the foundation of freedom, not it's antithesis.
> > >
> > Because the premise is impossible, thus flawed,
> >
> > *Impossible for practical reasons, but neither inconceivable nor
> > internally inconsistent.
> >
> Absolute determinism is indeed incompatible with the evolution of
> conception.
>
> So you say. But you have not really explained, except by appeal to
> unsupported and inevident broad assertions.
>
Yes I have, repeatedly and voluminously; you must have forgotten,
not read, or be uncomprehending, so I'l repeat yet again. Unless
consciousness and will can exert differential influences upon
circumstances so that they can be selected for, there is no reason
for them to evolve, or for the massively complex structures
subtending them to have evolved; in the absence of such
selectional pressures, the chances that they would have
spontaneously done so are vanishingly small.
> >
> > the conclusion is
> > invalid and unsound (not to mention itself impossible). "Freedom Is
> > Slavery" is one of George Orwell's 1984 slogans, and what has
> > transpired here is Newspeak pseudoreasoning.
> >
> > > In Zen, the
> > enlightened man is said to be one with the law of causation, and the
> > perceptions of Determinism on the one hand, or of freedom, choice
> > and influence, on the other hand, are both error, presumably from
> > uninspired failure to synthesize frames of reference (subjective
> > choice and objective Determinism) into the correct Gestalt.
> >
> Merleau-Ponty said that our freedom does not oppose itself to the
> situation but gears itself to the situation.
>
> *The omniscience. though it narrows away choice, would offer optimum
> freedom. As I have asserted all along.
>
Freedom and choice are not inversely correlative. The freedom to
do only one thing is poorer than the choice among many.
>
> We must choose from
> between the feasible alternatives available, but in most cases there
> are a multiplicity of feasible alternatives available from which to
> choose.
>
>
> *Surely, one would choose the best, the optimum, in so far as one only
> knew.
>
> *Choice obtains out of relative ignorance.
>
The idea that there is only one best choice is your first error; the
idea that perfect omniscience is possible considering infinite
regress is your second, and the assumed idea that there could be
either a) multiple or individual omnisciences who nevertheless
would not choose according to their individual styles, or b) that
there could be only one omniscience that could still have a
personality on which to base its choice - is your third.
>
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===============================This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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