Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id IAA21296 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 11 Apr 2001 08:42:04 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 02:43:51 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <3AD3C4E7.15157.CA8A48@localhost> In-reply-to: <006301c0c251$783d59c0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 11 Apr 2001, at 2:34, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 1:45 AM
> Subject: Re: Determinism
>
>
> > On 10 Apr 2001, at 13:33, Robin Faichney wrote:
> >
> > > On Tue, Apr 10, 2001 at 11:06:04AM +0100, Chris Taylor wrote:
> > > > > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
> > > >
> > > > > Agreed.
> > > >
> > > > Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in
> > > > time, under exactly the same environmental conditions, with the
> > > > same orientation of molecules and distribution of charges around
> > > > their body (incl. nervous system), always make the same choice?
> > > > [Thereby obeying simple deterministic causality].
> > >
> > > The only way two scenarios can be absolutely identical is if you
> > > look at one scenario twice. In which case, the same decision
> > > would be made.
> > >
> > > I hope you don't think that's a glib or tricksy answer. I mean it
> > > absolutely seriously. If everything is the same, then everything
> > > will be the same.
> > >
> > But the same situation cannot ever recur; even memory of the first
> > would be too much, as would the simple molecular changes of
> > ourselves and our environs. The impossible is an illegitimate
> > hypothetical.
>
> No. The impossible includes many legitimate hypotheticals.
>
The impossible cannot be used to prove the certain except be
elimination of alternatives, which your usage does not. It can show
that 2 + 2 must equal 4 by eliminating all other alternatives.
>
> > >
> > > > If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough
> > > > way to be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that
> > > > to get our feeling of free choice - I know that on different
> > > > days I might make a different choice about the same thing
> > > > (because internals have changed, and so have other externals),
> > > > so am I building (flawed and internally different) models of
> > > > future behaviour all the time that come out at equivalent
> > > > fitness,
> > >
> > > Sorry, don't know what you mean by that.
> > >
> > > > or is there a more formal 'rounding' process going
> > > > on (i.e. most things seem roughly equivalent when not directly
> > > > compared side by side - you can tell different thickness of
> > > > paper apart well when they are both there to compare, but not so
> > > > well when the examinations of the two sheets are a day apart).
> > >
> > > Nope, I just don't get this. You are free, though your molecules
> > > and your brain cells are not. The concept of freedom only applies
> > > to creatures with some intelligence (I won't try to quantify how
> > > much), and brain cells have none -- they're just tiny bits of
> > > electrochemical gear.
> > >
> > > The only problem I see here is to get your head around the meaning
> > > of "subjective". The way I see it (!) is: because something is
> > > only evident from one point of view does *not* imply it's
> > > illusory. What "subjective" means in this context is "evident from
> > > only one point of view". All of our experience tells us we're
> > > free, to some extent. ANY theory that denies such a self-evident
> > > truth has to be wrong. In fact, the concept of freedom derives
> > > from our experience of it, so that we are free is true BY
> > > DEFINITION! So all we have to do now is to understand the
> > > relationship between our brain cells and ourselves, where that
> > > they are determined, and that we are free, are facts that the
> > > theory has to account for. It's not an easy job, but there really
> > > is no alternative, and I think I've made real progress on it
> > > (standing on the shoulders of those such as Dennett and Nagel).
> > >
> For, in Zen, the enlightened man is said to be one with the law of
> causation, and the perceptions of Determinism on the one hand, or of
> freedom, choice and influence, on the other hand, are both error,
> presumably from uninspired failure to synthesize frames of reference
> (subjective choice and objective Determinism) into the correct
> Gestalt.
>
This is a repeat of another statement in another thread, and my
Merleau-Pontian answer there still holds here.
>
> > This is true enough; we have apodictically self-evident and
> > undeniable experiential evidence of our own freedom, and only
> > Popperianly logically flawed overgeneralizations (to universality,
> > yet) of some (not all, and of objects, not ourselves) empirical
> > observations which may be interpreted to be in line with
> > superdeterminism. The rational and reasonable alternative is
> > transparently obvious.
> > > --
> > > Robin Faichney
> > > Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> > > (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
> > >
> > > ===============================================================
> > > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > =============================================================== This
> > was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of
> > Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For
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> > http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
> >
> >
>
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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