Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id IAA21272 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 11 Apr 2001 08:37:35 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 02:40:08 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-transfer-encoding: Quoted-printable Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <3AD3C408.16661.C72351@localhost> In-reply-to: <005a01c0c24a$12cbf9e0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 11 Apr 2001, at 1:41, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 1:25 AM
> Subject: Re: Determinism
>
>
> On 10 Apr 2001, at 13:02, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Chris Taylor" <Christopher.Taylor@man.ac.uk>
> > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> > Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 6:06 AM
> > Subject: Re: Determinism
> >
> >
> > > > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
> > >
> > > > Agreed.
> > >
> > > Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in time,
> > > under exactly the same environmental conditions, with the same
> > > orientation of molecules and distribution of charges around their
> > > body (incl. nervous system), always make the same choice? [Thereby
> > > obeying simple deterministic causality].
> > >
> > > If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough
> > > way to be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that to
> > > get our feeling of free choice - I know that on different days I
> > > might make a different choice about the same thing (because
> > > internals have changed, and so have other externals), so am I
> > > building (flawed and internally different) models of future
> > > behaviour all the time that come out at equivalent fitness, or is
> > > there a more formal 'rounding' process going on (i.e. most things
> > > seem roughly equivalent when not directly compared side by side -
> > > you can tell different thickness of paper apart well when they are
> > > both there to compare, but not so well when the examinations of
> > > the two sheets are a day apart).
> > >
> > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > > Chris Taylor (chris@bioinf.man.ac.uk)
> > > http://bioinf.man.ac.uk/ »people»chris
> > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > >
> >
> >
> > Most precisely, perfect knowledge would negate choice, not freedom.
> > Because the more one knows, this tends to narrow one's choices.
> > -Down to the one optimal decision, given adequate knowledge, let
> > alone hypothetical perfect and complete knowledge.
> >
> As I have stated before, there may be more than one optimal
> choice available, such as multiple solutions to quadratic equations.
>
> *Ah, yes. But that is a problem of limited scope. Omniscience would
> mean knowing which solution would be best for any application, and
> every consequence.
>
But that is making the unwarranted assumption that one or the
other would always be better than the other. Neither is better than
the other for solving the equation.
> >
> > But I have argued that even this might not actually negate freedom,
> > or the feeling there of, because:
> >
> > Super Determinism is both necessary and sufficient for freedom.
> > After all, what sort of freedom would be sheer randomness?
> >
> It is not an either/or, superdeterminism or complete randomness.
>
> *Non sequitur. So what?
>
Just the point that there is an entire spectrum between the poles
which cannot be wished away or ignored.
>
> There may be influences which it is harder to oppose than to go
> along with, although one can do either; the first just takes a greater
> effort of will. You obviously believe that human striving is for
> nothing, and that everything any of us does is effortless because it
> is all predestined, and that our sensations of effort and perseverence
> are travestous self-delusions. You can choose to believe such tripe,
> but I refuse to.
>
> *You are not paying attention. I said nothing of effortlessness, and I
> differentiate the subjective referential from the illusory.
>
You missed my point.
There could be nothing BUT effortlessness is superdeterminism
applied. Effort would not only be counterproductive, but impossible.
> >
> > Freedom is characterized by predictable behavior: Give someone free
> > reign over their impulses, and behavior will be predictable, and we
> > call them predictable.
> >
> Actually, no; that is what being an individual is all about.
>
> *How does your response disagree with my initial statement?
>
Anyone who has any experience in sociology or economics knows
that statistical models not only project a wide spectrum of
possibile responses, some more likely than others, but also that
none of them may be assigned to an individual a priori. Just
because something may be (partially and sometimes) understood
looking backwards does not mean that it can be predicted
looking forwards.
> >
> > Likewise, loftier motives. Because when we experience the greatest
> > freedom in deciding choices, we say that in so far as such is
> > conceivable, had we to do it again, we'd do it exactly the same. But
> > when a person of principle is predictable, we call them, instead,
> > reliable.
> >
> But this is exactly the delusion. Each moment happens but once;
> as heraclitus says, one cannot step in the same river twice.
>
> *True, but hypothetical examples purely for illustration need not be
> feasible in actuality.
>
If what is being proposed is a universal empirical condition, yes,
they must, unless they are used to demonstrate the impossibility
of an alternative, which yours does not.
>
> It is
> therefore absurd and nonsensical to appeal to a hyppothetical
> which is in fact an impossibility.
>
> *Not at all.
>
In the manner in and for the purpose for which you appealed, quite
so.
>
> If frogs had wings, they wouldn't
> bump their butts when they hit the ground, and this has at least a
> chance of some day happening.
>
> >
> > Here, again, the predictability on principle, superdeterminism, is
> > the foundation of freedom, not it's antithesis.
> >
> Because the premise is impossible, thus flawed,
>
> *Impossible for practical reasons, but neither inconceivable nor
> internally inconsistent.
>
Absolute determinism is indeed incompatible with the evolution of
conception.
>
> the conclusion is
> invalid and unsound (not to mention itself impossible). "Freedom Is
> Slavery" is one of George Orwell's 1984 slogans, and what has
> transpired here is Newspeak pseudoreasoning.
>
> > In Zen, the
> enlightened man is said to be one with the law of causation, and the
> perceptions of Determinism on the one hand, or of freedom, choice and
> influence, on the other hand, are both error, presumably from
> uninspired failure to synthesize frames of reference (subjective
> choice and objective Determinism) into the correct Gestalt.
>
Merleau-Ponty said that our freedom does not oppose itself to the
situation but gears itself to the situation. We must choose from
between the feasible alternatives available, but in most cases there
are a multiplicity of feasible alternatives available from which to
choose.
>
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Apr 11 2001 - 08:40:24 BST