Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id GAA20901 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 11 Apr 2001 06:45:19 +0100 Message-ID: <005a01c0c24a$12cbf9e0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> From: "Aaron Agassi" <agassi@erols.com> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> References: <3AD3A486.11233.4C0CF1@localhost> Subject: Re: Determinism Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 01:41:36 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4522.1200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4522.1200 Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
----- Original Message -----
From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 1:25 AM
Subject: Re: Determinism
On 10 Apr 2001, at 13:02, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Chris Taylor" <Christopher.Taylor@man.ac.uk>
> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 6:06 AM
> Subject: Re: Determinism
>
>
> > > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
> >
> > > Agreed.
> >
> > Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in time,
> > under exactly the same environmental conditions, with the same
> > orientation of molecules and distribution of charges around their
> > body (incl. nervous system), always make the same choice? [Thereby
> > obeying simple deterministic causality].
> >
> > If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough way
> > to be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that to get
> > our feeling of free choice - I know that on different days I might
> > make a different choice about the same thing (because internals have
> > changed, and so have other externals), so am I building (flawed and
> > internally different) models of future behaviour all the time that
> > come out at equivalent fitness, or is there a more formal 'rounding'
> > process going on (i.e. most things seem roughly equivalent when not
> > directly compared side by side - you can tell different thickness of
> > paper apart well when they are both there to compare, but not so
> > well when the examinations of the two sheets are a day apart).
> >
> > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > Chris Taylor (chris@bioinf.man.ac.uk)
> > http://bioinf.man.ac.uk/ »people»chris
> > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >
>
>
> Most precisely, perfect knowledge would negate choice, not freedom.
> Because the more one knows, this tends to narrow one's choices. -Down
> to the one optimal decision, given adequate knowledge, let alone
> hypothetical perfect and complete knowledge.
>
As I have stated before, there may be more than one optimal
choice available, such as multiple solutions to quadratic equations.
*Ah, yes. But that is a problem of limited scope. Omniscience would mean
knowing which solution would be best for any application, and every
consequence.
>
> But I have argued that even this might not actually negate freedom, or
> the feeling there of, because:
>
> Super Determinism is both necessary and sufficient for freedom. After
> all, what sort of freedom would be sheer randomness?
>
It is not an either/or, superdeterminism or complete randomness.
*Non sequitur. So what?
There may be influences which it is harder to oppose than to go
along with, although one can do either; the first just takes a greater
effort of will. You obviously believe that human striving is for
nothing, and that everything any of us does is effortless because it
is all predestined, and that our sensations of effort and
perseverence are travestous self-delusions. You can choose to
believe such tripe, but I refuse to.
*You are not paying attention. I said nothing of effortlessness, and I
differentiate the subjective referential from the illusory.
>
> Freedom is characterized by predictable behavior: Give someone free
> reign over their impulses, and behavior will be predictable, and we
> call them predictable.
>
Actually, no; that is what being an individual is all about.
*How does your response disagree with my initial statement?
>
> Likewise, loftier motives. Because when we experience the greatest
> freedom in deciding choices, we say that in so far as such is
> conceivable, had we to do it again, we'd do it exactly the same. But
> when a person of principle is predictable, we call them, instead,
> reliable.
>
But this is exactly the delusion. Each moment happens but once;
as heraclitus says, one cannot step in the same river twice.
*True, but hypothetical examples purely for illustration need not be
feasible in actuality.
It is
therefore absurd and nonsensical to appeal to a hyppothetical
which is in fact an impossibility.
*Not at all.
If frogs had wings, they wouldn't
bump their butts when they hit the ground, and this has at least a
chance of some day happening.
>
> Here, again, the predictability on principle, superdeterminism, is the
> foundation of freedom, not it's antithesis.
>
Because the premise is impossible, thus flawed,
*Impossible for practical reasons, but neither inconceivable nor internally
inconsistent.
the conclusion is
invalid and unsound (not to mention itself impossible). "Freedom Is
Slavery" is one of George Orwell's 1984 slogans, and what has
transpired here is Newspeak pseudoreasoning.
>
>
In Zen, the enlightened man is said to be one with the law of causation, and
the perceptions of Determinism on the one hand, or of freedom, choice and
influence, on the other hand, are both error, presumably from uninspired
failure to synthesize frames of reference (subjective choice and objective
Determinism) into the correct Gestalt.
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