Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id HAA21077 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 11 Apr 2001 07:38:17 +0100 Message-ID: <006301c0c251$783d59c0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> From: "Aaron Agassi" <agassi@erols.com> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> References: <3AD2DB0C.10E293B9@bioinf.man.ac.uk>; from Christopher.Taylor@man.ac.uk on Tue, Apr 10, 2001 at 11:06:04AM +0100 <3AD3A935.30001.5E567E@localhost> Subject: Re: Determinism Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 02:34:32 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4522.1200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4522.1200 Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
----- Original Message -----
From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 1:45 AM
Subject: Re: Determinism
> On 10 Apr 2001, at 13:33, Robin Faichney wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Apr 10, 2001 at 11:06:04AM +0100, Chris Taylor wrote:
> > > > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
> > >
> > > > Agreed.
> > >
> > > Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in time,
> > > under exactly the same environmental conditions, with the same
> > > orientation of molecules and distribution of charges around their
> > > body (incl. nervous system), always make the same choice? [Thereby
> > > obeying simple deterministic causality].
> >
> > The only way two scenarios can be absolutely identical is if you look
> > at one scenario twice. In which case, the same decision would be
> > made.
> >
> > I hope you don't think that's a glib or tricksy answer. I mean it
> > absolutely seriously. If everything is the same, then everything will
> > be the same.
> >
> But the same situation cannot ever recur; even memory of the first
> would be too much, as would the simple molecular changes of
> ourselves and our environs. The impossible is an illegitimate
> hypothetical.
No. The impossible includes many legitimate hypotheticals.
> >
> > > If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough way
> > > to be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that to get
> > > our feeling of free choice - I know that on different days I might
> > > make a different choice about the same thing (because internals have
> > > changed, and so have other externals), so am I building (flawed and
> > > internally different) models of future behaviour all the time that
> > > come out at equivalent fitness,
> >
> > Sorry, don't know what you mean by that.
> >
> > > or is there a more formal 'rounding' process going
> > > on (i.e. most things seem roughly equivalent when not directly
> > > compared side by side - you can tell different thickness of paper
> > > apart well when they are both there to compare, but not so well when
> > > the examinations of the two sheets are a day apart).
> >
> > Nope, I just don't get this. You are free, though your molecules and
> > your brain cells are not. The concept of freedom only applies to
> > creatures with some intelligence (I won't try to quantify how much),
> > and brain cells have none -- they're just tiny bits of electrochemical
> > gear.
> >
> > The only problem I see here is to get your head around the meaning of
> > "subjective". The way I see it (!) is: because something is only
> > evident from one point of view does *not* imply it's illusory. What
> > "subjective" means in this context is "evident from only one point of
> > view". All of our experience tells us we're free, to some extent. ANY
> > theory that denies such a self-evident truth has to be wrong. In fact,
> > the concept of freedom derives from our experience of it, so that we
> > are free is true BY DEFINITION! So all we have to do now is to
> > understand the relationship between our brain cells and ourselves,
> > where that they are determined, and that we are free, are facts that
> > the theory has to account for. It's not an easy job, but there really
> > is no alternative, and I think I've made real progress on it (standing
> > on the shoulders of those such as Dennett and Nagel).
> >
For, in Zen, the enlightened man is said to be one with the law of
causation, and the perceptions of Determinism on the one hand, or of
freedom, choice and influence, on the other hand, are both error, presumably
from uninspired failure to synthesize frames of reference (subjective choice
and objective Determinism) into the correct Gestalt.
> This is true enough; we have apodictically self-evident and
> undeniable experiential evidence of our own freedom, and only
> Popperianly logically flawed overgeneralizations (to universality,
> yet) of some (not all, and of objects, not ourselves) empirical
> observations which may be interpreted to be in line with
> superdeterminism. The rational and reasonable alternative is
> transparently obvious.
> > --
> > Robin Faichney
> > Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> > (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
> >
> > ===============================================================
> > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
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> > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
> >
> >
>
>
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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