Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id SAA19873 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 10 Apr 2001 18:06:52 +0100 Message-ID: <007501c0c1e0$024cda40$5eaefea9@rcn.com> From: "Aaron Agassi" <agassi@erols.com> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> References: <013f01c0bd6b$21682e80$5eaefea9@rcn.com>; <3AD133AA.6664.BBCD42@localhost> <00ca01c0c113$29cfd680$5eaefea9@rcn.com> <20010409183947.A685@reborntechnology.co.uk> <003001c0c120$2cb138a0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> <20010410091320.A553@reborntechnology.co.uk> <3AD2DB0C.10E293B9@bioinf.man.ac.uk> Subject: Re: Determinism Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 13:02:21 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4522.1200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4522.1200 Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
----- Original Message -----
From: "Chris Taylor" <Christopher.Taylor@man.ac.uk>
To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 6:06 AM
Subject: Re: Determinism
> > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
>
> > Agreed.
>
> Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in time, under
> exactly the same environmental conditions, with the same orientation of
> molecules and distribution of charges around their body (incl. nervous
> system), always make the same choice? [Thereby obeying simple
> deterministic causality].
>
> If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough way to
> be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that to get our
> feeling of free choice - I know that on different days I might make a
> different choice about the same thing (because internals have changed,
> and so have other externals), so am I building (flawed and internally
> different) models of future behaviour all the time that come out at
> equivalent fitness, or is there a more formal 'rounding' process going
> on (i.e. most things seem roughly equivalent when not directly compared
> side by side - you can tell different thickness of paper apart well when
> they are both there to compare, but not so well when the examinations of
> the two sheets are a day apart).
>
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Chris Taylor (chris@bioinf.man.ac.uk)
> http://bioinf.man.ac.uk/ »people»chris
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
Most precisely, perfect knowledge would negate choice, not freedom. Because
the more one knows, this tends to narrow one's choices. -Down to the one
optimal decision, given adequate knowledge, let alone hypothetical perfect
and complete knowledge.
But I have argued that even this might not actually negate freedom, or the
feeling there of, because:
Super Determinism is both necessary and sufficient for freedom. After all,
what sort of freedom would be sheer randomness?
Freedom is characterized by predictable behavior: Give someone free reign
over their impulses, and behavior will be
predictable, and we call them predictable.
Likewise, loftier motives. Because when we experience the greatest freedom
in deciding choices, we say
that in so far as such is conceivable, had we to do it again, we'd do it
exactly the same. But when a person of principle is predictable, we call
them, instead, reliable.
Here, again, the predictability on principle, superdeterminism, is the
foundation of freedom, not it's antithesis.
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