Re: Determinism

From: Aaron Agassi (agassi@erols.com)
Date: Wed Apr 04 2001 - 17:18:29 BST

  • Next message: Aaron Agassi: "Re: Determinism"

    Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id RAA00735 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 4 Apr 2001 17:23:34 +0100
    Message-ID: <012601c0bd22$e32ba540$5eaefea9@rcn.com>
    From: "Aaron Agassi" <agassi@erols.com>
    To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    References: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D3101745D65@inchna.stir.ac.uk>
    Subject: Re: Determinism
    Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2001 12:18:29 -0400
    Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
    X-Priority: 3
    X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
    X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4522.1200
    X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4522.1200
    Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk
    Precedence: bulk
    Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Vincent Campbell" <v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk>
    To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2001 11:41 AM
    Subject: RE: Determinism

    > <No, just the opposite:
    >
    > > The less you know, the more options may seem viable. But the more one
    > > knows,
    > > the more choices are eliminated, because it becomes clear that they
    would
    > > not achieve the desired outcome. if one had perfect knowledge, there
    would
    > > always be only one optimum decision in ever circumstance. No range of
    > > choice.>
    > >
    > Ah, I see, I understand. But doesn't that have a normative
    > assumption, that with perfect knowledge one would be compelled to make the
    > optimum decision? Why should one make this assumption? Surely one is not
    > compelled to do what is optimum- or is that just a feature of the "real
    > world" impossibility of perfect knowledge (i.e. no-one behaves that way
    > because no-one has perfect knowledge)?
    >
    > Besides, I don't much like this designation of freedom as lack of
    > knowledge, which is essentially what's being stated. Perhaps I'm thinking
    > too much about the concept in terms of its usage in political philosophy.
    >
    > Vincent
    >
    >
    I confess that I find your implication of freedom as sheer perversity flying
    in the face of better judgement, the more disturbing. And I may even be
    forced to concede the possibility. But what kind of freedom is that? Is
    there nothing better?

    ===============================================================
    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Apr 04 2001 - 17:26:43 BST