Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id OAA02242 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 29 Mar 2001 14:57:11 +0100 Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2001 14:48:57 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <20010329144857.C547@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D3101745D31@inchna.stir.ac.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.15i In-Reply-To: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D3101745D31@inchna.stir.ac.uk>; from v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk on Thu, Mar 29, 2001 at 01:03:15PM +0100 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Thu, Mar 29, 2001 at 01:03:15PM +0100, Vincent Campbell wrote:
>
> <That "processes by which cultural information is transmitted" bit
> is
> > rubbish. At the most fundamental level, the processes are very simple,
> > and are roughly similar for all memes, religious, scientific or whatever.
> > If you want to know why people are susceptible to irrational beliefs, on
> > the other hand, the answer lies in psychology, not memetics. But then
> > psychology wouldn't give you such scope to display your prejudice,
> > would it?>
> >
> The processes are very simple and similar are they- how do you know?
> Isn't that what memetics is about, exploring the processes of cultural
> transmission, trying to identify them. That's what I think it's about,
> perhaps that's where our disagreements have their roots.
I don't particularly believe in memetics as a science, and I consequently
don't care much what those who do, think it's about. I'm with Dennett in
seeing it as being primarily of philosophical interest.
I said "at the most fundamental level". What we have is transmission of
information from one brain to another via behaviour and artefacts. It
really is that simple -- if you disagree, please explain why.
> Irrational beliefs
> are a good place to start because we know that people don't believe them
> because they are genuinely true-
Some beliefs are held because most other people around hold them,
and it's easier socially just to fit in, rather than question them.
There are doubtless many other "bad" reasons to hold beliefs. Why you
think this is better tackled by looking at the transmission of cultural
information, than by psychology, defeats me.
> not in the why of those beliefs which, of
> course, is a question for psychology- but in the how of transmission from
> person to person, and the why of particular beliefs over others.
The "how of transmission" I described above. I can't imagine why you
think the "why of particular beliefs over others" is a matter for memetics
rather than psychology.
> In other
> words, given two equally false beliefs, why does one become a global belief,
> and the other a local or even idiosyncratic one?
That's for psychology, social anthropology, etc. to answer. The
transmission of the information is a "no-brainer". The question is,
why does it take root in the individual brain.
Regarding all that followed in this message, sometimes the baiting of the
rabidly anti-religious just gets unbearably tedious, like here and now,
which is why I'm dropping it. You're welcome to any consequent feeling
of victory. You may even crow a little, and I probably won't bother to
respond. For various obvious reasons, I think we'd do better to focus
more closely on memetics.
-- Robin Faichney Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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