RE: The Demise of a Meme

From: Vincent Campbell (v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk)
Date: Thu Mar 29 2001 - 13:03:15 BST

  • Next message: Robin Faichney: "Re: The Demise of a Meme"

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    From: Vincent Campbell <v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk>
    To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Subject: RE: The Demise of a Meme
    Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2001 13:03:15 +0100
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            <And the opportunity it affords you to do all the religion-bashing
    you
    > like is just a bonus, I suppose.>
    >
            As if I needed new opportunities to do this...

            <That "processes by which cultural information is transmitted" bit
    is
    > rubbish. At the most fundamental level, the processes are very simple,
    > and are roughly similar for all memes, religious, scientific or whatever.
    > If you want to know why people are susceptible to irrational beliefs, on
    > the other hand, the answer lies in psychology, not memetics. But then
    > psychology wouldn't give you such scope to display your prejudice,
    > would it?>
    >
            The processes are very simple and similar are they- how do you know?
    Isn't that what memetics is about, exploring the processes of cultural
    transmission, trying to identify them. That's what I think it's about,
    perhaps that's where our disagreements have their roots. Irrational beliefs
    are a good place to start because we know that people don't believe them
    because they are genuinely true- not in the why of those beliefs which, of
    course, is a question for psychology- but in the how of transmission from
    person to person, and the why of particular beliefs over others. In other
    words, given two equally false beliefs, why does one become a global belief,
    and the other a local or even idiosyncratic one?

            <Have you forgotten how I explained that I don't believe in ridding
    > oneself of memes either, but rather in not clinging to or avoiding them?
    > I said in so many words that the brain is still full of memes, but I
    > try not to regard any of them as particularly "mine". Is there any
    > possibility of progress here, or are we doomed to keep slipping back
    > into entrenched positions?>
    >
            I don't know, that depends if you'll ever see the contradiction in
    your position.

            <Thanks Vincent. That's exactly what I was talking about. Your
    > determination to keep science superior -- and to do so using memetics,
    > if possible -- is blinding you to the simple truth. Which is that all
    > items of cultural information are, by definition, equally memetic.
    > And that has absolutely no implication as to their value! That's just
    > your baggage, which you really need to drop. Every item of cultural
    > information is a meme. What differentiates one broad area of culture
    > from another is the kind of qualities that the memes inhabiting it need
    > to survive. As in, empirical testability, etc. There is plenty scope
    > there for you to propound the superiority of science, but no, you have
    > to try to say it's somehow "less memetic". That is precisely what I was
    > saying you do, and you just provided a perfectly clear example of it,
    > and my point is made. Thanks again.>
    >
            I don't know what you think I've said here that legitimates your
    perspective. It is not me that equates "equality" in memetic terms,
    whatever that actually means, with validity, which you quite clearly do.
    I've said that scientific theories, and science as an institution is
    potentially memetic, several times in fact, but science is a way of breaking
    through cultural filters to a closer approximation of the external world
    than religions which are not just rooted in culture, but define cultures.

            <Of course my practices (not beliefs) are consequential. But we
    were
    > talking about revelations, not consequences. My point was that there's
    > a clear division of labour: science investigates the external world,
    > religion investigates the internal world. A religion that claims to
    > offer revelations about the material world is as far off-track as those
    > people who still believe in cold fusion. The fact that there may be
    > consequences in either direction is irrelevant.>
    >
            You say potato... What I can't get is how someone well educated in
    psychology really feels there's as much personal insight to be gained from
    religious practices as from a discipline, however problematic it may be,
    that tries to be scientific.

    >> But your methodology has no yardstick by which to judge if
    its
    > >> appropriate to the task to which its directed.
    >
            <I think I'm quite a good judge of my mental state. Not perfect,
    I'm sure,
    > but good enough for practical purposes, in the real world.>
    >
            Exactly my point. Isn't it the most extreme form of audacity to
    presume that one is able to critically evaluate one's own mental state with
    any degree of objective accuracy?

            <Why don't you check it out then? Or would you prefer someone else
    did
    > it for you?>
    >
            Ther are many things we all think and do that we regard as
    'problems' that may in fact not be, if only we were prepared to consult
    others.

            <The main difference is that religion's yardsticks are primarily
    private,
    > so everyone has to do the experiment for themselves. If it was practical
    > -- which it obviously isn't -- that would be preferable in science too.>
    >
            I'd disagree here, religion's yardsticks aren't private, they're
    social, and crucially, arbitrary.

            <Any and every experiment requires a null hypothesis. Without a
    clear
    > idea of what is being tested, there is no experiment. Whether from a
    > dream or some other "internal" "revelation": no idea, no experiment.>
    >
            What about the phenomena in the first place, doesn't that precede
    the idea and the experiment?

            <That's easy. Because mine are tested every day. (Which makes them
    not
    > beliefs but working hypotheses.)>
    >
            You keep telling yourself that...

            <I've said a fuck of a lot more than that, and either you're just
    not
    > bothering to think about it, or you're deliberately ignoring it. I hope
    > it's the former, but either way it kind of looks like I'm wasting my time,
    > doesn't it?>
    >
            Robin, review your own posts, and tell me there isn't a common
    thrust of refusal to accept definition or location in response to challenges
    to the positions/definitions you offer.

    Vincent

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