Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id NAA00975 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 9 Oct 2000 13:55:57 +0100 From: "Richard Brodie" <richard@brodietech.com> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: RE: the conscious universe Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2000 05:53:11 -0700 Message-ID: <NBBBIIDKHCMGAIPMFFPJCEGMFIAA.richard@brodietech.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0) In-reply-to: <20001007170038.B799@reborntechnology.co.uk> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4133.2400 Importance: Normal Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Robin,
As far as I know, from reading his work and talking with him directly, I am
in complete agreement with Dennett's idea of memes. If I haven't presented
it that way it's due to my own failing. Dawkins I would say hasn't fleshed
out the concept to the degree you're looking for and prefers not to get too
deep into specifics. He is happy to take credit for popularizing the notion
that there might be another replicator beyond the gene without taking a
stand on the nature of the beast. He's endorsed both Blackmore's and my
books in his foreword to Meme Machine.
Richard Brodie richard@brodietech.com www.liontales.com
-----Original Message-----
From: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk [mailto:fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk]On Behalf Of
Robin Faichney
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2000 9:01 AM
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: the conscious universe
On Sat, Oct 07, 2000 at 07:49:53AM -0700, Richard Brodie wrote:
> I don't mean to imply anything subjective with my use of the word
"mental."
> The mind is a real, actual part of a human being (in my mind anyway).
I agree about the reality of the mind, but others do not. Subjective, for
me, does not mean "unreal", but for many it does. Dawkins and Dennett
are very keen on objectivity, and view memes as objective entities.
"Mental" does, I believe, imply "subjective", where that means not
"unreal", but associated with the subject, concerned with perceptions
rather than with what's "really out there", the object. Perceptions, are,
for me, IN THEIR OWN WAY as real as what's out there, but for Dennett they
are not. What I'm saying is that I really don't think Dennett would be
happy with "mental information", and I don't think you should talk about
the Dawkins/Dennett/Brodie definition, because there's no such beast.
They're interested in neural patterns, you're interested in mental ones.
To me, and others, these are different aspects of the same thing, but
I don't believe Dennett takes that view. Of course, you might know
otherwise, in which case I'll be happy to accept that I'm wrong.
-- Robin Faichney=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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