Re: the conscious universe

From: Joe E. Dees (joedees@bellsouth.net)
Date: Thu Oct 05 2000 - 01:23:22 BST

  • Next message: Lloyd Robertson: "Re: Purported mystical "knowledge""

    Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA03322 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 5 Oct 2000 01:21:01 +0100
    Message-Id: <200010050018.UAA05550@mail3.lig.bellsouth.net>
    From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2000 19:23:22 -0500
    Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
    Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
    Subject: Re: the conscious universe
    In-reply-to: <20001004092839.B10239@reborntechnology.co.uk>
    References: <200010032146.RAA19620@mail0.lig.bellsouth.net>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Tue, Oct 03, 2000 at 04:51:28PM -0500
    X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.01b)
    Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk
    Precedence: bulk
    Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    

    Date sent: Wed, 4 Oct 2000 09:28:39 +0100
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: the conscious universe
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
    Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk

    > On Tue, Oct 03, 2000 at 04:51:28PM -0500, Joe E. Dees wrote:
    > >
    > > > On Mon, Oct 02, 2000 at 08:31:50PM -0500, Joe E. Dees wrote:
    > > > > Yeah, except for one small detail; the world isn't as uniform as the
    > > > > pencil. People and animals are experientially quite different to us
    > > > > from rocks and running water.
    > > >
    > > > But do we ever experience their consciousness? I don't think so.
    > > > I say we take it on faith -- and that's exactly as it should be.
    > > > Skepticism ultimately falls into solipsism.
    > > >
    > > No, we take it on evidence; the evidence of the observed behavior of
    > > others, which is unlike that of rocks and running water, but is like
    > > our own - we who are conscious.
    >
    > Rocks and running water, obviously, are not conscious. People and animals
    > obviously seem to be so, and I am obviously not saying they're not.
    > My point is that *ultimately*, i.e. when delving down into the deepest
    > roots of what consciousness actually is, it makes most sense to consider
    > it an attribute of the universe as a whole, rather than a property or
    > function of some individual things. In that sense it is exactly like
    > life: it cannot be isolated, but can be understood when you ask what it is
    > about this universe that allows it to exhibit life -- and consciousness.
    > Systems thinking, Joe, as opposed to reductionism. And not terribly
    > difficult, once you get your blinkers off.
    >
    I utilize systems thinking, but the embrace of it does not entail that
    all systems, even the most simple, must be conscious; nor does it
    entail that the consciousness of sufficiently complex adaptive
    microsystems (dissipative systems is the Prigogine term) such as
    us bleeds past their and/or our boundary threshholds into the deep-
    space stardust near-void, or into any of the dust within it, or into a
    conscious animation of the entirety. You are in fact proposing a
    universal Gaia Hypothesis, which makes a lot less sense when
    applied to the cosmos than it does when applied terrestrially.
    > --
    > Robin Faichney
    >
    > ===============================================================
    > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
    >
    >

    ===============================================================
    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Oct 05 2000 - 01:22:30 BST