Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA03252 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 5 Oct 2000 01:14:27 +0100 Message-Id: <200010050011.UAA01083@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2000 19:16:36 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: the conscious universe In-reply-to: <20001004091712.A10239@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <200010032158.RAA23524@mail2.lig.bellsouth.net>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Tue, Oct 03, 2000 at 05:03:20PM -0500 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.01b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Date sent: Wed, 4 Oct 2000 09:17:12 +0100
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: the conscious universe
From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Tue, Oct 03, 2000 at 05:03:20PM -0500, Joe E. Dees wrote:
> >
> [RF]
> > > > > My computer can be said to react to sensing its keys being pressed by
> > > > > putting characters up on the screen (as well as doing much other stuff).
> > > > > Explain how "reaction to the sensed" is evidence of consciousness.
> [JD]
> > > > There is reaction in your attempted counterexample, but not
> > > > sensation; it is the same blind and qualeless physical reaction
> > > > present when one billiard ball strikes another, just hooked on a
> > > > longer causal chain. Thus, my example stands.
> [RF]
> > > No. You claimed that "reaction to the senses" is evidence of
> > > consciousness. And now you say the PC reacting to key presses doesn't
> > > count because it's not conscious. You are assuming what you set out
> > > to prove.
> [JD]
> > No, YOU are assuming what you set out to prove - that keyboards
> > sense, simply because you press them and text appears on the
> > screen. Does that mean that when you shoot a billiard ball and it
> > strikes another, that they sense each other? You have no
> > evidence of this, or of 'keyboard sensation', either.
>
> If you say that "sensing" logically implies consciousness, then you
> can't claim that sensing is evidence of consciousness.
>
OF COURSE you can. Given that if A (there is sensing), then B
(there is consciousness (this is what logical implication means - A
entails B)), then sensing IS INDEED evidence of consciousness.
>
> If "sensing" is to be used in the looser sense (!) of whatever stimulates
> a reaction, as it must to avoid that circularity, then my argument stands.
>
As I showed above, there is no corcularity; instead there is a linear
progression from premise to conclusion following the syllogistic
form of:
If A then B
A
Therefore B
> You claimed that "reaction to the senses" is evidence of consciousness.
> I don't say computers are conscious -- in fact, I say they're not.
> Which is why my example of a computer "reacting to its senses" contradicts
> your claim. Please try to keep track.
>
No, I am right on track. My point is that computers DO NOT
sense; when we type on the keyboard and text pops up, we are
simply observing (and participating in) a cause-effect chain bereft of
any sensing whatsoever except for ours.
>
> > > Self-reference is required only for self-consciousness, not for
> > > consciousness.
> > >
> > Actually, EXPLICIT self-reference is required for self-
> > consciousness; any time an organism reacts to its environment in
> > a discriminating fashion, the perceived environment changes, and
> > the reaction modifies again, which once again changes the
> > environment, and so on, a feedback loop of mutual co-reference is
> > established. It's just that this feedback loop may cycle inside the
> > brain, with no immediate connection to the environment, when one
> > engages in self-conscious ruminations. Such a complex loop,
> > either internal or external, is not possible between two rocks in
> > deep space; it is possible between living organisms and their
> > environing ecosystem.
>
> But I never said rocks are conscious. In fact, I said they're not.
> My contention is precisely that it's the universe as a whole that
> should be considered conscious, not individual components thereof.
>
SHOULD be considered conscious? That sounds like a religious
and moral appeal, not a logical argument. Either the universe as a
whole is or is not conscious, and the intermittent billiard-ball and
common gravitational connections between its components in deep
space are insufficient for the calibre of interrelations necessary to
support dynamic and recursive complexity.
>
> And, of course, this is deep philosophical mode: in ordinary life,
> we would still think of people and animals as being conscious.
> Universal consciousness, or panpsychism, is a solution to "the mind/body
> problem", that's all.
>
I believe that panpsychism is a religious assumption which only
serves to forestall further exploration into the structure, function and
prerequisites of consciousness by erroneously contending that an
answer is already known in spite of the absence of evidence for it,
when in fact it is a principle which must be believed-in, because it
cannot be known.
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
> ===============================================================
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>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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