Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id JAA29178 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 4 Oct 2000 09:53:58 +0100 Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2000 09:17:12 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: the conscious universe Message-ID: <20001004091712.A10239@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <200010030124.VAA06401@mail6.lig.bellsouth.net>; <20001003092815.A1129@reborntechnology.co.uk> <200010032158.RAA23524@mail2.lig.bellsouth.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i In-Reply-To: <200010032158.RAA23524@mail2.lig.bellsouth.net>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Tue, Oct 03, 2000 at 05:03:20PM -0500 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Tue, Oct 03, 2000 at 05:03:20PM -0500, Joe E. Dees wrote:
>
[RF]
> > > > My computer can be said to react to sensing its keys being pressed by
> > > > putting characters up on the screen (as well as doing much other stuff).
> > > > Explain how "reaction to the sensed" is evidence of consciousness.
[JD]
> > > There is reaction in your attempted counterexample, but not
> > > sensation; it is the same blind and qualeless physical reaction
> > > present when one billiard ball strikes another, just hooked on a
> > > longer causal chain. Thus, my example stands.
[RF]
> > No. You claimed that "reaction to the senses" is evidence of
> > consciousness. And now you say the PC reacting to key presses doesn't
> > count because it's not conscious. You are assuming what you set out
> > to prove.
[JD]
> No, YOU are assuming what you set out to prove - that keyboards
> sense, simply because you press them and text appears on the
> screen. Does that mean that when you shoot a billiard ball and it
> strikes another, that they sense each other? You have no
> evidence of this, or of 'keyboard sensation', either.
If you say that "sensing" logically implies consciousness, then you
can't claim that sensing is evidence of consciousness.
If "sensing" is to be used in the looser sense (!) of whatever stimulates
a reaction, as it must to avoid that circularity, then my argument stands.
You claimed that "reaction to the senses" is evidence of consciousness.
I don't say computers are conscious -- in fact, I say they're not.
Which is why my example of a computer "reacting to its senses" contradicts
your claim. Please try to keep track.
> > Self-reference is required only for self-consciousness, not for
> > consciousness.
> >
> Actually, EXPLICIT self-reference is required for self-
> consciousness; any time an organism reacts to its environment in
> a discriminating fashion, the perceived environment changes, and
> the reaction modifies again, which once again changes the
> environment, and so on, a feedback loop of mutual co-reference is
> established. It's just that this feedback loop may cycle inside the
> brain, with no immediate connection to the environment, when one
> engages in self-conscious ruminations. Such a complex loop,
> either internal or external, is not possible between two rocks in
> deep space; it is possible between living organisms and their
> environing ecosystem.
But I never said rocks are conscious. In fact, I said they're not.
My contention is precisely that it's the universe as a whole that
should be considered conscious, not individual components thereof.
And, of course, this is deep philosophical mode: in ordinary life,
we would still think of people and animals as being conscious.
Universal consciousness, or panpsychism, is a solution to "the mind/body
problem", that's all.
-- Robin Faichney=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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