Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id XAA27954 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 3 Oct 2000 23:01:15 +0100 Message-Id: <200010032158.RAA23524@mail2.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2000 17:03:20 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: the conscious universe In-reply-to: <20001003092815.A1129@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <200010030124.VAA06401@mail6.lig.bellsouth.net>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Mon, Oct 02, 2000 at 08:29:07PM -0500 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.01b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Date sent: Tue, 3 Oct 2000 09:28:15 +0100
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: the conscious universe
From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Mon, Oct 02, 2000 at 08:29:07PM -0500, Joe E. Dees wrote:
> > > My computer can be said to react to sensing its keys being pressed by
> > > putting characters up on the screen (as well as doing much other stuff).
> > > Explain how "reaction to the sensed" is evidence of consciousness.
> > >
> > There is reaction in your attempted counterexample, but not
> > sensation; it is the same blind and qualeless physical reaction
> > present when one billiard ball strikes another, just hooked on a
> > longer causal chain. Thus, my example stands.
>
> No. You claimed that "reaction to the senses" is evidence of
> consciousness. And now you say the PC reacting to key presses doesn't
> count because it's not conscious. You are assuming what you set out
> to prove.
>
No, YOU are assuming what you set out to prove - that keyboards
sense, simply because you press them and text appears on the
screen. Does that mean that when you shoot a billiard ball and it
strikes another, that they sense each other? You have no
evidence of this, or of 'keyboard sensation', either.
>
> > > My position: There is, and can be, no objective evidence for (or against)
> > > consciousness, in individuals or in the universe, because it is entirely
> > > subjective, a "matter of opinion" as opposed to one of fact, which is why
> > > it is entirely legitimate to suggest that it be considered a universal
> > > attribute, instead of inexplicably being located in some systems that
> > > exceed some arbitrary degree of complexity.
> > >
> > Actually, the degree of complexity is not arbitrary; it is that which
> > is established by Godelian self-reference generally,
>
> Self-reference is required only for self-consciousness, not for
> consciousness.
>
Actually, EXPLICIT self-reference is required for self-
consciousness; any time an organism reacts to its environment in
a discriminating fashion, the perceived environment changes, and
the reaction modifies again, which once again changes the
environment, and so on, a feedback loop of mutual co-reference is
established. It's just that this feedback loop may cycle inside the
brain, with no immediate connection to the environment, when one
engages in self-conscious ruminations. Such a complex loop,
either internal or external, is not possible between two rocks in
deep space; it is possible between living organisms and their
environing ecosystem.
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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>
>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
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For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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