Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id RAA07467 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sat, 5 Aug 2000 17:11:09 +0100 Message-Id: <4.3.2.7.2.20000805095842.00cf46a0@pop3.htcomp.net> X-Sender: mmills@pop3.htcomp.net X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2 Date: Sat, 05 Aug 2000 11:19:16 -0500 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk From: "Mark M. Mills" <mmills@htcomp.net> Subject: RE: Hymenoepimecis In-Reply-To: <4.3.2.7.2.20000804005033.00ceb370@pop3.htcomp.net> References: <A4400389479FD3118C9400508B0FF230040E95@DELTA> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
John,
At 01:45 PM 8/2/00 +1000, you wrote:
>>What 'cultured' behavior is not the same perturbation?
>>
>>It seems the wasp toxin is simply a crude way to perturb the neural
>>system
>>compared to the efficiency of language.
>There is no sharp qualitative boundary between cultural and biological
>evolution IMO.
Ok. I'm uncomfortable with this, though. I'm not sure I want to agree
that culture evolves. Just agreeing on what the word means is hard enough,
assuming it evolves invokes a host of additional difficulties. I won't
dwell on this, though.
In my model, both meme and gene are biological inheritance factors. They
are distinguished by substrate. The gene is DNA based. The meme is based
on some binary aspect neural tissue. There is a qualitative difference
between DNA based gene and neural based meme.
>It is surely the case that language is effective through
>the action of neurochemicals in the nervous system and brain.
Agreed.
>The issue
>is whether or not these biomolecules evolve themselves through the
>mechanisms of acquiring cultural characters. Since the facility for
>culture is evolved biologically (I believe), then the propensity for
>neural perturbations is biological. The appropriate level of analysis is
>"genetic" (sensu population genetics), not memetic.
We have been bouncing terms off each other for years, so you know how many
times I've flip-flopped on the meaning of the term 'gene.' Despite this
lack of conviction, I'll argue for a strict linkage between DNA and 'gene'.
Over the last 50 years, the term gene has converged upon a DNA based
definition. As patent law continues to refine a DMA based legal definition
for genetic terms, this DNA foundation will only become more
concrete. Why fight that trend?
If a 'gene' denotes a very high statistical relationship between DNA
sequences and some chemical process, then neural circuit-switch states can
hardly be called 'genes.' While one can find high correlations between
all molecular building blocks of the neural circuit switch (however we
ultimately determine it is constructed), the state (pass data or stop data)
cannot be correlated to DNA. The DNA based building blocks must leave the
switch undetermined, or it won't be a switch.
Configurations of neural switch states are self-configuring, using a
variety of internal (neuron to neuron) and external stimuli to establish
which state to exhibit at any given moment. Consider the variety of
'environment configured' instincts. Fish and birds with homing instincts
'learn' their home location. Imprinting is very instinctive, but fully
conditioned upon early experiences. This process of self-configuration
starts as soon as embryonic neural cells emerge.
Edelman calls the process of self-organization 'neuronal group
selection.' This self-configuration starts as soon as embryonic nerve
cells start interacting (neuronal group selection). 'Cultural' stimulation
simply extends the refinements in self-configuration. Most of us here
have probably engaged in some sort of self-education. That motivation for
self-education had neural sources, representing ongoing neural
self-configuration activities. As best I can tell, the human neural system
only stops self-organizing when the chemical system fails.
The source of environmental neural stimulation producing responses subject
to neuronal group selection is initially internal to the embryo. Most
neural interaction is cell to cell, but even from the start external
stimuli effect state determination. Lateral asymmetries are some of the
earliest developmental features clearly outside of DNA control. Lateral
asymmetry is undoubtedly triggered by chance or external stimuli. For
example, the 'handedness' of chicken is established by the eye facing out
towards light entering through the egg shell. Cultural influences on
neural self-organization represent a refinement, a recursive feedback loop,
not a fundamental change in self-configuration.
If genetics is the biology of chemical self-organization via DNA, it seems
reasonable to call memetics the biology of electro-chemical
self-organization via memory. Perhaps the process of self-organization
dominated by human stimuli should be called 'memetics' and
self-organization due non-human stimuli something else. I can't see any
experimental criteria suitable for distinguishing the two clearly
(especially at neural levels), so they are both memetics to me.
It seems a bit circular to limit a science of cultural evolution to stimuli
with a cultural source. How can one examine 'emerging culture' when there
is no 'cultural stimuli' involved? A biology of neural memory could
illuminate the emergence recursive environmental stimuli (culture) from a
basic foundation of non-recursive environmental stimuli, though.
>In the spider/wasp case, if the wasp's ability to control the spider's
>neural system is itself not a case of biological evolution, but the
>result of learning or imitation, then I would say it is wasp-memetics
>(and spider biological selection). But if the wasp capacity to control
>the spider is evolved by selection on genes, then memetic analyses are
>otiose - we already have perfectly servicable theoretical models.
I wasn't thinking of wasp memetics when presenting the hymenopimecis
example. The spider's neural system is being perturbed. Understanding
the perturbation might tell us something about spider memory biology, thus
memetics. If spider memory systems have any features similar to human
memory, then it also contributes to our understanding of how humans
configures memory. It is possible that the spider memory mechanisms will
even illuminate aspects of human cultural memory.
As to being otiose, I've outlined why genetics seem inappropriate.
I like Edelman's terms 'neuronal group selection' and 'topobiology,' but
both seem overly specific for the range of topics we discuss
here. Neuronal group selection is particularly useful for understanding
cultural as a refinement of largely internal self-organization processes,
but it leaves the mechanics of memory initiation, replication, maintenance
and removal unaddressed.
Mark
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